Kenneth Cesta

Third Circuit Reverses Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration, Holds Arbitration Clause in Consumer Financing Agreement Is Enforceable

April 17, 2024 by Kenneth Cesta

In Mancuso v. MDG USA Inc., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered defendant MDG’s appeal of an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging violations of state and federal fair credit laws. The plaintiff purchased a laptop computer from MDG and signed a financing agreement requiring monthly payments on his account. A dispute arose regarding the remaining balance on the account, and after the plaintiff directed his bank to stop payment on the monthly charges to the account, MDG reported the plaintiff to credit agencies.

The plaintiff then filed a state court action in Pennsylvania alleging violations of state and federal fair credit laws. MDG removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause included in the financing agreement, which covered “any past, present, or future claim, dispute, or controversy … relating to or arising out of” the agreement. The plaintiff admitted he signed the financing agreement and his claims arose from the agreement, but argued that the agreement was “unenforceable because of fraud and unconscionability.” The district court denied MDG’s motion to compel without prejudice. The court concluded that it was not apparent from the face of the complaint whether the plaintiff’s claims were subject to arbitration and ordered limited discovery related to that issue.

In reversing the district court’s decision, the Third Circuit first noted that because the plaintiff did not dispute he had a valid contract with MDG, the court’s review was limited to “whether the arbitration clause itself — not the rest of the contract — is enforceable.” The court then rejected the arguments raised by the plaintiff in challenging the enforceability of the arbitration clause. The court concluded that the arbitration clause was not “hidden and minimized” and further noted that the plaintiff did not contend he was unaware of the clause when he signed the financing agreement. Further, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the arbitration clause was confusing because of a numbering error, noting that the error was in the arbitration clause itself, which means that for the plaintiff to have even noticed the error, he would have to have read the arbitration clause. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the financing agreement was unconscionable because he could not alter its terms, noting that the arbitration provision was not procedurally unconscionable because it allowed the plaintiff to send MDG an “arbitration opt out notice.” The court then held that the plaintiff did not raise “a colorable legal issue of fraud, unconscionability, or unenforceability of the arbitration clause” and his claims were subject to the arbitration provision. The court reversed the district court’s denial of MDG’s motion to compel arbitration and directed the court to enter an order compelling arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims.

Mancuso v. MDG USA, Inc., No. 23-1963 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2024).

Ninth Circuit Compels Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual Labor Claims Under PAGA, Remands Non-Individual Claims

March 27, 2024 by Kenneth Cesta

In Johnson v. Lowe’s Home Centers LLC, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court order granting defendant Lowe’s motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff Maria Johnson’s individual claims brought under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) and remanded the district court’s dismissal of her non-individual claims for further consideration.

In connection with her employment with Lowe’s Home Centers, Johnson signed a contract that included a mandatory arbitration agreement in which she agreed that any controversy arising from her employment would be settled by arbitration. The contract also included a provision known as a “representative action waiver,” which barred the arbitration of disputes brought as a representative action or an action brought as a private attorney general action under PAGA. As the court explained, an “individual” PAGA claim asserts violations of California labor laws that impact the claimant personally, while a “representative” or “non-individual” PAGA claim is based on violations that impact other employees.

In November 2020, Johnson filed an action in California state court alleging individual and non-individual PAGA claims. Lowe’s removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration of Johnson’s individual claim and to dismiss her non-individual PAGA claim. The district court granted Lowe’s motion in its entirety. The Ninth Circuit noted the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s non-individual PAGA claims was consistent with California law as then interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2022 in Viking River Cruises Inc. v. Moriana, which interpreted a prior California Supreme Court decision as holding that pre-dispute waivers of both individual and non-individual PAGA claims were forbidden under California law and that “PAGA requires joinder of individual and non-individual claims, such that both claims must be tried in the same forum.” While Johnson’s appeal of the district court’s order granting Lowe’s motion was pending, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in 2023 in Adolph v. Uber Technologies Inc. The Ninth Circuit noted that in Adolph, the California Supreme Court “corrected Viking River’s misunderstanding of PAGA,” holding that “[o]nly if there has been a final determination that the plaintiff’s arbitrated individual PAGA claim is without merit does the plaintiff lose statutory standing under PAGA to pursue his or her non-individual PAGA claims in court.”

With that backdrop, the Ninth Circuit then addressed whether the district court’s order compelling Johnson to arbitrate her individual PAGA claims was proper, and the impact of the Adolph decision on Johnson’s non-individual PAGA claims. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement between the parties, which included a severability clause, was valid and encompassed the claims at issue in the case. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting Lowe’s motion to compel Johnson to arbitrate her individual PAGA claims. In addressing the dismissal of the non-individual claims, the court vacated the order and remanded the non-individual claims to the district court to apply the California Supreme Court’s recent holding in Adolph, noting that Adolph held that “a plaintiff in a bifurcated representative PAGA claim still has statutory standing” … and that “[s]tanding under PAGA is not affected by enforcement of an agreement to adjudicate a plaintiff’s individual claim in another forum.”

Johnson v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, No. 22-16486 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2024).

Eleventh Circuit Dismisses Appeal From Order Compelling Arbitration and Staying Case for Lack of Jurisdiction

February 14, 2024 by Kenneth Cesta

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed, sua sponte, a district court order that granted defendant Trina Solar (U.S.) Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the underlying case. The court did not address the facts of the case in its per curiam opinion, other than to note the dismissal and closure of the case would not impact the merits of the litigants’ claims. Without discussion, the court based its dismissal on 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1)–(3), and the precedent cited in its opinion confirming “[a]n appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order that compels arbitration and stays, rather than dismisses, the action.” The court noted the district court order that the plaintiff sought to appeal “stayed, rather than dismissed, the case and expressly contemplated further proceedings.” The court dismissed the appeal, concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the underlying order compelling arbitration and staying the case.

Allco Finance Limited Inc. v. Trina Solar (U.S.) Inc., No. 23-13968 (11th Cir. Jan. 11, 2024).

Ninth Circuit Reverses Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration, Concluding “Delegation Provision” Is Enforceable

January 25, 2024 by Kenneth Cesta

Noting the court was deciding, as a matter of first impression, “what a party must do to specifically challenge a delegation provision and what a court may consider when evaluating this challenge,” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bielski v. Coinbase Inc., reversed a district court order that denied defendant Coinbase’s motion to compel arbitration.

Coinbase is an online cryptocurrency exchange. Plaintiff Abraham Bielski maintained an account, or “digital wallet,” with Coinbase that allowed him to store and transfer cryptocurrency in and out of his account. Before opening his account, Bielski was required to accept Coinbase’s user agreement, which included a three-step process to resolve any disputes: (i) an “informal complaint process,” which involved contacting Coinbase and attempting to resolve the dispute amicably; (ii) a “formal complaint process” involving a written complaint; and (iii) arbitration of the dispute pursuant to an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement included a “delegation provision” providing that disputes arising out of the agreement including the “enforceability, revocability, scope, or validity” of the agreement were delegated to the arbitrator.

Shortly after opening his account, a dispute arose involving an unauthorized transfer from Bielski’s digital wallet. Bielski “live chatted” with company representatives, called the company hotline, and wrote two letters requesting help to recover his funds. He then filed a lawsuit under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E alleging Coinbase failed to investigate the unauthorized transfer of funds from his account. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration of the claims under the user agreement. The district court denied the motion to compel concluding the arbitration agreement and the delegation provision were “inseverable” and unconscionable.

On appeal, Bielski argued that the delegation provision and the arbitration agreement were unconscionable and unenforceable. The court first addressed what a party must do to challenge a delegation provision, and what a court may consider in evaluating the challenge. Coinbase argued on appeal that Bielski did not do enough to challenge the delegation provision. The court rejected this argument, concluding that by specifically objecting to the delegation provision in his opposition to the motion to compel, Bielski sufficiently challenged the provision. The court noted its approach was consistent with decisions in the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, but contrary to the approach in the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, which require a party to provide “more substance in their delegation provision challenge.” The court then addressed what a court may consider in evaluating the challenge, concluding that “a court must be able to interpret that provision in the context of the agreement as a whole, which may require examining the underlying arbitration agreement as well.” Finally, the court rejected Bielski’s argument that the delegation provision was unconscionable, held that the district court erred in refusing to enforce the delegation provision, and reversed the order denying Coinbase’s motion to compel arbitration.

Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 22-15566 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2023).

Third Circuit Affirms Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration After AAA Declines to Administer Arbitration

January 23, 2024 by Kenneth Cesta

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a district court decision denying defendant MicroBilt Corp.’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the plaintiff had fully complied with all provisions of her arbitration agreement with MicroBilt.

In connection with a loan plaintiff Maria Del Rosario Hernandez applied for in 2020, the lender utilized a product offered by MicroBilt, referred to as an “instant bank verification report,” which allowed the lender to verify Hernandez’s identity and financial information. The verification report included information for other persons with the Hernandez name, including a person who was on a government watch list that caused the lender to deny Hernandez’s loan application.

After Hernandez filed a lawsuit alleging MicroBilt violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, MicroBilt filed a motion to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration provision that was part of the loan application process. The arbitration provision included an “exclusive resolution” clause, which required that any disputes or claims be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration. The arbitration provision also stated the arbitration would be conducted by a single arbitrator in accordance with AAA rules, punitive and consequential damages were not recoverable, and each party would be responsible for its own attorneys’ fees. Hernandez dismissed her lawsuit and submitted the claim to the AAA. Treating the matter as a “consumer agreement” under the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, the AAA administrator assigned to the matter notified MicroBilt that the damages limitation included in the arbitration provision conflicted with Principle 14 of the consumer due process protocol of the rules, which requires that an arbitrator “should be empowered to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law or equity.” MicroBilt refused to waive the damages limitation and the AAA declined to administer the arbitration under Rule 1(d). Hernandez then reinstated her claims in the district court and MicroBilt moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion to compel, finding Hernandez had fully complied with the arbitration provision.

In affirming the district court’s denial of the motion to compel, the Third Circuit recognized the arbitration provision covered Hernandez’s claims but noted that under 9 U.S.C. § 4, it “may compel arbitration only where there is a ‘failure, neglect, or refusal … to arbitrate under a written agreement.’” The court found the district court’s denial of MicroBilt’s motion was correct because Hernandez was in full compliance with the relevant arbitration provisions. As a result, the court concluded it lacked authority under section 4 to compel arbitration. The court also rejected MicroBilt’s argument that the AAA administrator’s requirement that MicroBilt waive the damages limitation was an “arbitrability” issue that should have been resolved by the arbitrator. The court found that, under Consumer Rule 14(a), arbitrators have the exclusive power to rule on “the existence, scope, or validity” of an arbitration provision, and the administrator’s decision to dismiss the arbitration did not implicate any of those issues. The court also rejected MicroBilt’s argument that the “exclusive resolution” clause of the arbitration provision conflicts with Hernandez pursuing her claims in court. The court noted that Hernandez has fully complied with the AAA rules, and “[s]everal courts have allowed plaintiffs to return to court after administrative dismissals under Rule 1(d), despite general agreements to arbitrate.” The court affirmed the district court’s decision denying defendant MicroBilt’s motion to compel arbitration.

Hernandez v. MicroBilt Corp., No. 22-3135 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2023).