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You are here: Home / Archives for John Pitblado

John Pitblado

SECOND CIRCUIT FINDS DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DECISION ON ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARD

March 28, 2017 by John Pitblado

The factual and procedural background of this case can be found here. In sum, beginning in the 1990s, the appellants, a group of Brazilian companies (collectively, “CBF”) entered into a series of contracts with Primetrade AG, a Swiss company, for the purchase and sale of pig iron. Primetrade transferred its assets, including the contracts with CBF, to another Swiss company, Steel Base Trade, AG (“SBT”), which “began operating with the same officers and directors as Primetrade AG and at the same offices.” AMCI International Gmb (“AMCI”) later acquired SBT. The following year, CBF entered into additional purchase and sale contracts with SBT that did not purport to bind any assigns or successors-in-interest. The contracts each contained an arbitration clause which provided for arbitration in Paris. In 2008, as commodity prices fell, SBT defaulted on its obligations under the contracts with CBF. CBF then commenced arbitration. During the course of arbitration, CBF alleged that SBT stalled the arbitration while it was fraudulently transferring its assets to Prime Carbon, a shell company formed and operated by the principals of SBT. In 2010, SBT filed for bankruptcy in Switzerland, and in 2011, SBT’s bankruptcy administrator informed the arbitration panel that the company had insufficient funds to participate in the arbitration and conceded CBF’s claims against SBT. The arbitration panel later issued a final award in favor of CBF for the amount of $48 million plus interest and costs. The award further held that CBF “did not introduce sufficient evidence . . . to demonstrate the existence of fraud in the bankruptcy proceedings.” In 2013, CBF commenced an action in New York federal court against various individuals and corporate entities alleged to be the “alter egos” and “successors in interest” of SBT. CBF sought to enforce the award and to assert various state law fraud claims relating to the underlying dispute. The New York district court dismissed the action because: (i) the award had not been first confirmed by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (ii) the fraud claims were barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion because the arbitration panel had denied similar claims. The appellants appealed.

On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on two grounds: (i) the lower court erred by requiring the appellant, an award debtor, to bring a confirmation action prior to enforcement in a secondary jurisdiction; and (ii) the fraud claims were not barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.

First, the Second Circuit held that there was no requirement to confirm an arbitration award at the arbitral seat of the arbitration before enforcing it in a secondary jurisdiction. The Second Circuit explained that the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) eliminated the “double exequatur” requirement, which mandated confirmation at the seat as a precondition to the enforcement of arbitral awards abroad. Under the Convention, the Second Circuit noted that CBF needed only to commence a summary, single-step proceeding to achieve recognition and enforcement of the award in a court in the United States. Thus, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in holding that appellants were required to confirm their foreign arbitral award at the seat of the arbitration before they would be allowed to enforce it.

Next, the Second Circuit noted that the liability of the appellees for satisfaction of the arbitration award would be determined under the applicable law in the New York district court. Thus, as there were further legal and factual inquiries on the question of veil-piercing and alter ego liability, the Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to consider the issues under the applicable law in the New York district court.

Finally, with respect to issue preclusion, the Second Circuit noted that the doctrine is applicable to issues resolved by an earlier arbitration, but that the doctrine’s application is constrained by equity. The Third Circuit then noted that CBF claimed that it was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the fraud claims before the arbitration panel because the appellees deliberately misled the panel as to the extent of their fraud. Thus, the Second Circuit held that the grant of issue preclusion was inappropriate and that CBF should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery on its fraud claims, and that the appellees may be given the opportunity to re-raise the issue preclusion issue after discovery at the district court’s discretion.

CBF Indústria De Gusa S/A, et al. v. AMCI Holdings Inc., et al., No. 15-1133 (2nd Cir. Mar. 2, 2017).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT LOOKS TO ALABAMA’S DOCTRINE OF “INTERTWINING” TO DETERMINE NON-SIGNATORY CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE

March 27, 2017 by John Pitblado

Under Alabama law, “arbitration may be compelled under the doctrine of ‘intertwining’ where arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims are so closely related that the party to a controversy subject to arbitration is equitably estopped to deny the arbitrability of the related claim. But if the language of the arbitration provision is party specific and the description of the parties does not include the nonsignatory, the inquiry is at an end and the claims against the non-signatory cannot be submitted to arbitration.”

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a non-signatory cannot be compelled to arbitrate because the language of the agreements to arbitrate is party specific, does not include the non-signatory, and expressly states that all other disputes are not subject to arbitration.

The Court did, however, stay the action against the non-signatory, overturning the decision of the District Court for abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the stay, as the claims against the non-signatory and signatories “are based on the exact same factual allegations, the vast majority of which relate to the [signatories] only.”

Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, et al. v. Brett Laferrera, et al., No. 16-14519 (11th Cir. Feb. 27 2017)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Jurisdiction Issues, Week's Best Posts

NINTH CIRCUIT CONFIRMS ARBITRATION AWARD CHALLENGED FOR LACK OF “REASONED OPINION”

March 9, 2017 by John Pitblado

Petitioner Daniel Olson brought an action in federal court seeking vacatur of an award against him in arbitration of an employment dispute. He challenged the arbitration award for lack of a “reasoned opinion” and failure of the arbitrator to rule on all of the evidentiary issues and claims submitted. The district court denied the motion to vacate and Olson appealed.

In the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the Court reminded Plaintiff that “Arbitrators have no obligation to give their reasons for an award” and that here, “the arbitration award included two bases for the arbitrator’s determination that [Defendant] was the prevailing party, which provides enough of the arbitrator’s reasoning to facilitate the limited review available under the FAA.”

The Court further rejected Plaintiff’s claims that the arbitrator did not rule on all of the evidentiary issues, stating “arbitrators’ awards are not judicial opinions. The proceedings the arbitrator conducts are generally informal, lacking most of the fixed rules of procedure and evidence.” As to Plaintiff’s contention that the arbitrator failed to rule on all the claims submitted for arbitration, that too was rejected as “the award states that all claims not expressly granted herein are hereby, denied.”

Olson v. Harland Clarke Corp.a>, 14-35586 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2017)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

KENTUCKY FEDERAL COURT ORDERS FURTHER BRIEFING ON WHETHER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OR KENTUCKY LAW APPLIES IN DISPUTE INVOLVING AN INSOLVENT INSURER

March 8, 2017 by John Pitblado

The background of this case is as follows. State Insurance Commissioner Brian Maynard, acting as liquidator of the failed Kentucky Health Cooperative (“KYHC”), filed suit in Kentucky state court against CGI Technologies and Solutions, Inc. (“CGI”), KYHC’s administrator pursuant to an Administrative Services Agreement (the “Agreement”), which contained an arbitration clause. The suit alleged that CGI was “grossly negligent” in processing and paying claims and thus breached the Agreement. The state court action was removed to federal court. CGI commenced a separate federal action to compel arbitration, which was consolidated with the first action. The Liquidator made a motion to remand, challenging the Kentucky federal court’s power to decide the case.

In seeking to remand, the Liquidator claimed that Kentucky’s Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Law (“IRLL”) vests exclusive jurisdiction in Kentucky state court, thus “reverse preempting” federal diversity jurisdiction, and in the alternative, argued that the federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction. The Kentucky federal court first found that the application of the IRLL’s exclusive jurisdiction directly conflicts with federal law, and thus that the IRLL’s jurisdiction provision was preempted by the federal removal and diversity subject matter jurisdiction statutes and the court had the subject matter jurisdiction required to decide the case. Next, the court found that because the case is really a contract action for damages and the court has subject matter jurisdiction, it should exercise the authority granted to it and refuse to exercise the discretion to abstain.

Finally, turning to the merits, the Kentucky federal court noted that the threshold issue was not whether there was a breach of the Agreement or whether the liquidation of KYHC was due to CGI’s actions or inactions, but rather what substantive law applies. CGI argued that the Agreement contains a “Dispute Resolution” clause which provided for all disputes to be resolved by mediation or arbitration, and that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) compels the court to enforce the binding arbitration clause. The Liquidator, on the other hand, argued that the IRLL provides for exclusive jurisdiction in state court, and thus under McCarran Ferguson, “reverse preempts” the FAA. The Liquidator also noted that the Agreement contained a “Governing Law” clause which provides that the Agreement is governed by Kentucky law. The Kentucky federal court denied the Liquidator’s motion to remand, but held that it required further briefing on which law shall apply. Thus, the court ordered the parties to submit briefing on the limited issues of : 1) Whether the IRLL allows enforcement of the Agreement’s “Dispute Resolution” clause; 2) Whether the FAA can apply in light of the parties “Governing Law” clause in the Agreement; and 3) Any other relevant argument which addresses choice of law.

Maynard v. CGI Technologies and Solutions, Inc., 16-cv-0037 (USDC E.D. KY Jan. 3, 2017).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Jurisdiction Issues

NEW JERSEY COURT COMPELS ARBITRATION, DECLINES TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE ARBITRATOR DESPITE “EXORBITANT” ADMINISTRATIVE FEE

March 6, 2017 by John Pitblado

Terra Finance LLC brought an action to compel arbitration. Defendant Acrow Corporation moved to dismiss the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the arbitration clause was unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable. Defendant attached two other arbitration agreements as evidence that the subject provision was unconscionable. As a result, the Court converted the motion to a motion for summary judgment.

To support unconscionability, Acrow argued: “(1) the clauses constitute contracts of adhesion; (2) at the time that each arbitration clause was executed, [Plaintiff] did not seek assistance of legal counsel; and (3) during negotiations over the… agreement, [Defendant’s] representative stated that arbitration before the ICC would be cheaper than litigation in U.S. courts.”

The Court rejected Acrow’s arguments, and compelled arbitration as Acrow “failed to come forward with evidence from which the Court might conclude that the arbitration clauses are procedurally or substantively unreasonable.”

The Court further declined Acrow’s request for the Court to appoint a substitute arbitrator in ICC’s place, on the grounds that ICC is “unavailable” due to the “exorbitant administrative fee.” Pursuant to Section 5 of the FAA, “exorbitant” administrative fee does not amount to a “lapse in the naming of an arbitrator” which would allow the Court to appoint a substitute.

Terra Finance, LLC, et al. v. Acrow Corp. of Am.a>, 16-0075 (USDC D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2017)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

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