Carlton Fields

Late last year, a district court judge in Connecticut granted Defendant General Electric’s (“GE”) motion to compel arbitration based on Plaintiff’s signature to GE’s Acknowledgement Conditions of Employment Form. Ms. Pingel, plaintiff, was hired by GE in 2006. Four years later she brought a discrimination action against GE, which was later resolved. As part of that resolution, Ms. Pingel received a new position within GE. That employment was contingent on Ms. Pingel signing an employment contract containing agreed upon procedures for alternative dispute resolution. GE did not provide a hard copy of these procedures to Ms. Pingel, but did provide the location of these forms online. Both parties signed the agreement. Two and a half years later, Ms. Pingel was fired. She subsequently sued for discrimination, and GE moved to compel arbitration.

Ms. Pingel opposed the motion to compel arbitration alleging (1) the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable and (2) the parties did not have a meeting of the minds when the contract was signed. The court did not find these arguments dispositive. First, to find an agreement to arbitrate unconscionable, the provision need be oppressive or particularly one sided. The court found that as “the delegation provision equally binds both parties [this] weighs heavily against such a conclusion.” The court further noted that general challenges to a contract, here unconscionability of the arbitration agreement, does not necessarily preclude the enforcement of said agreement. That issue is for the arbitrator to decide. Ms. Pingel did not allege any specific unconscionable provisions within the arbitration agreement; therefore the general allegations are better decided by an arbitrator. Finally, as Ms. Pingel signed the acknowledgment form, the court found this compelling evidence to show a meeting of the minds. The court noted that ignorance from failing to read a contract is not a winning argument.

The District court therefore granted GE’s motion to compel arbitration on all of Ms. Pingel’s claims. Pingle v. General Electric Company, Case No. 3:14– 00632 (CSH) (USDC D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2014).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

A Florida court of appeals affirmed a trial court decision to deny arbitration finding a later signed contract supplanted an earlier contract with an arbitration provision. The Appellant, HHH Motors, LLP, signed a retail purchase agreement with Appellees, Jenny and Kristopher Holt, to purchase a Dodge Ram truck. The contract contained an arbitration provision. To finance the truck purchase, both parties then executed a retail installment sales contract (“RISC”) which failed to include a similar provision. The contract did include a merger clause however, which signified that the RISC was to be a complete and final agreement between HHH Motors and the Holts.

The Holt’s then filed a class action lawsuit alleging HHH Motors violated Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act relating to certain customer charges. The trial court denied HHH Motors motion to compel arbitration based on the retail purchase agreement, and they subsequently appealed.

HHH Motors argued that their right to arbitration vested when the original agreement was signed. They further argued that as the contracts were signed “contemporaneously,” both contracts should be interpreted together. While the appeals court did acknowledge two documents signed contemporaneously on the same transaction may be interpreted together, this argument was not dispositive. The RISC was “was sufficiently unequivocal to render the [retail purchase agreement] arbitration clause nugatory.” The court further noted that if HHH Motors wanted to include an arbitration clause in the RISC, they easily could have done so. HHH Motors v. Holt, No. 1D13-4397, (Fla. 1st DCA, Dec. 3, 2014).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.