Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

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ENHANCEMENTS TO REINSURANCE FOCUS

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We have added some new features to Reinsurance Focus to make it more useful for our readers. While we have been posting information about upcoming educational programs of interest and recent law review articles of interest, this information has not been conveniently displayed on an ongoing basis. We have added two sections to the right sidebar of the front page. Coming Events has the titles, principal sponsor, date and location of educational programs of interest, with links to the URL for the program promotional materials. Recent Law Review Articles has the author, title and publication information for law review articles of interest. You will need a subscription to LEXIS, WESTLAW or some other service to view such articles. We have also added the name of the Carlton Fields attorney writing each post at the end of the post with an e-mail link, in case you wish to ask for additional information. Finally, we have added links to biographical information about our post authors and information about our reinsurance practice in the Welcome box at the top of the right sidebar. We hope that this additional information is helpful to our readers, and encourage comments and suggestions on how to make Reinsurance Focus more useful to you.

Rollie Goss

COURT HOLDS THAT FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT IS NOT A SOURCE OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently dismissed an appeal of an Order which addressed venue and transfer issues in a matter filed seeking to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court held that since the FAA can not itself be a basis for federal question jurisdiction, and there were insufficient jurisdictional allegations to establish diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts lacked jurisdiction of the matter, and remanded the case with instructions that it be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Other courts have also held that the FAA does not itself confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Oteeva, LP v. X-Concepts LLC, No. 06-11181 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2007).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

COURT DENIES INSOLVENT INSURER’S MOTION TO DISMISS; ACTION TO BAR ARBITRATION WILL PROCEED

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Plaintiff, Midwest Employers Casualty Company (“MECC”) filed an action to bar Legion Insurance Company (“Legion”) from arbitrating forty-three reinsurance contracts, which MECC claimed did not contain arbitration provisions. MECC also sought a declaration of its liability under those contracts. Legion filed a motion to dismiss on four separate grounds. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

First, Legion, which is in liquidation, argued that because the Pennsylvania court had in rem jurisdiction over its assets, the Missouri federal court could not exercise jurisdiction. The court disagreed, finding that while the liquidation action was in rem, the present action was in personam. Second, Legion argued that the case was “reverse preempted” by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The court disagreed on the basis that the ultimate issue in the case was a standard contract dispute, and did not involve the state’s regulation of insurance. Third, Legion argued that the court should abstain from deciding the case under Burford v. Sun Oil Company. In Burford, the Supreme Court held that abstention is appropriate where “exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” The district court concluded that abstention under Burford was not appropriate because this case did not affect complex state administrative processes and would not impair the liquidation process. Finally, Legion argued that full faith and credit and the principle of comity required the court to defer to the liquidation proceedings. The court disagreed, finding that those principles did not prevent its exercise of jurisdiction. Midwest Employers Casualty Co. v. Legion Ins. Co., Case No. 4:07-cv-00870, (USDC E.D. Mo. Nov. 11, 2007).

UK COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMS DECISION REGARDING NORTH KOREAN REINSURANCE CLAIMS

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In a September 6, 2007 post to this blog, we reported on the decision of the UK Commercial Court striking a defense of settlement to reinsurance claims arising out of claims by North Korean insurers. The UK Court of appeals has affirmed that ruling. Korea National Ins. Corp. v. Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG [2007] EWCA Civ. 1066 (Court of Appeals Oct. 30, 2007).

SEVENTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIES CRITICAL DATES FOR PURPOSES OF FAA’S THREE-MONTH LIMITATIONS PERIOD

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The Seventh Circuit has addressed important issues relating to the commencement of efforts to vacate an arbitration award. The relevant facts are found in the district court's Order. An arbitration award was entered against Webster under the rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. section 12, when a party moves to vacate, confirm or modify an arbitration award, notice “must be served upon the opposing party or his attorney within three moths after the award is filed or delivered.” The district court found Webster's attempt to vacate the award was one day late, and hence barred, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The courts held that the award was “filed or delivered” within the meaning of the FAA and the AAA's rules when it was both e-mailed and mailed by the arbitrator to counsel for the parties, regardless of when counsel received the mailed version or opened his e-mail. The court noted that a request to vacate an award is a motion, rather than a new action, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the plain language of section 12 of the FAA speaks in terms of “service” rather than “filing.” Since Webster's counsel filed a Complaint seeking to vacate the award one day prior to the three month deadline, but did not serve the action on his opponent until one day after the three month deadline, the request to vacate the award was untimely under the FAA. The Court rejected Webster’s argument that the FAA’s limitation period was tolled with the filing of the action, stating instead that there was “nothing ambiguous about § 12’s provision that the statute of limitations is tolled when notice of a motion to vacate is ‘served upon the opposing party or his attorney.’” (emphasis added). This is a critical principle for parties seeking to vacate or confirm an award under the FAA. Webster v. A.T. Kearney, Inc. & Electronic Data Systems Corp., No. 06-3094 (7th Cir. Nov. 2, 2007).