Brendan Gooley

Seventh Circuit Concludes That Arbitration Clause That Waives ERISA Remedies Is Invalid

October 11, 2021 by Brendan Gooley

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently concluded that an arbitration clause that prohibited claimants from seeking or receiving any remedy that provided additional retirement benefits or other relief was unenforceable because it prospectively waived ERISA remedies.

James Smith worked for Triad Manufacturing Inc. Triad offered Smith and other employees a defined contribution employee retirement plan. In 2018, after Smith had left Triad, Triad added an arbitration provision with a class action waiver to the plan, which stated:

Each arbitration shall be limited solely to one Claimant’s Covered Claims, and that Claimant may not seek or receive any remedy which has the purpose or effect of providing additional benefits or monetary or other relief to any Eligible Employee, Participant or Beneficiary other than the Claimant.

In 2020, Smith filed a putative ERISA class action alleging that Triad’s board had breached fiduciary duties and engaged in prohibited transactions based on the board’s governance of the retirement plan. The board filed a motion to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to dismiss.

The district court denied the board’s motion. The district court concluded that Smith had not consented to the arbitration clause because his employment with Triad ended in 2016 but the arbitration clause had been added in 2018 and there was no evidence that Smith had even received notice of the amendment. The court also concluded that the arbitration clause was “unenforceable because it prospectively waived Smith’s right to statutory remedies provided by ERISA.”

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. It agreed that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because its language prohibiting claimants from seeking or receiving any remedy that provided additional benefits or other relief was inconsistent with ERISA’s allowance of “such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of [a] fiduciary.” The Seventh Circuit did not address whether Smith had agreed to the arbitration clause, whether he had received notice of the provision, or whether a plan sponsor can unilaterally add an arbitration clause. The Seventh Circuit did, however, conclude that “ERISA claims are generally arbitrable” and noted that the arbitration clause’s class action waiver did not present any problem, as the Seventh Circuit “has blessed that arbitration maneuver many times.”

Smith v. Board of Directors of Triad Manufacturing, Inc., No. 20-2708 (7th Cir. Sept. 10, 2021).

Second Circuit Affirms Denial of Motions to Compel Arbitration in Suit Against Trump Corp. and Trump Family

September 13, 2021 by Brendan Gooley

The Second Circuit recently affirmed the denial of motions to compel arbitration filed by, inter alia, the Trump Corp. and a nonparty from whom the plaintiffs sought discovery.

Several anonymous plaintiffs filed a putative class action against the Trump Corp., former President Donald J. Trump, and members of his family asserting federal and state claims alleging that the defendants had fraudulently induced them to enter into business relationships with nonparty ACN Opportunity LLC. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants publicly represented that they were independent of ACN when they were actually allegedly accepting large payments from ACN. When the plaintiffs entered their business relationships with ACN, they signed arbitration agreements agreeing to arbitrate disputes.

When the plaintiffs filed suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint and then the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. The defendants also filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses in the agreements between the plaintiffs and ACN.

The plaintiffs subsequently served ACN with a subpoena seeking various documents. In response, ACN objected and sought to compel arbitration of the discovery dispute.

The district court denied the motions to compel arbitration by the defendants and ACN, both of whom then appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the motions to compel arbitration.

On appeal, the defendants primarily argued that arbitrability should have been decided by the arbitrator, not the district court, and that they were entitled to compel arbitration under equitable estoppel principles. ACN meanwhile principally argued that the district court had erred when the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain ACN’s motion to compel.

With respect to the defendants, the Second Circuit first concluded that the defendants “did not adequately raise before the district court their argument that, under Contec [Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2005)], the issue of arbitrability was for the arbitrator to determine or, more broadly, that the questions of equitable estoppel and waiver should have been determined by an arbitrator.” The Second Circuit noted that the defendants had asked the district court to resolve those questions and had only included a “casual citation,” “without further explanation or argument” on this issue.

On the merits, the Second Circuit held that the defendants were not entitled to compel arbitration under principles of equitable estoppel. To invoke equitable estoppel, the court explained that “there must be a close relationship among the signatories and non-signatories such that it can reasonably be inferred that the signatories had knowledge of, and consented to, the extension of their agreement to arbitrate to the non-signatories.” That standard was not met here. “There was no corporate relationship between the defendants and ACN of which the plaintiffs had knowledge, the defendants [did] not own or control ACN, and the defendants [were] not named in the [] agreements between ACN and the plaintiffs.” Indeed, the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants had concealed their relationship with ACN and held themselves out as independent.

Turning to ACN’s motion, the court explained that there was “no actual case or controversy between the plaintiffs and ACN . . . and therefore no subject-matter jurisdiction.” The only “controversy” was a discovery dispute, which was insufficient to compel arbitration.

The Second Circuit also rejected ACN’s alternative argument that it was entitled to invoke arbitration under principles of equitable estoppel, explaining that ACN had not properly raised that argument before the district court and that ACN had therefore forfeited it.

Doe v. Trump Corp., Nos. 20-1228 & 20-1278 (2d Cir. July 28, 2021).

Court Refuses to Vacate Award Stemming From Workplace Personal Injury

August 5, 2021 by Brendan Gooley

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently refused to vacate an arbitration award stemming from a workplace personal injury after the arbitrator concluded that the employee was primarily responsible for his own injuries.

Daniel Pacelli was working for Vane Line Bunkering Inc. (known as “Vane Brothers”), as a tankerman on one of Vane Brothers’ barges in New York Harbor when he slipped, fell, and was injured on ice while attempting to salt the deck of the barge. He initiated an arbitration action against Vane Brothers. A JAMS arbitrator heard the case and concluded that Pacelli had sustained $986,750 in damages and that both Pacelli and Vane Brothers were negligent. More specifically, the arbitrator concluded that Pacelli was 70% at fault while Vane Brothers was 30% at fault. The arbitrator therefore reduced Pacelli’s damages accordingly. Pacelli moved to vacate the award.

The district court declined to vacate the award. It rejected Pacelli’s arguments that the arbitrator had (1) manifestly disregarded the law; (2) been partial to Vane Brothers; (3) engaged in “misbehavior” by repeatedly delaying his decision; and (4) improperly failed to award interest.

With respect to manifest disregard, the court concluded that the arbitrator had applied the law regarding contributory negligence to the facts of the case and had supported his decision regarding comparative fault with evidence from the record, including evidence that Pacelli had acted carelessly by attempting to salt a narrow part of the deck at night and in freezing temperatures without seeking assistance. The court noted that the Second Circuit does not recognize manifest disregard of the evidence as a ground for vacating an award and refused to reweigh the evidence.

The court also rejected Pacelli’s argument that the arbitrator had been partial to Vane Brothers. After the arbitration hearing but months before the arbitrator issued his decision, the arbitrator disclosed that he had a small ownership interest in JAMS and JAMS disclosed that it had a small number of other arbitrations with Vane Brothers, its counsel, and/or its counsel’s law firm. The court noted that Pacelli had waived this argument by not raising it before the arbitrator. The court nevertheless also explained that the facts did not show improper partiality and rejected Pacelli’s argument that the arbitrator’s small ownership interest was material in any event.

Turning to Pacelli’s next argument — that the arbitrator’s delays warranted vacatur — the court noted that Pacelli had not pointed to any “authority to support his position that the arbitrator’s extension requests amounted to ‘misbehavior’ by the arbitrator such that Pacelli’s rights were prejudiced.” That was especially true because Pacelli had consented to the extensions.

Finally, the court rejected Pacelli’s contention that it should vacate the award because the arbitrator had not awarded prejudgment interest. Although the court acknowledged that it would have been proper for the arbitrator to award prejudgment interest, the court noted that Pacelli had failed “to point the Court to any case in which a district court vacated an arbitration award for failure to award prejudgment interest” and noted that courts had declined to do any such thing.

The court then went on to confirm the arbitration award.

Pacelli v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-09431 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021).

Eleventh Circuit Declines to Compel Arbitration in Suit Against Rental Car Company Under Arbitration Clause in Orbitz’s Terms of Service

August 4, 2021 by Brendan Gooley

The Eleventh Circuit recently declined a rental car company’s attempt to invoke an arbitration clause in Orbitz.com’s terms of use in a lawsuit brought by a disgruntled customer who booked his rental car through Orbitz despite the seemingly broad language of the clause.

Ancizar Marin used Orbitz.com to book a rental car from Sixt Rent A Car. When Marin booked his rental car, he agreed to Orbitz’s terms of use, which included an arbitration clause requiring Marin to arbitrate “[a]ny and all claims.” Orbitz’s terms defined “claims” as:

[A]ny disputes or claims relating in any way to [1] the Services, [2] any dealings with our customer service agents, [3] any services or products provided, [4] any representations made by us, or [5] our Privacy Policy.

Marin subsequently picked up his car from Sixt and returned it. A few weeks later, however, he received an email from Sixt claiming that he had damaged the car and seeking $700 related to that damage. Marin sued Sixt in a putative class action. He did not sue Orbitz.

Sixt moved to compel arbitration under the arbitration clause in Orbitz’s terms. The district court denied Sixt’s motion and Sixt appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed.

The Eleventh Circuit explained that whether Marin’s claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in Orbitz’s terms required the court to determine whether Marin’s suit was a “claim” within the meaning of Orbitz’s arbitration clause. That in turn required the court to determine whether Marin’s suit was a “dispute[] or claim[] relating in any way to … any services or products provided.” Although the court concluded that the answer to that question was not entirely clear, the court determined that Marin’s suit was not within the scope of Orbitz’s arbitration clause because the phrase in question related to Orbitz’s services or products, not the services or products of third parties that partnered with Orbitz. The court noted that the surrounding clauses all related “to services or products provided by Orbitz.” It also explained that Orbitz’s terms required customers asserting “claim[s]” to give written notice to Orbitz and that it would be strange to require customers to inform Orbitz about grievances they had with third parties. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that Orbitz’s terms recognized that customers would have agreements with the third-party vendors whose services they booked on Orbitz’s website. That further suggested that the phrase “services or products provided” in Orbitz’s terms referred to Orbitz’s services or products. The court also explained that “common sense” suggested that Orbitz was referring to its services and products, not third-party services or products.

The court next rejected Sixt’s argument that the Moses H. Cone canon that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration” applied. The court explained that the canon applied “only if Marin’s lawsuit against Sixt was an immediate, foreseeable result of the performance of [Marin] accepting Orbitz’s Terms” because the canon only applied if “the FAA governs the arbitration agreement at issue.” But Marin’s lawsuit was not an immediate, foreseeable result of accepting Orbitz’s terms; his dispute was with Sixt. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Sixt’s argument that Florida law incorporated the canon.

The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Sixt’s motion.

Calderon v. Sixt Rent A Car, LLC, No. 20-10989 (11th Cir. July 14, 2021).

Court Confirms Arbitration Decision Concluding That Discrimination Claims Were Time-Barred

June 18, 2021 by Brendan Gooley

A federal district court recently confirmed an arbitration decision concluding that a disgruntled former employee’s discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII were time-barred because the former employee did not initiate arbitration in a timely fashion.

Clare Anagonye, a financial adviser, filed a charge with the EEOC claiming she was constructively discharged and discriminated and retaliated against on the basis of her race, color, and gender in violation of Title VII. The EEOC dismissed the charge on January 19, 2018, and advised Anagonye of the 90-day limitation period for filing a civil action at that time.

Anagonye filed a civil action within the 90-day time period, but her employment contract with her former employer contained an arbitration clause. The district court concluded that the clause was valid and enforceable and stayed Anagonye’s action pending arbitration. Anagonye subsequently filed a demand for arbitration on or about August 27, 2019.

Anagonye’s former employer argued that the arbitration clause in the employment contract required Anagonye to initiate arbitration, not a lawsuit, within 90 days of the EEOC’s dismissal.

An arbitrator panel of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) agreed and concluded that Anagonye’s demand for arbitration was time-barred and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction over her claim. Anagonye’s former employer moved to confirm the award and Anagonye, proceeding pro se, moved to vacate it.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan confirmed the award. A magistrate judge concluded that Anagonye had “failed to establish any of the statutory grounds for setting aside the arbitration decision.” The judge noted that it had already rejected Anagonye’s primary claim that court, not arbitration, was the appropriate venue for her claims when it ordered a stay pending arbitration and that Anagonye had waived any challenge to that decision by failing to object to it. The judge also rejected Anagonye’s “conclusory statements and speculation” regarding alleged “corruption” by the AAA panel, noting that the record established that Anagonye had the opportunity to select arbiters despite her allegations to the contrary. Finally, the judge held that he was precluded from adjudicating the panel’s decision that Anagonye’s claim was time-barred because “the FAA does not provide for judicial review of an arbitrator’s legal conclusions.”

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation.

Anagonye v. Mass Mutual Insurance Co., No. 2:18-cv-11170 (E.D. Mich. May 21, 2021).