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Benjamin Stearns

Eleventh Circuit Finds Removal Jurisdiction Is Included Within Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards

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In 2001, Del Monte International GmbH and Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. entered into an agreement for the production, packaging, and sale of MD-2 pineapples, a variety of pineapple that Del Monte had developed and which subsequently became the most popular pineapple in the world. The contract included an agreement to arbitrate as well as an agreement that, upon termination of the contract, INPROTSA would either destroy or return its stock of pineapples to Del Monte. However, when the agreement expired in 2013, INPROTSA sold the MD-2 pineapples to third parties rather than destroy or return them to Del Monte.

Del Monte initiated arbitration and was ultimately awarded approximately $26 million and an injunction against INPROTSA’s continued sale of the MD-2 pineapple. INPROTSA filed a petition to vacate the award in Florida state court. Del Monte removed the case to federal court and filed a combined motion to dismiss the petition to vacate and cross-petition to confirm the award. After some “procedural detours,” the district court granted Del Monte’s cross-petition to confirm the award.

INPROTSA appealed, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, among other issues. INPROTSA argued that there are only two causes of action that may be brought under 9 U.S.C. § 203, the jurisdictional provision of the statute implementing the Convention: (1) an action to compel arbitration; and (2) an action to confirm an arbitral award. According to INPROTSA, because a petition to vacate an arbitral award is not one of the recognized causes of action, the federal court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.

INPROTSA conceded that the district court had removal jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 205, but argued that the scope of the court’s removal jurisdiction was not coterminous with that of its subject-matter jurisdiction. Effectively, INPROTSA argued that federal courts should be required to remand any case removed to federal court under § 205 that did not also have a federal jurisdictional basis under § 203.

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed on all counts. First, the court held that the Convention does not provide an “exhaustive list of actions and proceedings falling under the Convention” such that the court must inquire whether the action is one of the two types recited above. Rather, the relevant inquiry for the court is whether the action or proceeding “falls under the convention.” The court stated that an action or proceeding falls under the Convention for purposes of § 203 when the action “sufficiently relate[s] to an agreement or award subject to the Convention, such that the agreement or award could conceivably affect the outcome of the case.”

Second, although the court agreed with INPROTSA that removal jurisdiction was not necessarily coterminous with subject-matter jurisdiction, the court nevertheless determined that Congress intended to provide a federal forum for resolving issues implicating the Convention. The court reasoned that it would “make little sense for Congress to specifically authorize removal of cases over which the federal courts would lack subject-matter jurisdiction. … It makes far more sense to conclude Congress intended § 203 to be read consistently with § 205 as conferring subject-matter jurisdiction over actions or proceedings sufficiently related to agreements or awards subject to the Convention.”

Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int’l GmbH, 921 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2019).

Court Finds Jurisdiction Over Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award in Dispute Between Liquidator and Foreign Reinsurer

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In the wake of the liquidation of Legion Indemnity Co., the Illinois Director of Insurance, as liquidator of Legion, and Catalina Holdings arbitrated claims originating under reinsurance agreements between Legion and a predecessor of Catalina. After the arbitrators ruled in favor of Catalina, Catalina filed a petition to confirm the award with the Northern District of Illinois. The Director moved to dismiss.

The court found that it had jurisdiction over the petition under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The arbitration agreement arose out of a dispute over reinsurance contracts, which are generally considered “commercial” under 9 U.S.C. § 2, and the contracts arose out of a relationship between a citizen of the United States and a citizen of the United Kingdom. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 202, all arbitral awards fall under the Convention unless they arise out of “a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States.”

The court ruled against the Director’s argument that the Convention is reverse-preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act because the Convention did not “invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by [the] State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.” Finally, the court found that Burford abstention would be inappropriate in this case. The Director argued, pursuant to Burford, that the court should “abstain from the exercise of federal review that would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” There are two “essential elements” to this type of Burford abstention: The state must offer a forum where these claims may be litigated, and that forum must “stand in a special relationship of technical oversight or concentrated review to the evaluation of those claims.” The requisite elements were not present in this case and, as a result, the court refused to abstain.

Catalina Holdings (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Hammer, No. 1:18-cv-05642 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2019).

Discovery Under Section 1782 Denied Based on Finding That Chinese Arbitration Organization Was Not a “Foreign or International Tribunal”

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Section 1782(a) permits a person to seek a court order for the production of documents for use “in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. …” To obtain discovery under the statute, the petitioner must meet three requirements: (1) the person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the district where the application was made; (2) the discovery must be for use in a foreign proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal; and (3) the applicant must be either a foreign tribunal or an interested person.

Here, the court relied on precedent in the Second Circuit holding that when Congress enacted section 1782, “it intended to cover governmental or intergovernmental arbitral tribunals and conventional courts and other state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies,” but did not intend to cover “arbitral bodies established by private parties.” Based on this precedent, the court found that the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) did not qualify as a foreign tribunal under section 1782(a). While the court acknowledged that CIETAC was originally established in 1954 by the Chinese government, the court explained that: (1) CIETAC’s jurisdiction is derived exclusively from the private agreement of the parties to arbitration proceedings; (2) the parties, not the state, are permitted to choose their own arbitrator; (3) the arbitrator’s decision is final and binding upon both parties; and (4) CIETAC itself emphasizes it is “independent of the administrative organs of the Chinese government, and free from any administrative interference in handling cases.” The court also noted that permitting parties to seek discovery through American courts under section 1782(a) would undermine significant advantages of arbitration, specifically, its efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and thereby conflict with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. The court therefore held that CIETAC is not a “foreign or international tribunal” within the meaning of section 1782(a).

In re Application of Hanwei Guo, No. 1:18-mc-00561-JMF (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2019).

English Court Enjoins Washington State Court Action in Favor of Arbitration in London

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In a dispute involving a complex, multilayered excess insurance policy, the Commercial Court of the Queen’s Bench Division enjoined Weyerhaeuser, a Washington company, from suing Catlin Syndicate Limited, a London-based insurer, in Washington based on the parties’ agreement to arbitrate in London.

The “Layer 4 Policy” at the heart of the lawsuit provided that the choice of law and jurisdiction governing disputes under the contract would be “as per Lead Underlying Policy.” Endorsement 7 of the Lead Underlying Policy provided for “any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the policy to be determined in London under the Arbitration Act 1996.” However, Endorsement 8 of the Lead Underlying Policy stated that Washington state law governed the policy, and Endorsement 9 provided that Catlin would “submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent jurisdiction within the United States.” Significantly, however, Catlin’s submission to jurisdiction in the United States was “solely for the purpose of effectuating arbitration.” Therefore, the court held the result was dictated by Endorsement 7, which required the parties to arbitrate disputes in London.

The court gave great weight to the “commercial parties” involved in the dispute, finding that a conflict in drafting “could or should [not] lightly be attributed to commercial parties,” and “struggl[ing]” to see why “commercial parties” would provide for the “unusual” limits on arbitration advanced by Weyerhaeuser.

The court’s ruling was based on English law, but the court found the result would be the same under Washington law, as presented to the court via expert evidence. Although the court recognized that Washington’s adopted policy is “adverse to arbitration,” the court stated that an interpretation of the parties’ contract that “does not work commercially … weigh[s] strongly against” a finding that Washington state policy should alter the parties’ agreement.

Catlin Syndicate Limited v. Weyerhauser Company, No. CL-2018-000292, [2018] EWHC 3609 (Comm) (Dec. 21, 2018).

Applied Underwriters Defeats Class Certification in Long-Running Worker’s Compensation Reinsurance Dispute

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Applied Underwriters beat back an attempt by plaintiffs to certify a class in their lawsuit related to Applied Underwriters’ “EquityComp” and “SolutionOne” workers’ compensation programs. We previously reported on this case, which involves a disputed Reinsurance Participation Agreement used to control worker’s compensation rates, on July 21, 2016, December 1, 2016, November 15, 2017, January 31, 2018, and August 30, 2018. The court has now determined that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a class action would be “superior” to individual actions, as required by four factors under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), and denied class certification.

In determining that the first factor of the class members’ interest in individually controlling the litigation, weighed against certification, the court noted that the individual damages alleged by claimants in this action were large and there was no evidence that any class member would be unable to bring an action absent class certification. The second factor of the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by class members, weighed “strongly” against certification, as more than “100 separate arbitrations, lawsuits, and California Department Insurance appeals involving 67 California participants in the program” were already pending. On that basis, the court determined that a substantial number of putative class members had an interest in controlling their own litigation and that “realistic alternatives” to a class action exist.

The third factor of the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum, weighed “slightly” against certification, where the remaining claims were all brought under California law (which weighed in favor of certification), but the many potential claimants were “located throughout the state,” including some that were “far from this court.” Additionally, certifying the class would automatically select federal court as the preferred forum for all class members even though the previously filed actions discussed above had demonstrated otherwise.

Finally, the court determined the “manageability” factor of the likely difficulties in managing a class action, also weighed against certification, where the court would have to determine the extent of overlap between the class action and the many previously filed actions, as well as how to properly formulate a class notice that accounts for the potentially overlapping and differing claims brought in the various actions and the class action. “These difficulties would only be magnified where many similar actions have already concluded and others have progressed substantially.”

Shasta Linen Supply, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-1222-WBS-AC (USDC E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019).