Alex Bein

New York Federal Court Denies Reinsurer’s Motions for New Trial and Judgment as a Matter of Law, Modifies Accrual Date for Prejudgment Interest

May 9, 2022 by Alex Bein

In a matter previously covered in this blog, the Northern District of New York was asked to determine whether Clearwater Insurance Co. (the reinsurer) was entitled to a new trial, a judgment as a matter of law, or an amendment to the judgment rendered in favor of Utica Mutual Insurance Co. (the cedent).

At trial, the jury agreed with Utica’s interpretation of the parties’ reinsurance contract and found that an underlying settlement between Utica and insured Gould’s Pumps was negotiated in good faith. As a result, the jury awarded Utica $10 million in damages under the reinsurance treaty, and a judgment was entered consistent with this verdict.

Among several post-trial motions filed by the parties, Clearwater moved for a new trial or judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence, that there were errors in the jury instructions and verdict form, and that a recent Second Circuit decision nullified the jury’s verdict as a matter of law. Clearwater also moved to amend the judgment, arguing that Utica was not entitled to prejudgment interest or, in the alternative, that prejudgment interest should accrue from a later date. The court denied Clearwater’s motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s verdict to be adequately supported and upholding the jury instructions used at trial. The court also denied Clearwater’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law, finding that the cited Second Circuit decision did not nullify the jury’s verdict.

However, the court granted Clearwater’s motion to amend the judgment in part, finding that the court’s calculation of prejudgment interest from the date Utica submitted its first unpaid reinsurance billing would result in a windfall for Utica. The court determined that the reasonable accrual date for prejudgment interest was the midpoint of the unpaid reinsured billings and modified its judgment accordingly.

Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Clearwater Insurance Co., No. 6:13-cv-01178 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022).

Second Circuit Dismisses Appeal of Order Compelling Arbitration in Labor Dispute, Extends Prior Holding in Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House Inc.

February 24, 2022 by Alex Bein

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently dismissed a plaintiff’s appeal of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration on the grounds that the order was a non-appealable interlocutory order under 9 U.S.C. § 16(b). In dismissing the appeal, the court also extended the reach of its earlier decision in Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015), with respect to voluntary dismissals in disputes governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The relevant facts of Samake v. Thunder Lube Inc. are procedural in nature. In Samake, plaintiff Sekouba Samake filed suit in federal court against his former employer alleging violations of the FLSA and other laws. The employer moved to compel arbitration, and Samake promptly filed a notice of unilateral voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The district court entered an order retaining jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Cheeks, in which the Second Circuit held that any FLSA settlement must be reviewed by the district court before the parties may dismiss a case by joint stipulation pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Samake then filed a letter with the trial court indicating that the parties had not settled, and sought to withdraw his notice of voluntary dismissal. The court entered an order effecting Samake’s withdrawal of his notice of voluntary dismissal. Thereafter, the parties briefed the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, and the court ultimately granted the motion. Samake timely filed an appeal of the order compelling arbitration.

On appeal, Samake argued primarily that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to continue the proceedings — and enter an order compelling arbitration — because its jurisdiction was automatically revoked as a result of Samake’s notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). By implication, Samake took the position that the Second Circuit’s holding in Cheeks should be restricted to its facts, such that a trial court retains jurisdiction to review FLSA settlements after the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (as the Cheeks court held), but loses jurisdiction if the plaintiff files a unilateral notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

In rejecting Samake’s argument, the Second Circuit held that Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) both provide that voluntary dismissal is automatic “subject to any applicable federal statute,” including the FLSA:

We hold that the same result is warranted when the dismissal is effected unilaterally under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) as when dismissal is effected by stipulation of all parties under (A)(ii). As a matter of grammar and structure, the exception to automatic dismissal for “any applicable federal statute” in subsection (A) applies equally to both subsections (A)(i) and (A)(ii); and Cheeks held that the FLSA is such an “applicable federal statute.” The plain text (set out in the margin) thus extends Cheeks to all dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1)(A).

Thus, the court concluded that the trial court below properly retained jurisdiction over the action under Cheeks, notwithstanding Samake’s prior voluntary dismissal. Based on this, the court further concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to both effectuate Samake’s withdrawal of his voluntary dismissal and to consider the employer’s motion to compel arbitration. As the resulting order compelling arbitration was itself non-appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16(b), the court dismissed Samake’s appeal of that order for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Samake v. Thunder Lube, Inc., No. 21-102 (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 2022).

SDNY Confirms Arbitration Award in Employment Dispute, Finds Arbitrator Did Not Manifestly Disregard Law

February 1, 2022 by Alex Bein

A federal court in the Southern District of New York recently confirmed an arbitration award in an employment dispute between Gould Paper Corp. and its former employee David Berkowitz. On July 19, 2019, Berkowitz initiated arbitration proceedings against Gould under JAMS rules. Berkowitz generally alleged age discrimination, and Gould asserted counterclaims for conversion and unjust enrichment. The arbitrator issued a final award dated February 18, 2021, and an amended award dated March 17, 2021, finding for Berkowitz on his age discrimination claim and for Gould on its unjust enrichment counterclaim. In the award, the arbitrator ordered Gould to pay a net amount to Berkowitz of $45,533.49 and rejected all other relief sought by the parties, including fees, costs, liquidated damages, and emotional distress damages.

On August 4, 2021, Berkowitz filed a petition in federal court seeking to confirm the award of compensatory damages and to vacate and/or modify the award so as to grant an additional award of attorneys’ fees and costs, liquidated damages, and emotional distress damages. As a threshold issue, the court considered whether Berkowitz’s petition to modify the award was timely filed. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the statutory period during which a motion to vacate or modify may be filed is three months after the arbitration award is “filed or delivered.” According to the court, neither party disputed whether the three-month limitation applied, but they disagreed over when the period began to run — namely, when the award was first transmitted to the parties by email, or when Berkowitz was first “served” with the award by mail in compliance with established JAMS procedures. However, noting that the question of when an award is considered “filed or delivered” has not been definitively settled in the Second Circuit, the court declined to rule on the issue.

Next, the court considered Berkowitz’s entitlement to a modification of the award so as to grant attorneys’ fees and costs, liquidated damages, and emotional distress damages pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 11(c), which allows a court to modify or correct an award “[w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.” Noting that this provision of the FAA has been interpreted narrowly to permit modification “to reflect the clear intent of the arbitrator,” the court concluded that the arbitrator had in fact indicated a clear intent not to award such damages, and rejected Berkowitz’s argument accordingly.

The court then considered whether the arbitrator’s refusal to award attorneys’ fees and costs, liquidated damages, and emotional distress damages constituted “manifest disregard of the law” warranting vacatur in part. Noting that a movant seeking vacatur based on “manifest disregard” bears a heavy burden in establishing that (1) the arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case, the court concluded that Berkowitz was unable to meet this standard. Specifically, the court found that Berkowitz had failed to adequately cite controlling law or statutory provisions supporting his entitlement to the requested fees, costs, and damages in the underlying arbitration and thus could not meet the first prong of the “manifest disregard” standard.

Finally, the court considered whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority in refusing to award attorneys’ fees and costs, liquidated damages, and emotional distress damages to Berkowitz. Noting that Berkowitz’s “real objection” was that the arbitrator committed a legal error in denying the damages sought, the court concluded that Berkowitz’s claim that the arbitrator exceeded his authority was without merit. Based on the above, the court denied Berkowitz’s petition and granted Gould’s motion to confirm.

Berkowitz v. Gould Paper Corp., No. 1:21-cv-06582 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2022).