Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Seventh Circuit Refuses to Vacate Arbitration Award Under Public Policy Exception

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently refused to invalidate an arbitration award in a breach of contract case involving patent royalties based on purported violations of public policy.

Dr. John Insall patented various knee replacement devices and licensed them to medical device company Zimmer Biomet Holdings Inc. Zimmer paid Dr. Insall, and later his estate, royalties in return. Dr. Insall’s last patent expired in 2018, and Zimmer informed his estate it would be ceasing royalty payments because it believed further payments ran “counter to the policy and purpose of patent laws.” The estate claimed that was improper and the parties arbitrated the matter. An arbitration panel concluded that the payments could continue and thus ruled for the estate. Zimmer moved to vacate the award on public policy grounds. The district court confirmed the award.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It noted that even if Zimmer’s arguments that there is a “well-defined public policy that a party may not be compensated for patent rights after the patent’s expiration,” the arbitration award still needed to be confirmed because “the panel determined that the royalty payments in question were not grounded in any patent rights” but were instead “untied” to Dr. Insall’s “patents, products, or technology.” Put differently, the panel interpreted the contract as providing for payments for “non-patent rights” that were “closely related” to patents. The court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act does not allow it to question whether the arbitrators erred or even clearly erred in interpreting a contract, but to only determine whether it interpreted the contract.

Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. v. Insall, No. 23-1888 (7th Cir. July 12, 2024).

Alabama Federal Court Holds That Tort of Bad Faith Does Not Extend to Reinsurance Contracts

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In Alabama Municipal Insurance Corp. v. Munich Reinsurance America Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama addressed whether, under Alabama law, “reinsurance falls within the limited category of insurance agreements to which the tort of bad faith applies.” The case involved claims brought by plaintiff Alabama Municipal Insurance Corp. (AMIC), a nonprofit joint insurance company owned by several municipalities, against its reinsurer Munich Reinsurance America Inc. AMIC obtained contracts for reinsurance from Munich under which Munich covered and would be responsible for paying a portion of claims received by AMIC that exceeded a base amount noted in the reinsurance contracts. AMIC alleged that Munich wrongfully declined reinsurance coverage for the full amount due under five separate insurance claims submitted to AMIC, and Munich underpaid the claims by approximately $1.9 million.

AMIC filed a lawsuit against Munich alleging breach of the reinsurance contracts for the five claims and for bad faith for refusing to pay on three of the claims. Munich filed a motion to dismiss the three counts of bad faith under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that “Alabama does not recognize the tort of bad faith in the reinsurance context.” The parties agreed the dispute was governed by Alabama state law. In addressing the motion to dismiss, the court observed that the Alabama Supreme Court had not addressed whether a claim for bad faith may be brought in connection with a reinsurance contract. The court then noted that “[w]here no state court has decided the issue a federal court must make an educated guess as to how that state’s supreme court would rule.” Applying this principle after a thorough review of decisions addressing the tort of bad faith, the court concluded that “[g]iven the Alabama Supreme Court’s repeated efforts to limit the application of the tort [of bad faith], as well as its emphasis on the primary purpose of the tort as a means to protect consumers, this court concludes that the Alabama Supreme Court would not extend the tort of bad faith to the reinsurance context.” The court then granted Munich’s motion to dismiss the bad faith claims and denied AMIC’s motion to amend its complaint to add additional claims of bad faith.

Alabama Municipal Insurance Corp v. Munich Reinsurance America Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00300 (M.D. Ala. July 22, 2024).

 

Sixth Circuit Confirms Arbitration Award Despite Argument That Case Was International and Beyond Arbitrator’s Authority

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The arbitration award stemmed from the pro se complaint of Joseph Ruzindana for wrongful termination against his former employer, FCA US. In the arbitration, Ruzindana claimed that he was harassed and discriminated against by FCA US.

After the arbitrator rendered an award in favor of FCA US, Ruzindana filed a motion to vacate, arguing that the case “was an international one beyond the Arbitrator’s and state Authority because some of FCA US’s vehicles would be sold in Brazil and some of his colleagues were located in Brazil.” However, the arbitration agreement between the parties authorized the arbitrator to decide “whether the challenged personnel decision or action was (1) lawful under applicable federal, state and local law, or (2) consistent with the Company’s At Will employment policy.” As a result, the resolution of Ruzindana’s employment-related claims fell within the arbitrator’s powers, regardless of any connection between those claims and Brazil.

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court may vacate an arbitration award under only four circumstances:

  1. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
  2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
  3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
  4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

Ruzindana did not allege that the arbitration award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means or that the arbitrator was partial, corrupt, or guilty of any misconduct. He did allege that the matter was “beyond the arbitrator’s” authority but, as noted above, the district court and the Sixth Circuit held to the contrary.

Because Ruzindana did not satisfy any of the grounds for vacating an arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), the Sixth Circuit held that the district court properly denied his motion to vacate the arbitration award.

Ruzindana v. FCA US, LLC, No. 23-1649 (6th Cir. July 3, 2024).

NJ Court Finds No Waiver of Arbitration Rights in FDCPA Case, Grants Motion to Compel

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In Hejamadi v. Midland Funding LLC, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, on remand from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, addressed whether the defendants waived their rights to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs’ putative class action claims alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

The court’s opinion notes that the case involved a lengthy procedural history set forth in two prior opinions and in the Third Circuit’s decision remanding the matter to the district court. In sum, in 2017, the defendants purchased various credit card accounts from Citibank and then filed a debt collection action against plaintiff Shanthi Hejamadi, who in turn filed a counterclaim against the defendants pursuant to the FDCPA. The defendants dismissed the collection claim, removed the remaining counterclaim to federal court, and moved to compel arbitration under the mandatory arbitration and class action waiver provisions in the plaintiff’s original credit card agreements with Citibank. After amendments to the class action complaint, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice and ordered limited discovery on the arbitrability issue. The defendants renewed their motion to compel arbitration, which was granted by the court on March 31, 2022. The court found that the defendants “had the right to arbitrate plaintiff’s claims … and had not waived that right.” The court based its opinion on Third Circuit precedent at that time, which focused on analyzing prejudice to the party opposing arbitration in analyzing a motion to compel like the one before the court.

The plaintiffs appealed the court’s March 31 opinion and while the appeal was pending, the U.S Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morgan v. Sundance Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022), which, as noted by the district court, held that “whether a party waived a contractual right to arbitrate is decided by the same standard as waiver of any other contractual right” and that “there are no arbitration-specific variants of federal procedural rules, like those concerning waiver, based on the Federal Arbitration Act’s policy favoring arbitration.” The Third Circuit remanded the plaintiffs’ pending appeal of the order compelling arbitration to the district court to address the waiver issue now governed by the decision in Morgan.

On remand, the district court noted that Morgan “rejected the case law of various circuits, including the Third Circuit, that conditioned arbitration waiver on a showing of prejudice” and that the Third Circuit’s test in determining whether a party waived its right to arbitrate will now focus “on the actions of the party seeking to arbitrate, rather than the effects of those actions on the party opposing arbitration.” Applying this new standard to the defendants’ renewed motion to compel arbitration in the Hejamadi action, the court noted that the “waiver inquiry — whether a party has intentionally relinquished or abandoned its rights to arbitrate — is informed by the circumstances and context of each case.” After a thorough review of the record, the court found that the defendants’ conduct did not establish a waiver of their right to arbitrate and ordered that the parties proceed to arbitration.

Hejamadi v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 2:18-cv-13203 (D.N.J. June 25, 2024).

Second Circuit Rejects Enforcement of Class Waiver and Arbitration Agreement Under FAA, Finds That Provisions Impermissibly Limited “Plan-Wide” Remedies Under ERISA

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The plaintiff sued the trustee of his retirement plan, his former employer, and others for breach of fiduciary duties in connection with the plan’s purchase of shares of the employer’s parent company for more than fair market value. The plan was a defined contribution plan, with a separate individual account for each participant. The complaint sought relief under section 502(a)(2) of ERISA, including restoration of plan-wide losses, surcharge, accounting, constructive trust, disgorgement of profits, and other equitable relief.

The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the FAA on an individual basis, relying on plan provisions that required participants to resolve any legal claims solely in their “individual capacity and not in a representative capacity” and that prohibited participants from seeking or receiving “any remedy that has the purpose or effect of providing additional benefits or monetary or other relief to” other participants or beneficiaries. The defendants argued that compelling individual arbitration would not limit any substantive rights or remedies that the plaintiff “could personally achieve under ERISA section 502(a)(2),” as the plaintiff could only ever have recovered losses within his individual plan account.

The district court disagreed with the defendants and denied the motion, and a divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit found, over a dissenting judge, that the above provisions were unenforceable because, as the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits found in analogous cases, the provisions would prevent the plaintiff from pursuing remedies under section 502(a)(2) that were, by their nature, plan-wide. Analyzing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the court explained that “the Section 502(a)(2) vehicle for enforcing Section 409(a) provides for only plan-wide remedies.” If the arbitration provisions prevented the plaintiff from pursuing the statutory plan-wide remedies, then it effectively prevented him from vindicating his substantive statutory rights under ERISA. Consequently, the above plan provisions (and the arbitration agreement as a whole) were unenforceable.

In reaching its decision, the court distinguished Supreme Court rulings, including Epic Systems, Italian Colors, Concepcion, and Gilmer, which enforced arbitration agreements containing a waiver of aggregated actions involving statutory rights. This case was different, the court explained, as precluding a representative action would deprive the plaintiff of the “full range” of statutory substantive rights and remedies. Drawing from another recent Supreme Court case, Viking River Cruises, the court highlighted a “qualitative difference” between waivers of collective action procedures, and waivers that purport to preclude a party from arbitrating in a representational capacity on behalf of a single absent principal (the plan). The court also observed that there would be “no legal way to provide many of the equitable remedies allowed by statute and sought by [the plaintiff] without impacting the accounts of other plan participants and beneficiaries or binding the Plan Administrator and Trustee vis-à-vis other participants.” The court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration.

Cedeno v. Sasson, No. 21-2891 (2d Cir. May 1, 2024).