

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of October, two thousand ten.

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
Chief Judge,
JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
Circuit Judges,

-----X
COUNTY OF NASSAU,
Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-
Appellee,

-v.-

09-3643-cv

JUDITH L. CHASE, JOSEPH M. ZORC, ZORC
& CHASE,
Defendants-Counterclaimants-
Appellants.

-----X

FOR APPELLANTS: Judith L. Chase
Joseph M. Zorc
Zorc & Chase

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3

4 **FOR APPELLEE:** Dennis J. Saffron, Appeals Bureau Chief
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9 Appeal from a grant by the United States District Court
10 for the Eastern District of New York (Platt, J.) of a motion
11 to confirm an arbitration award.
12

13 **UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED**
14 **AND DECREED** that the district court's grant of Appellee's
15 motion to confirm an arbitration award is **AFFIRMED** and that
16 Appellants' petition to vacate the arbitration award is
17 **DENIED**.
18

19 Joseph Zorc, Judith Chase, and their law firm Zorc & Chase
20 (collectively, "Zorc and Chase") challenge the district
21 court's grant of a motion from the County of Nassau
22 ("Nassau") to confirm an arbitration award. We assume the
23 parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the
24 procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
25

26 **[1]** When reviewing a district court's confirmation of an
27 arbitration award, the Circuit Court reviews findings of
28 fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Idea
29 Nuova, Inc. v. GM Licensing Group, Inc., No. 09-3652, 2010
30 WL 3079917, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2010). However, both
31 courts review arbitration awards with "strong deference" to
32 the arbitrators. Id. Relief should be appropriately rare,
33 with only a "very narrow set of circumstances delineated by
34 statute and case law" permitting vacatur. Porzig v.
35 Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, N. Am. LLC, 497 F.3d 133, 138
36 (2d Cir. 2007).
37

38 **[2]** When, as here, a retainer contract specifies that any
39 appeal from an arbitration award is to be governed
40 exclusively by New York state law, the designation must be
41 honored by the courts unless the state law conflicts with
42 federal law. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
43 Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470, 477-78
44 (1989). This is true even when the contract involves
45 interstate commerce and would otherwise fall within the
46 coverage of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Id. at
47 476-78; see also Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611

1 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that state law is
2 generally applicable to arbitration appeals and that FAA
3 only preempts when state law actually conflicts with federal
4 law). "The FAA is not the only way into court for parties
5 wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate
6 enforcement under state statutory or common law, for
7 example, where judicial review of different scope is
8 arguable." Hall Street Assocs., LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., 552
9 U.S. 576, 590 (2008). Because New York law accords with the
10 policies of the FAA (in favor of binding arbitration),
11 federal law does not preempt New York state law here. New
12 York state law therefore governs our review of this
13 arbitration award. Accordingly, while we agree with the
14 District Court that the arbitral award must be confirmed, we
15 do so pursuant to N.Y. C.P.R.L. § 7510, and not the Federal
16 Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9, as the District Court did.

17
18 **[3]** Zorc and Chase assert that the arbitrators engaged in
19 "manifest disregard of the law." This is the federal, not
20 state, standard for whether an arbitrator has so far
21 exceeded the scope of authority that the award should be
22 overturned. See Porzig, 497 F.3d at 139 (articulating
23 "manifest disregard" as federal standard). Under New York
24 state law, the appropriate standard is whether the
25 arbitration award "violates a strong public policy, is
26 irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated
27 limitation on the arbitrator's power." N.Y.C. Transit Auth.
28 v. Transp. Workers' Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 6
29 N.Y.3d 332, 336 (2005). Zorc and Chase fail to satisfy this
30 standard.

31
32 Under New York law, arbitrators are not bound by principles
33 of substantive law or legal procedure: An arbitrator "may
34 do justice as he sees it, applying his own sense of law and
35 equity to the facts as he finds them to be and making an
36 award reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the
37 agreement." Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299,
38 308 (1984). Misapplication of law and errors of fact are
39 insufficient to overturn an award. Motor Vehicle Accident
40 Indemnification Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 89 N.Y.2d
41 214, 223 (1996).

42
43 The arbitration award in this case violates no "strong
44 public policy" of New York or federal law, and Zorc and
45 Chase never argue that it does. Furthermore, the
46 arbitration clause here contains no limitations on the
47 arbitrators' power, so the arbitrators cannot have "clearly

1 exceed[ed] a specifically enumerated limitation" on their
2 power (again, Zorc and Chase never dispute this). Lastly,
3 neither the arbitrators' decision nor the actual award is
4 irrational: The arbitrators adduced facts and explained how
5 those facts support their ultimate decision. Specifically,
6 the arbitrators found that Zorc and Chase's billing
7 practices were suspicious, that their explanations for their
8 bills were not credible, and that Nassau had been grossly
9 overbilled. These findings of fact are not irrational.

10
11 **[4]** Under New York state law, a sufficient showing of
12 partiality can justify overturning an arbitration award.
13 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(ii). Zorc and Chase make this
14 assertion but provide no evidence of any actual partiality
15 by any arbitrator--they never even assert that any of their
16 arbitrators had a predisposition to favor Nassau or had any
17 improper motive that would favor Nassau. Instead, Zorc and
18 Chase claim that because the arbitrators made factual
19 findings adverse to them, the arbitrators must have been
20 harboring secret bias against them. This assertion begs the
21 question of partiality.

22
23 The district court's grant of Nassau's motion to confirm the
24 arbitration award is **AFFIRMED**; the petition by Zorc and
25 Chase to vacate the arbitration award is **DENIED**.

26
27
28 FOR THE COURT:
29 CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
30