On September 25, 2012, we reported on an order finding unconstitutional the confidentiality provision of Delaware’s novel business arbitration procedures, in which a sitting judge of the Court of Chancery presides in court as arbitrator. The federal district court held that since the arbitration process essentially functions like a civil trial, the confidentiality provision violated the qualified right of access to criminal and civil trials protected by the First Amendment. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed (with one dissenting judge), but not before conducting the First Amendment “experience and logic test,” which the lower court had failed to do. As to “experience” the court explored the history of both civil trials and arbitrations and concluded that “both the place and process of Delaware’s proceeding have historically been open to the press and general public.” Regarding the “logic” of public access to the arbitration proceedings, the court held that the “benefits of openness weigh strongly in favor of granting access to Delaware’s arbitration proceedings” and in “comparison, the drawbacks of openness” are relatively slight. The court did not give much weight to the Delaware chancellor and judges’ arguments that: (1) privacy is necessary to protect closely held information, (2) privacy is necessary to prevent the “loss of prestige and goodwill” of the disputants, (3) privacy encourages a “less hostile, more conciliatory approach,” and (4) that public access would “effectively end Delaware’s arbitration program.” The court concluded, “the interests of the state and the public in openness must be given weight, not just the interests of rich businesspersons in confidentiality.” Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine, Case No. 12-3859 (3d Cir. Oct. 23, 2013).
This post written by Michael Wolgin.
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