Reinsurance Focus

The plaintiff’s property sustained fire damage, for which the plaintiff sought coverage under an insurance policy issued by the defendants. After a dispute arose, the plaintiff sued the defendants in Mississippi state court. The defendants, foreign insurance companies, removed the action to Mississippi federal court pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The defendants then moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the insurance policy, which stated that the parties would arbitrate any dispute if they failed to agree on any aspect of the policy. The plaintiff opposed and moved to remand the case to state court, citing language in the policy’s cover note conferring U.S. courts with “exclusive jurisdiction” over any dispute under the policy. The sole issue was whether the plaintiff’s claim was arbitrable.

Applying a four-factor test used in the Fifth Circuit to analyze arbitrability under the Convention, the court found the first factor – whether there is a written agreement to arbitration – to be decisive here. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the policy’s arbitration and exclusive jurisdiction clauses conflicted, finding that any such conflict was resolved by the policy’s “service-of-suit” provision. That provision addressed service of process in the event of litigation but also expressly provided that it “will not be read to conflict with or override the obligations of the parties to arbitrate their disputes as provided for in any Arbitration clause within this Policy” and that it is solely “intended as an aid to compelling arbitration or enforcing such arbitral award, not as an alternative to such Arbitration clause for resolving disputes arising out of this contract of insurance.” Finding that this language clearly demonstrated the parties’ intent to arbitrate, and that the three other factors in the four-factor test were undisputed, the court granted the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand.

First United Methodist Church of Corinth, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Policy No. PG197716, No. 1:19-cv-00120 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 4, 2019).

The action arises out of a foreclosure sale in which property was conveyed to First 100 LLC. Subsequent to the foreclosure sale, First 100 conveyed the property to Alan and Theresa Lahrs as trustees of the Lahrs Family Trust. In this action, the Lahrs filed crossclaims against First 100 alleging, among other things, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. An operating agreement between First 100 and the Lahrses contained a binding arbitration clause providing that “[a]ny dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to this [a]greement or the breach thereof shall solely be settled by arbitration under the Commercial Arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association.” First 100 moved to compel arbitration.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted the motion and stayed the action pending the arbitration. The court explained that in addressing a motion to compel arbitration, the court’s role is “limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Further, there is a strong federal policy that favors arbitration, and a court will not accept a controversy unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause does not cover the dispute. The court held that the crossclaims and the issue of liquidated damages were subject to the arbitration agreement.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Christopher Cmtys., No. 2:17-cv-01033 (D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2019).

The court granted Aetna’s motion to compel arbitration of a former employee’s age and disability wrongful termination claims that alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The plaintiff argued that the arbitration provision in a stock option web-based clickwrap agreement to which he agreed was invalid on the grounds of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. The court, however, found that clickwrap agreements are valid and enforceable under applicable New Jersey law and that Aetna provided sufficient evidence illustrating that acceptance of the terms of the stock agreement through the website was a necessary precondition to the plaintiff’s receipt of stock options in each year. The court held that the contract was not procedurally unconscionable because even assuming the stock agreement was presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis,” the plaintiff was free to decline it and would not have suffered negative consequences.

The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the contract was substantively unconscionable. The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s contention that the arbitration provision mandated submission of the plaintiff’s claims to an “inherently unfair and biased arbitral forum,” noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this idea. Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a contract provision limiting discovery during arbitration was substantively unconscionable. The court determined that the discovery provision was “less severe” than the provisions found by other New Jersey courts to be unconscionable. The discovery provision was not overly restrictive because it authorized the arbitrator to permit further discovery, which was not tied to an “impossibly high burden.” The court further noted that the plaintiff did not demonstrate how the discovery provision impaired his ability to litigate his case fairly. The plaintiff merely stated that “discovery is particularly important in the employment discrimination context.” Such contentions, however, are insufficient.

Falk v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 3:19-cv-00434 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2019).