Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Court Enforces ICSIC Award

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The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) is a treaty aimed at encouraging and facilitating private foreign investments in developing countries, to which the United States is a signatory. The ICSID has an internal framework for adjudicating and enforcing investor-state disputes. Under the ICSID, any contracting state can request an arbitration tribunal. The parties can challenge an arbitration tribunal award by seeking an annulment of the award on specific grounds, including that the tribunal manifestly exceeded is powers, that there was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal, that the proceeding seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or that the award failed to state the reasons on which it was based. At this point, a three-person ad hoc committee convenes to review the request for an annulment.

The ICSID is not empowered to enforce awards; the prevailing party must seek enforcement of its award with a court of a member state. The court of a member state plays only a limited role, and member states are not permitted to review an award on its merits. ICSID awards are beyond the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act. However, the court’s role is more than just a rubber stamp. The courts must apply the same standard to ICSID awards that a federal court applies when it gives full faith and credit to a final judgment of a state court. This means that a federal court must “‘give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so’, and, by extension, means that federal courts must accord ICSID awards the same binding effect required under the Convention.” With respect to fraud, a federal court should decline to give full faith and credit to a state court judgment only if the state court would itself decline to enforce the judgment on grounds of fraud. This same standard applies to declining an ICSID award based on fraud.

This case involves a dispute between TECO, an energy company incorporated in the United States, and the Republic of Guatemala, over electricity rates. The dispute was subject to the ICSID. The ICSID arbitration tribunal issued an award in favor of TECO. TECO requested an annulment of part of the award, and Guatemala requested an annulment of the entire award. The committee issued its decision on annulment, which was in favor of TECO. TECO commenced this action to enforce the award. The court enforced the award based on the above standards, as it was clear that the ICSID committee would itself enforce this award.

TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, No. 1:17-cv-00102, 2019 WL 4860819 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2019).

New York Court Compels Arbitration of Commercial Marijuana Dispute

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The defendants moved to compel arbitration of a complex dispute concerning the parties’ investment in medical marijuana companies. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants breached a non-compete agreement and fiduciary obligations by taking virtually all the business belonging to the parties’ mutual holding company and transferring it to a competing company in which the plaintiff held a substantially smaller interest. The holding company’s operating agreement contained a broad arbitration clause requiring that all disputes, claims, rights, and obligations between the parties arising out of the agreement be resolved by final and binding arbitration. The plaintiff brought suit in New York state court seeking to compensate the holding company for its loss of business. The defendants argued that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and laches, and moved to dismiss and/or compel arbitration under the operating agreement.

While agreeing that the defendants had potentially strong affirmative defenses, including a statute of limitations and laches, the court held that the merits of these claims and defenses must be decided by an arbitrator. Although New York law allows courts to rule on “gateway” issues, such as a statute of limitations and laches defenses, the court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied here because the matter involved interstate commerce. Under the FAA, the court explained, threshold questions of these kinds are presumptively reserved for the arbitrator. The arbitration clause in this case also expressly incorporated the American Arbitration Association rules. New York courts generally defer arbitrability questions to the arbitrators in such cases. The court also held that the defendants did not waive their right to move to compel arbitration. Because the defendants insisted throughout the case that it belonged in arbitration, the court held that the plaintiff could not now claim to be prejudiced by the defendants’ request for that relief.

Broumand v. Abbot, No. 655954/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Oct. 4, 2019).

Court Confirms Arbitration Award Under FAA’s Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Awards

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This case arises from a dispute over the parties’ obligations under several oil and gas leases. The parties engaged in an arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. The arbitration panel entered awards in favor of defendants Alan Larson and others. Northeast Natural Energy LLC filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, there is a strong presumption in favor of an arbitration award and a court must grant an order confirming an arbitration award, except in few enumerated instances. One ground for vacating an award includes “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” The court may also vacate an arbitration award when the arbitrators displayed a “manifest disregard” of the law. This means there must be “absolutely no support at all in the record justifying the arbitrator’s determinations.”

The court denied Northeast Energy’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and held that the panel did not exceed its powers and did not manifestly disregard the law. The court explained that there was nothing in the record to support that the panel exceeded its powers by rewriting the leases and failing to interpret the leases as written. The court further explained that the panel did not remove a provision from the leases, and the record supported the panel’s interpretation. The court found that the panel’s application of the parol evidence rule was not “completely irrational” as it cited appropriate legal authority and did not misapply Pennsylvania law. Lastly, the court held that the panel did not manifestly disregard the law in making awards to non-testifying defendants because the record revealed that the panel had sufficient information to make such findings.

Ne. Natural Energy LLC v. Larson, No. 3:18-cv-00240 (W.D. Penn. Sept. 20, 2019).

Ninth Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Case Involving Foreign Arbitration Award Based on Comity for French Appellate Ruling and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction

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The parties entered into a contract under which the plaintiff Cerner Middle East Limited would provide hardware, software, and services to iCapital S/E to facilitate iCapital’s fulfillment of a contract that it had been awarded by the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Health. The contract required the parties to submit any disputes to binding arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, specified that the seat of arbitration would be in Paris, and provided a choice-of-law clause electing the law of the state of Missouri.

A dispute arose and Cerner issued a request for arbitration when iCapital failed to make payments due under the contract, to which iCapital responded by objecting to the arbitration. The principal of iCapital, Ahmed Saeed Mahmoud Al-Badi Al-Dhaheri, declined to respond at all. The International Court of Arbitration concluded that the arbitration should proceed against both iCapital and Dhaheri and appointed a tribunal. The tribunal issued an award against both iCapital and Dhaheri for $62 million in July 2015, determining that it had jurisdiction over the latter as he was the sole proprietor of iCapital and, alternatively, because he was the alter ego of the reorganized iCapital LLC.

Cerner sought to enforce the arbitration award in Oregon state court seeking to attach funds in an Oregon bank account owned by Dhaheri. Cerner relied on a quasi in rem theory to establish jurisdiction. The case involved “type two” quasi in rem jurisdiction, which requires that (1) a court of competent jurisdiction render a judgment against the defendant; and (2) the defendant owns property in the forum state. The defendants removed to federal court and moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that Cerner did not possess a valid judgment against Dhaheri and therefore could not rely on quasi in rem to establish jurisdiction. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.

Cerner appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeal of Paris affirmed a French trial court decision that confirmed the arbitration award and found that the tribunal had jurisdiction over Dhaheri in addition to iCapital. In light of this development, the Ninth Circuit determined that it was not required to decide whether the district court was correct in deciding that the tribunal’s award had to be confirmed as valid by another court before quasi in rem jurisdiction could be exercised.

The defendants then argued that the Ninth Circuit should not recognize the tribunal’s award (or the Paris court’s ruling), in part because the French decision was not entitled to recognition under the principles of international comity. Citing to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit stated that foreign decisions should be accorded deference unless an underlying issue renders the judgment suspect. The Ninth Circuit found that none of the grounds for disregarding a foreign judgment applied here, noting that a foreign judgment may be entitled to comity even if the U.S. court disagrees with its reasoning. The decision of the Paris court met the minimum standard of reasonableness, and therefore the decision deserved recognition under principles of international comity. The requirements for quasi in rem jurisdiction were thus met, and the action seeking to enforce the award should not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Cerner Middle E. Ltd. v. iCapital, LLC, No. 17-35514 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2019).

Second Circuit Affirms Judgment Confirming Arbitration Award in Favor of Labor Union Involving Alleged Non-Signatory to Collective Bargaining Agreement

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The dispute involved a long-term health care provider and an assisted living services provider that was based in the same building. The union represented certain housekeeping employees at the location. The long-term health care provider was a signatory to the relevant collective bargaining agreements, and “for years” it applied the terms of the agreements to assisted living employees, including remitting union dues and health fund payments on their behalf. Another company began managing the housekeeping department at the property in 2013. The company signed an assumption agreement with respect to the operative collective bargaining agreement, under which the assisted living provider was not a signatory. The company ultimately stopped applying the 2008 collective bargaining agreement to the assisted living employees, and the union filed a grievance. Arbitration ensued, resulting in the issuance of the arbitration award at issue here.

On appeal, the defendants argued that the district court erred in confirming the arbitration award because the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the 2008 collective bargaining agreement, and, in doing so, the arbitrator violated public policy. The Second Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award based on the “strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration awards.” The Second Circuit relied on the fact that the collective bargaining agreement broadly authorized the arbitrator to resolve grievances, defined as “a dispute with regard to the application, interpretation or performance of an express term or condition” of the 2008 collective bargaining agreement. The court found that the arbitrator did resolve grievances within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement here, as the arbitrator determined: (1) prior to 2013, the long-term health care and assisted living providers were treated as a single employer; (2) the assisted living provider was included in the “signatory employers list” of a prior collective bargaining agreement; (3) the long-term health care provider continued to provide those benefits under the 2008 collective bargaining agreement; and (4) the long-term health care provider and the management company violated the collective bargaining agreement by unilaterally removing assisted living employees from the bargaining unit.

The arbitrator also concluded that the long-term health care provider and assisted living provider’s single-employer status continued after the sale because the providers had interrelated operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership. The arbitrator’s determination of who was bound by the collective bargaining agreement by virtue of the parties’ conduct was within the scope of his authority and “an arguable construction of the agreement.” The Second Circuit rejected the defendants’ arguments that the award violated public policy by making the union the bargaining representative for assisted living employees and that the award did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.

1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E. v. Alaris Health at Hamilton Park, No. 18‐2898 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2019).