Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT ISSUES ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION AGAINST A NON-SIGNATORY TO AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

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The plaintiff, Birmingham, along with a group of investors, entered into a funding agreement with defendant’s subsidiary, ALVE, which served as a holding company for intellectual property of the defendant, Abbott. The funding agreement related to the development of a stent product and contemplated successor stent product, and contained a broad arbitration provision. Pursuant to the funding agreement, ALVE and Abbott were to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain regulatory approval of these products. Concurrent with the funding agreement, Abbott entered into a “keep well” agreement with ALVE obligating Abbott to guarantee ALVE’s performance under the funding agreement. The keep well agreement identifies Birmingham and the investors as its intended beneficiaries, and incorporated by reference provisions of the funding agreement. The keep well agreement did not contain an arbitration provision. Subsequently, Abbott decided not to pursue development of the stent product. Birmingham believed that the termination of the development was improper, and that the stent had significant commercial potential. It filed a lawsuit alleging that Abbott abandoned the stent because it wished to focus on a different stent, thereby breaching the keep well agreement. Abbott moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the funding agreement’s arbitration provision.

The court granted the motion to compel arbitration, citing the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and the estoppel doctrine, under which a non-signatory may compel arbitration where: (1) there is a close relationship between the parties and controversies and (2) the signatory’s claims against the non-signatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying agreement containing the arbitration provision. The court initially found that there was a close relationship between Abbott and ALVE and the controversy at issue because of those parties’ parent-subsidiary relationship. The second prong was also satisfied because the dispute between Birmingham and Abbott in the lawsuit was directly related to the terms of the funding agreement. Birmingham Associates Ltd. v. Abbott Laboratories, Case No. 07 Civ. 11332 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

SPECIAL FOCUS: THE MANIFEST DISREGARD OF LAW DOCTRINE: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

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With this post we are expanding the content of Reinsurance Focus to include an occasional article of greater length containing a more detailed analysis of a reinsurance or arbitration-related topic of interest. These posts will be placed in the Special Focus category of our blog, and will consist of a short executive summary of the article linked to the article. We hope that this somewhat more detailed exploration of selected topics adds to our readers’ enjoyment of our blog. Our current intention is to have one such Special Focus post about every other month. Following is the executive summary of our first such article.

The manifest disregard of law doctrine has been referred to as a “judicially created” basis for vacating arbitration awards, which arguably is not expressly provided for in the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). In the recent Hall Street Associates opinion (see the March 28, 2008 post), the United States Supreme Court stated that the grounds for vacating arbitration awards set forth in the FAA are the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award, which may imply that what some courts have described as judicially created bases for vacation, such as the manifest disregard of law doctrine, are not viable. In the accompanying article, we briefly explore the current status of the manifest disregard of law doctrine and whether it has a future after Hall Street Associates. Read the article.

This post written by Rollie Goss.

REINSURANCE BROKER MAY NOT PROCEED TO INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AFTER DISAPPOINTMENT ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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A reinsurance broker unsuccessfully sought an interlocutory appeal from a federal district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. The cause of action in the case was the Pennsylvania tort of negligent misrepresentation. It was alleged that the broker presented material misinformation to an Italian reinsurer that induced the reinsurer to reinsure various property and casualty risks in the United States. The broker argued on summary judgment that, under Pennsylvania law, this tort could not apply to it, since it was not a “professional information provider.” The court denied the summary judgment motion, and the broker subsequently moved to certify the question for immediate appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court denied this motion, too. After noting that interlocutory appeals are generally disfavored, the district court found that there was no controlling question of law as to which there was a substantial ground for difference of opinion (a requisite of a § 1292(b) certification). Although the broker contended that Pennsylvania law does not impose liability for negligent misrepresentation on a reinsurance broker who negligently provides information to a potential reinsurer, the district court essentially determined that this was not a per se rule, especially given that part of the service of acting as a reinsurance broker is to provide information about the risk on which a reinsurer expects to be able to rely. The court found, therefore, that it was not clear that the broker’s proposed question was “controlling.” The district court also determined that an immediate appeal would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation (another requisite of certification), observing that the case was already “on the eve of trial.” For these reasons, the motion for leave to appeal was denied. United National Insurance Co. v. Aon, Ltd., Case No. 04-539 (USDC E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2008).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

DISCUSSIONS OF LEGAL ADVICE BY CORPORATE EMPLOYEES IS ENCOMPASAED WITHIN THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, EVEN WHEN ATTORNEYS ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THE DISCUSSIONS

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A California court of appeals has held that the corporate attorney-client privilege extends to confidential communications between an insurer’s employees regarding legal advice and strategy if reasonably necessary for the transmission of that information or to further the purpose of the legal consultation, even when the corporation’s attorneys are not directly involved or when the communications do not include excerpts of direct communications from the attorneys. The trial court, relying on the recommendations of a discovery referee, had determined that only documents created by counsel or involving direct communications between the insurer and its counsel were protected under this privilege. Accordingly, it ordered the production of a number of documents from the insurer’s claim files, which contained reserve and reinsurance information. The insurer sought a writ of mandate from the court of appeals to compel the trial court to vacate this production order. The appellate court concluded that corporations could only act through agents, and that the discussion of legal advice by agents for the purpose of implementing that advice came within the attorney-client privilege, whether or not counsel were directly involved in such discussions. Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, No. B194793 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2007).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

COURT DISMISSES CASE AGAINST INSURERS ALLEGING UNDERREPORTING OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PREMIUMS

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The Workers’ Compensation Reinsurance Association and the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation insurance Association sued nine insurers, alleging violation of the federal RICO statute and unjust enrichment due to the intentional underreporting of the amount of workers’ compensation insurance they had written in order to minimize assessments and reinsurance premiums. Disagreeing with a Magistrate Judge, a District Judge granted a motion to dismiss, dismissing the RICO claims with prejudice and the unjust enrichment claims for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that allegations focusing on the participation of the defendants in their own business, rather than the business of an enterprise, failed to allege a RICO violation. The unjust enrichment claim failed due to the failure properly to allege diversity jurisdiction. The RICO claims were dismissed with prejudice, and the unjust enrichment claims were dismissed without prejudice. Workers’ Compensation Reinsurance Association v. American International Group, Inc., Case No. 07-3371 (USDC D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2008).

This post written by Rollie Goss.