Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Federal Circuit Affirms Denial of Oil Company’s Attempt to Compel Arbitration Following Loss at Trial

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Benton Energy Service Co. (BESCO) has lost its appeal seeking to compel arbitration in a drilling patent dispute against Cajun Services Unlimited LLC. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding a decision from the Eastern District of Louisiana, recently found that BESCO waived its right to arbitration of its claims in light of the extended litigation that took place before BESCO even raised the possibility of arbitration.

In January 2017, Cajun filed suit against BESCO in Louisiana district court in a dispute over ownership and intellectual property rights in an elevator system used in oil drilling. For seven months following BESCO’s first responsive pleading in that case, BESCO made no mention of arbitration, raising it for the first time in opposition to one of Cajun’s motions for summary judgment following discovery. That case was administratively closed, but a separate, similar suit was later filed. This time, BESCO raised arbitration as an affirmative defense, but only in the context of Cajun’s breach of contract claim. The case proceeded to trial, where a jury found in Cajun’s favor on all claims.

Following the jury verdict, BESCO moved to compel arbitration of all Cajun’s claims, asking the district court to vacate the jury verdict in light of an arbitration provision between the parties.  The district court denied BESCO’s motion to compel arbitration, noting that BESCO had failed to take any action to initiate arbitration until two years after litigation had commenced, and following an unfavorable trial on the merits. The court concluded that BESCO had waived its right to arbitration of all its claims by substantially invoking the judicial process to Cajun’s prejudice. On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the Louisiana district court did not clearly err in its conclusion and thus affirmed.

District Court Predicts that Alabama Supreme Court Would Refuse to Extend Bad Faith to Reinsurance Disputes

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The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama recently predicted that the Alabama Supreme Court would refuse to recognize bad faith claims in the context of reinsurance disputes if it was presented with the question. The district court therefore granted a reinsurer’s motion to dismiss several bad faith claims against it.

Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation (“AMIC”) sued Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. for purportedly underpaying several reinsurance claims by approximately $1.9 million. AMIC asserted bad faith claims as part of its suit. Munich Re moved to dismiss those claims, arguing Alabama does not (or rather, would not) recognize bad faith in the context of reinsurance disputes.

The district court agreed. It therefore granted Munich Re’s motion to dismiss and denied a motion by AMIC to amend. In sum, the court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court has limited bad faith claims to insurance situations “that most resemble typical insurance contracts” (e.g., those in which the insured is a consumer or individual, etc.) The district court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court declined to extend the tort to a situation involving a dispute between a primary and excess insurer and that another United States district court had predicted “that the Alabama Supreme Court would not choose to extend the tort to suretyships.” The district court noted that the tort was designed to protect vulnerable insureds who have little negotiating power when signing insurance contracts and that the insurer-reinsurer dynamic is not such a situation.

The court therefore predicted that the Alabama Supreme Court would not recognize bad faith claims in the context of insurer-reinsurer disputes and dismissed those claims.

Alabama Municipal Ins. Corp. v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00300-MHT-JTA (Doc. No. March 16, 2021).

Ninth Circuit Vacates “Bizarre” Arbitration Award in Drug-Related Employment Termination Dispute

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In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed a district court’s order confirming an arbitration award in favor of a former Costco employee who had been fired for selling cocaine on company property. The arbitrator found that the employee’s termination was barred by the doctrine of “industrial double jeopardy,” because he had already incurred a three-day suspension for his conduct, and awarded that the employee be “made whole.”

The Ninth Circuit took issue with the fundamental fairness of the arbitration proceedings. Following the presentation of evidence, the arbitrator engaged in extensive ex parte communications with the terminated employee and the Teamsters Union, which had represented the employee at arbitration. The arbitrator also conveyed a $6,000 settlement offer to the employee, which Costco was unaware of and had not authorized. When rendering his decision, the arbitrator did so via a “vague and bizarre” email sent only to the Teamsters Union, which said: “The above named grievant prevails in his grievance. The Union’s arguments as to double jeopardy were correct. Union remedy is adopted. So that I can look at myself in the mirror, my resignation is effective today.” The arbitrator failed to provide any reasoned basis for his decision, without any finding of fact or statement of law. He then resigned after rendering his email judgment.

Acknowledging the high standard that must be met to vacate an arbitration award, the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that the arbitration proceedings deprived Costco of a fundamentally fair hearing, and entitled Costco to vacatur of the award. “For all we know,” the majority commented, “the arbitrator flipped a coin, consulted a ouija board, or threw darts at a dartboard to determine the outcome.” The court concluded: “No Party agreeing to arbitration bargained for a proceeding such as this.”

Sixth Circuit Reverses District Court for Exceeding Its Authority by Ruling on Arbitrability in the Presence of an Unchallenged Delegation Clause

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The plaintiff alleged that she was a victim of an illegal predatory loan orchestrated by the defendant’s company. The loan allegedly charged excessive interest but was shielded from U.S. law by tribal sovereign immunity.

The plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the loan was illegal and that the defendant had committed RICO and other consumer protection violations. The loan contract, however, included an arbitration provision, providing that “any dispute … related to this agreement will be resolved through binding arbitration” under tribal law, subject to review in tribal court. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, contending that the plaintiff agreed to a delegation clause to arbitrate issues “concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope” of the arbitration agreement, but the district court denied the defendant’s motion. The court found that the enforceability of the arbitration agreement “has already been litigated, and decided against [the defendant], in a similar case commenced in Vermont.”

The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court exceeded its authority by resolving the issue of arbitrability and finding that the arbitration agreement was enforceable. The provision delegating the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator was invoked by the defendant but was never specifically challenged by the plaintiff or addressed by the district court. “Only a specific challenge to a delegation clause brings arbitrability issues back within the court’s province.” Accordingly, the “district court should have enforced [the delegation clause] and referred the case to arbitration.”

The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that the issue of arbitrability related to the defendant’s standing, and therefore could be adjudicated in court. In response, the Sixth Circuit noted that a “logical conundrum” exists because courts still must determine the existence of the contract even when a delegation clause exists in the underlying arbitration agreement. The court, however, relied on its prior decision in another case that “signaled” that a “nonsignatory’s ability to enforce an arbitration agreement concerned a question of arbitrability.” The court determined that it would “follow suit and find that whether [the defendant] can enforce the arbitration agreement against [the plaintiff] presents a question of arbitrability that [the] arbitration agreement delegated to an arbitrator.”

 Swiger v. Rosette, No. 19-2470 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 2021).

Court Confirms “Baseball Arbitration” Award, Finds Party Alleging Unfairness Was Caught Looking When It Failed to Object

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The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri confirmed an arbitration award in favor of Clayco Inc. in a dispute with its subcontractor arising from a construction contract. The parties’ contract provided detailed dispute resolution procedures comprising 13 paragraphs providing for mediation followed by arbitration if the mediation was unsuccessful. However, the contract also provided for an “alternate condensed and accelerated procedure” that could be “invoked” at Clayco’s option. This condensed procedure called for eight hours of mediation “followed by a ‘baseball arbitration’ in which the mediator immediately takes the role of arbitrator, each side submits a best and final offer and the arbitrator chooses of the two offers as the award.”

Clayco invoked the “baseball arbitration” procedure by letter to the subcontractor and the American Arbitration Association (AAA), as provided in the parties’ contract. More than nine months later, the mediation and arbitration were held according to the condensed procedure, and the arbitrator selected Clayco’s best and final offer as the award, resulting in an approximate $1.7 million award.

The subcontractor sought to vacate the award, arguing that Clayco had not properly “invoked” the procedure because it never received a copy of Clayco’s letter to the AAA selecting the condensed procedure. The court found that whether the subcontractor received a copy of the letter was irrelevant under the terms of the parties’ contract, which only required Clayco to make a “written application” to the AAA. Furthermore, the subcontractor had ample notice of the mediation and arbitration and never “made a formal written objection” to the proceeding. Instead, after the unfavorable arbitration award was rendered, it submitted an affidavit of counsel to the court in support of its motion for vacatur stating that counsel “asserted that [the ‘baseball arbitration’ was unfair.”

The court described the subcontractor’s argument as a “flimsy post hoc excuse[]” and stated that “a party may not sit idle through an arbitration procedure and then collaterally attack that procedure on grounds not raised before the arbitrators when the result turns out to be adverse,” quoting Marino v. Writers Guild of America, East, Inc., 992 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). Since the arbitration process took place according to the parties’ contract, and the subcontractor had waived any procedural defects even if it did not, the court confirmed the award.

Clayco, Inc. v. Food Safety Grp., Inc., No. 4:20-mc-00739 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 8, 2021).