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NINTH CIRCUIT: ENGLISH ARBITRATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY, AND DISPUTE NOT ARBITRABLE UNDER FEDERAL LAW

September 19, 2011 by Carlton Fields

Titan Maritime appealed a district court’s decision denying its motion to compel arbitration in an action filed by Cape Flattery Limited for gross negligence in the salvage of a vessel owned by Cape Flattery. Titan argued that the district court erred in refusing to apply English arbitrability law and that, even under federal arbitrability law, the dispute should go to arbitration. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration, noting specifically that under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), non-federal arbitrability law should apply only if there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to apply such non-federal law. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that federal arbitrability law did apply and that under federal law, the dispute was not arbitrable. Cape Flattery Limited v. Titan Maritime, LLC, No. 09-15682 (9th Cir. July 26, 2011).

This post written by John Black.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

NONSIGNATORY AGENTS OF A PARTY TO AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ARE NOT COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE

September 15, 2011 by Carlton Fields

The Fifth Circuit held that two agents and officers of Beacon Maritime, Inc. were not bound to arbitrate claims against Aban Offshore Limited because, although one officer had signed a contract containing an arbitration clause in his capacity as an officer of the company, neither had signed the agreement in his individual capacity. The court reversed a trial court decision compelling the individual officers to arbitrate. Among other authorities, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Restatement (Third) of Agency, which provides that when an agent contracts with another on behalf of a disclosed principal, the agent and the third party become parties to the contract, but the agent does not become a party to the agreement unless the agent and third party agree otherwise. The court also cited state and federal case law holding that nonparties resisting arbitration demands are not be bound by arbitration agreements. Guy Covington v. Aban Offshore Ltd., No. 10-40449 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2011).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues

REINSURER PRECLUDED FROM INTERPOSING EARLY DEFENSES IN LIQUIDATION CLAIMS PROCESS

September 14, 2011 by Carlton Fields

Everest Reinsurance Company intervened in the liquidation proceedings of Midland Insurance Company, and moved to have the anti-suit injunction vacated, in order to allow it to participate in the claims settlement process, and to interpose defenses. The trial court denied the motion, and Everest appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding Everest’s defenses were premature, as none of the relevant claims had yet been approved, and because adequate procedures existed for it to interpose defenses later in the process. It further found that Everest’s ability to challenge the liquidator’s claims decisions was limited by the “follow the fortunes” language in its reinsurance policies. Everest also appealed the trial court’s decision denying its motion for an order precluding the liquidator and Midland policyholders from introducing evidence of settlements entered into by Everest as a direct insurer in other proceedings. The court, however, affirmed that ruling as well, noting such evidence might be relevant insofar as it demonstrated that Everest utilized claims handling methodologies that it seeks to challenge in the Midland proceeding. In re Liquidation of Midland Insurance Co., No. 41294/86 (N.Y. App. Aug. 25, 2011).

This post written by John Pitblado.

Filed Under: Reorganization and Liquidation

COURT RULES FOR REINSURER IN ASBESTOS COVERAGE DISPUTE

September 13, 2011 by Carlton Fields

OneBeacon sued Commercial Union of Canada, based on its contention that Commercial Union agreed to reinsure successive renewals of a primary policy issued by OneBeacon to Harrisons & Crossfield (America) Inc. and affiliates. Harrisons faced lawsuits for asbestos-based personal injury claims. One of the OneBeacon primary policies at issue was renewed for three successive one-year terms in 1980, 1981, and 1982. Commercial Union issued a Facultative Certificate covering the policy period from March 28, 1980 through April 1, 1981. OneBeacon took the position that the parties intended for the reinsurance cover to be renewed as well. The court disagreed, finding as a matter of law that the Facultative Certificate was unambiguous, covered only the single year described in the contract, and that OneBeacon had not demonstrated with competent evidence any intent on the part of Commercial Union to extend the reinsurance cover beyond its stated term. The Court granted both parties’ motions to strike certain evidence (including a so-called “sham affidavit” proferred by OneBeacon that contradicted sworn testimony), denied OneBeacon’s motion for summary judgment, and granted Commercial Union’s motion for summary judgment. OneBeacon America Insurance Co. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. of Canada, Case No. 10-10164 (USDC D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2011).

This post written by John Pitblado.

Filed Under: Contract Interpretation, Reinsurance Claims, Week's Best Posts

THIRD CIRCUIT CONFIRMS THAT FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT PREEMPTS STATE LAW DEEMING CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVERS UNCONSCIONABLE

September 12, 2011 by Carlton Fields

The Third Circuit reversed a prior decision and held that, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, a New Jersey law providing that class arbitration waivers in consumer adhesion contracts are unconscionable is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. As we reported earlier on June 1, 2010, the Third Circuit had previously vacated a trial court order compelling individual arbitration holding that, under governing New Jersey law, provisions in adhesion contracts precluding class arbitrations are unconscionable and thus unenforceable. The defendant, Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless, successfully petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which vacated the Third Circuit’s decision after deciding in Concepcion that a similar California law was preempted by the FAA. On remand, the Third Circuit reversed its prior decision and affirmed the trial court’s order compelling individual arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims. Litman v. Cellco Partnership, No. 08-4103 (3d Cir. June 6, 2011).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

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