Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

CEDING REINSURER’S DISCLOSURE DEFICIENCIES INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT RETROCESSIONAIRE’S RESCISSION CLAIM

by

A federal district court recently made findings of fact and conclusions of law following a nine-day bench trial upholding a ceding reinsurer’s right to receive certain payments from a retrocessionaire under two retrocession agreements, and rejecting the retrocessionaire’s counterclaim for rescission. The plaintiff, Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., was the ceding reinsurer who contended that its own reinsurer, the retrocessionaire defendant American National Insurance Company, failed to pay certain claims submitted. ANICO countered that the retrocession agreements should be rescinded due to material disclosure deficiencies during the underwriting process and improper claims-handling procedures. The parties also disagreed regarding the payment of certain claims based on the agreement’s wording.

With respect to the counterclaim for rescission, the court agreed with ANICO that Munich had failed to fully disclose information relating to Munich’s own evaluation of the primary insurer’s program (such as Munich’s internal calculations of its estimated loss ratios), but nevertheless concluded that the counterclaim failed because the deficiencies in reporting were not material. There was a lack of evidence that ANICO’s underwriters would have acted differently if the information about the primary insurer’s program had been disclosed. ANICO’s underwriter testified that she considered Munich’s internal calculations to be material to her underwriting process, but the court did not find the testimony to be credible, noting that the underwriting procedures and forms could be completed without such information. Moreover, ANICO had failed to show that it was objectively reasonable for Munich to have believed that its own loss ratios were material to the retrocessionaire’s underwriting. The court also rejected ANICO’s claim for rescission based on Munich’s alleged improper claims-handling practices, finding no willful violation of Munich’s obligations under the agreements and concluding that ANICO waived such a claim by failing to timely raise it. Finally, applying New York law, the court concluded that late notice of the claim did not relieve ANICO of its obligations to pay under the agreements. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. v. American National Insurance Co., Case No. 09-6435 (FLW) (USDC D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2014).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

See our disclaimer.

FOREIGN ARBITRATION AWARD CONFIRMED UNDER INTERNATIONAL TREATY

by

A federal U.S. district court recently confirmed a foreign arbitration award obtained by a Belizean telecommunications company against the Government of Belize in arbitral proceedings held before a tribunal appointed by the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”). Factually, the case involved agreements between the company and Belize, wherein the company paid money in exchange for certain tax benefits and investment return guarantees associated with its telecommunications improvement plan. When Belize later refused to comply with the agreements, the company (i) requested arbitration before the LCIA, pursuant to the agreements, (ii) won declaratory and monetary relief upon Belize’s default, and (iii) assigned the monetary portion of the award to Belize Social Development, a British Virgin Island organization. Legally, the court first held that the arbitration award was governed by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “Convention”) (of which the Federal Arbitration Act is a codification) because England (where the arbitration took place) and the United States are both parties to the Convention. The court emphasized that, under the Convention, it should confirm the foreign award absent a finding that an enumerated exception to enforcement specified in the Convention applies. The court methodically deconstructed and denied Belize’s procedural arguments, including lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, lack of standing, forum non conveniens, international comity, and failure to join a required party under F.R.C.P. 19, and then turned to the exceptions to the Convention proffered by Belize, again ruling in favor of the company. The Convention arguments revolved around the following: (i) failure to produce copies of the arbitral award and accommodation agreements (Art. IV(1)); (ii) invalidity of accommodation agreements (Art. V(1)(a)); (iii) inappropriateness of arbitration (Arts. V(1)(c) and V(2)(a)); (iv) suspension of the award by a “competent authority” (Art. V(1)(e)); and (v) public policy (Art. V(2)(b)). None of these arguments was found to be meritorious, and the court confirmed the arbitral award. Belize Social Development Ltd. v. Government of Belize, Case No. 09-2170 (RJL) (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2013).

This post written by Kyle Whitehead.

See our disclaimer.

FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION TRUMPS CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSE

by

When an arrangement to jointly design health insurance products went sour, the product company (“PBG”) brought breach of contract and tort claims against its insurance agents. Acknowledging an existing arbitration agreement, PBG admitted that the contract claims should be arbitrated, but tried to keep the tort claims alive in the judicial system based on an Iowa choice-of law provision. PBG argued that the provision evinced the parties’ intent that an Iowa statute carving out tort claims from valid arbitration clauses should apply. Finding no ambiguity in the arbitration agreement that would allow for consideration of extrinsic evidence like the Iowa statute, and relying on the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, the court disagreed and ordered all claims, contract and tort, to arbitration. Pinnacle Benefits Group, LLC v. American Republic Insurance Company, Case No. 1:13CV186 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 13, 2013).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

See our disclaimer.

VERMONT ISSUES GUIDANCE ON SPECIAL PURPOSE FINANCIAL INSURERS

by

The Vermont Department of Financial Regulation’s Captive Insurance Division has released a bulletin entitled “Guidance for Special Purpose Financial Insurers” to provide guidance regarding licensing standards and regulatory requirements for Special Purpose Financial Insurance Companies, formerly known in Vermont as “Special Purpose Financial Captives” until legislation mid-last year. With a pronounced goal of “support[ing] the use of appropriate uniform standards for regulation of insurer-owned captives and Special Purpose Financial Insurance Companies and to establish best practices and high standards for their continued use,” the bulletin has an NAIC-esque tone. Among other standards, the bulletin provides a sampling of qualified transactions and then discusses transaction review, reporting, and disclosure procedures that appear to engender significant collaboration between and among interested and/or cedents’ regulators. Vermont’s bulletin comes on the heels of a string of regulator releases addressing the captive insurance market, including releases from the New York Department of Financial Services and NAIC in June and July 2013, respectively, and, most recently, the FIO in December 2013. Vt. Ins. Bulletin No. C-2014-01 (Jan. 27, 2014).

This post written by Kyle Whitehead.

See our disclaimer.

SILENCE IS GOLDEN: REINSURER ORDERED TO PAY PREJUDGMENT INTEREST TO INSURANCE COMPANY’S LIQUIDATOR ON AGREEMENT SILENT AS TO INTEREST

by

A New Hampshire insurance company, Home Insurance Company (“Home”), was placed in liquidation in 2003. When its reinsurer Century Indemnity Company (“CIC”) tried to claim an $8 million setoff from amounts owed to Home, the liquidator balked and demanded the $8 million. A New Hampshire statute allows for the payment of prejudgment interest on an “action on a debt or account stated.” Finding no “meaningful distinction” between an “action on a debt” and the dispute at hand, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the statute applied and that the liquidator was entitled to prejudgment interest from the date CIC was informed the setoff would not be allowed. The court’s holding was also based on the fact that key agreements between CIC and Home were silent as to interest. Interpreting that contractual silence as to interest, the court declined to write into the contract a provision which made the interest statute inapplicable. In re Rehabilitation of The Home Insurance Company, No. 2012-623 (N.H. Feb. 13, 2014).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

See our disclaimer.