Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REVERSES COVERAGE RULING UNDER REINSURANCE AGREEMENT

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Public Risk Management of Florida, an intergovernmental risk management association that functions as a primary insurer for certain government entities in Florida, ceded some of its risk to One Beacon under a reinsurance policy. Public Risk’s insured, the City of Wintergarden, made a claim for defense and indemnity for an underlying lawsuit against it by a contractor who performed public works, but was claimed it was underpaid as a result of delays arising from the City’s failure to provide accurate plans and maps. Public Risk defended under a reservation of rights. It also tendered the claim to One Beacon, which disagreed there was a duty to defend. Ultimately, Public Risk was not required to indemnify its insured, but sustained over $286,941.07 in loss for legal fees above the $200,000 retention, which it believed were owed by One Beacon pursuant to the reinsurance agreement. Public Risk sued One Beacon, but the district court found no duty to defend and dismissed the claim. Public Risk appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed the coverage ruling, finding that the underlying claims did not sound entirely in intentional tort, and therefore there was a duty to defend. Public Risk Management of Florida v. One Beacon Insurance Co., No. 13-15254 (11th Cir. June 24, 2014).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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CEDENT WINS BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM AGAINST R&Q REINSURANCE

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A Wisconsin federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Employers Insurance Company of Wausau, and against its reinsurer, R&Q Reinsurance Company, on Employers’ claim that R&Q breached its agreement by failing to pay Employers for those claims paid Employers to its insureds. R&Q unsuccessfully maintained that Employers could not combine its indemnity payments and defense expenses and that it should have calculated the defense expenses using the ratio terms provided on the certificate of insurance. The Court disagreed, finding that the reinsurance agreement did not distinguish between indemnity and defense expenses, which were covered under the agreement, such that Employers was not required to calculate the defense expenses differently from the way it calculated the indemnity payments. The court also rejected R&Q’s argument that Employers had failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that its payments exceeded the retention amount. The court found that R&Q’s argument was precluded by R&Q’s failure to present contrary evidence on summary judgment where a party must do more than speculate that other evidence supporting its case may exist. The court did, however, find a factual issue existed as to the calculation of prejudgment interest and denied Employer’s motion for summary judgment accordingly. Employers Insurance Company of Wausau v. R&Q Reinsurance Company, Case No. 13-cv-709-bbc (USDC W.D. Wis. July 28, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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COURT GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN $40M REINSURANCE COMMISSION DISPUTE

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Greenlight Reinsurance brought suit against Appalachian Underwriters (“AUI”), Appalachian Reinsurance (“App Re”) and Insurance Services Group (“ISG”) alleging it had been shortchanged more than $40,000,000 pursuant to three types of agreements it entered into with the respective defendants (1) a reinsurance agreement between Greenlight and AIU, where AIU acted as managing general agent, and was obliged to refund ceded premium beyond contractually defined amounts based on loss ratios; (2) a similar retrocession agreement with App Re; and (3) a guarantee agreement with ISG. Greenlight claimed that, based on loss ratio thresholds, it was owed a return of premium under the reinsurance and retrocession agreements, and that ISG had guaranteed those payments.

The court analyzed the agreements, and, based on the minimum loss ratios, and the undisputed calculations of ceded premium, held that AUI owed Greenlight $16,986,516 under the reinsurance agreement, and App Re owed Greenlight $24,456,213 under the retrocession agreement. The court held, however, that Greenlight failed to demonstrate that the guarantee from ISG was a guarantee of payment. Rather, the court found that it was a parental guarantee, which required ISG, as a parent corporation, to ensure that its subsidiaries, AIU and App Re, remained solvent, but did not require it to make direct payments on their behalf. The court thus granted summary judgment on Greenlight’s claims against AUI and App Re, but denied summary judgment as to ISG. Greenlight Reinsurance, Ltd. V. Appalachian Underwriters, Inc., Case No. 12-CV-8544 (JPO) (USDC S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2014).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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CALIFORNIA APPELLATE COURT UPHOLDS DELEGATION CLAUSE IN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

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The issue before the California Appellate Court was whether the trial court erred in enforcing a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and granting the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

Plaintiff/Petitioner brought a wage and hour action against her former employer. The defendant former employer moved to compel arbitration, pursuant to a clause contained in its employee handbook. The delegation clause provided, “The arbitrator has exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, or enforceability of this binding arbitration agreement.” Plaintiff opposed arbitration asserting that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Defendant, in turn, asserted that arbitration agreement contained a delegation clause providing that issues relating to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement were themselves delegated to the arbitrator for resolution. The dispute then turned to whether the delegation clause itself was unconscionable.

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded a portion of the rationale underlying Murphy v. Check ‘N Go of California, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 138 (Murphy); Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272 (Bruni); and Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 494 (Ontiveros) was no longer viable under California law. Murphy, Bruni, and Ontiveros relied on three factors to conclude that the delegation clauses at issue were substantively unconscionable: (1) they were outside the reasonable expectations of the parties; (2) they were not bilateral; and (3) they provided for decisionmaking by arbitrators who would be biased by their financial self-interest. The appellate court found that the first two factors did not apply to the delegation clause at issue and that the third factor was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Malone v. Superior Court, B253891 (Cal. Ct. App. June 17, 2014).

This post written by Kelly A. Cruz-Brown.

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NEW YORK FEDERAL COURT RULES IT CANNOT COMPEL ARBITRATION IN GEORGIA

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A New York federal court recently was presented with a motion to compel arbitration in Georgia. The district court first concluded that the arbitration provision was enforceable and then proceeded to the question of whether it had the authority to compel arbitration in a district other than its own. The court described what it deemed an “internal conflict” within the Federal Arbitration Act because the Act provides both that (1) courts must enforce an arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms, and (2) arbitration must take place “within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed.” The court also noted an unresolved split in the Second Circuit on how a New York district court should proceed when a suit pending before it involves an arbitration agreement that specifies that arbitration should take place outside the court’s district. Ultimately, the court ruled that it had no authority to compel arbitration outside its district, but nevertheless wished to enforce the valid forum selection clause contained in the agreement. Accordingly, the district court elected to stay the action, pending arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant in Georgia. This approach left the parties free to pursue their contractual rights and remedies in the appropriate venue without running afoul of the FAA. Klein v. ATP Flight School, No. 14-CV-1522 (USDC E.D. N.Y. July 3, 2014).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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