Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Illinois Federal Court Denies Motion to Dismiss Complaint Alleging Breach of Reinsurance Agreement Between Parties

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In PMC Casualty Corp. v. Virginia Surety Co., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, addressed a motion to dismiss a complaint filed by a party to a reinsurance agreement alleging that payments due to the reinsurer were being improperly withheld.

Defendant Virginia Surety Co. issued contractual liability insurance policies (CLIPs) to nonparty Protect My Car, which sold vehicle service contracts, or extended warranties, to owners of motor vehicles. The CLIPs issued by Virginia Surety were intended to insure Protect My Car’s obligations to vehicle owners under the service contracts. After it issued the CLIPs, Virginia Surety obtained insurance from plaintiff PMC Casualty Corp. to protect it against the risks it assumed under the CLIPs. Virginia Surety and PMC Casualty entered into a reinsurance agreement, which provided that “Virginia Surety ‘ceded,’ and PMC reinsured, 100 percent of the risk of any payments that might have to be made under the vehicle service contracts covered by the CLIPs.” PMC Casualty was required to maintain a trust account to secure its obligations to Virginia Surety, and the reinsurance agreement permitted withdrawal from the trust account for certain specified purposes. The parties then amended the reinsurance agreement and transferred the funds held in the trust account to a “funds withheld account” to be held by Virginia Surety, subject to the same withdrawal restrictions. Relying on a report issued by Virginia Surety, PMC Casualty then submitted a request for payment from the funds withheld account of more than $18 million, which PMC Casualty alleged was due. Virginia Surety declined the payment, alleging that the funds in the account should be used to cover its potential liabilities in a separate state court lawsuit involving another company.

PMC Casualty disputed that Virginia Surety was entitled to withhold the payment and filed a complaint for breach of contract. Virginia Surety moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the amounts it may be liable for in the state court action are, at least in part, the same sums that PMC Casualty is seeking, which makes them subject to the reinsurance agreement. PMC Casualty opposed the motion, arguing that the reinsurance agreement does not give Virginia Surety the sole discretion to withhold payment. The court found that the term “amount(s) relevant to the Agreement” is “arguably facially ambiguous, and it is not defined in the reinsurance agreement,” and noted that the interpretation of the agreement “may entail consideration of extrinsic evidence and thus may involve questions of fact.” The court concluded that given the ambiguities and the lack of merit of Virginia Surety’s other arguments, the complaint is not subject to dismissal on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

PMC Casualty Corp. v. Virginia Surety Co., No. 1:24-cv-07795 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2024).

Southern District of New York Issues Order on Post-Judgment Interest and Fees in Arbitration Case

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The Southern District of New York recently modified an arbitrator’s award regarding post-judgment interest and declined to award fees and costs related to the prevailing party’s motion to confirm the arbitration award.

Negocios y Telefonia Nedetel S.A. entered into a contract with Kenmar Securities LLC for Kenmar to provide advisory and investment banking services to Nedetel related to a potential sale of Nedetel. The contract included a “success fee” provision that required Nedetel to pay Kenmar a fee if a “transaction” for the sale of Nedetel closed. Nedetel terminated the contract and subsequently entered into a stock purchase agreement to sell 70% of Nedetel and a shareholders’ agreement to sell the remaining 30%. Kenmar claimed those agreements triggered the “success fee” provision and initiated arbitration. An arbitrator ruled in favor of Kenmar and awarded, among other things, post-award interest at the rate of 9%.

Kenmar moved to confirm the award. Nedetel did not dispute the merits of the arbitration award but claimed that post-judgment interest was limited to a rate lower than 9%. The court agreed. The court explained that 28 U.S.C. § 1961 sets a post-judgment interest rate tied to the weekly average one-year constant maturity Treasury yield. The court noted that the parties may contract for a different post-judgment interest rate. Nedetel claimed that the parties had not done that. Kenmar responded that the parties had agreed to a different rate by agreeing to submit the question of post-judgment interest to the arbitrator. The court rejected that argument, explaining that “the parties did not explicitly submit the issue of post-judgment interest to the arbitrator” and that, even if they had, “parties’ agreement to submit the interest rate issue to the arbitrator is insufficient to deviate from Section 1961” because “parties must expressly agree (1) on the interest rate and (2) that this rate applies specifically to post-judgment interest.” The court therefore ordered that post-judgment interest would accrue at the lower rate (approximately 3.28%) sought by Nedetel.

Kenmar also sought the fees and costs that it incurred to confirm the arbitration award. The court declined to award those fees and costs, explaining that “the parties did not agree to award the prevailing party fees and costs stemming from proceedings to confirm the arbitration award” and that it was unaware of any authority that allowed it to otherwise award those fees and costs.

Kenmar Securities LLC v. Negocios Y Telefonia Nedetel S.A. , No. 1:24-cv-06737 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2024).

Second Circuit Rejects Challenge to Arbitration Award

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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected an attempt to vacate an arbitration award related to a maritime contract.

Spliethoff Transport B.V. initiated arbitration against Phyto-Charter Inc. related to an alleged breach of a maritime contract. Spliethoff prevailed and moved to confirm the arbitral award. Phyto-Charter moved to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority, acted in “manifest disregard” of the parties’ choice of law clause and selection of venue, and made various evidentiary and procedural errors, including failing to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence.

The district court rejected Phyto-Charter’s arguments, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit rejected the argument that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the parties’ choice of law and selection of venue clauses and noted that “[n]one of the evidentiary or procedural rulings about which Phyto-Charter complain[ed] deprived it of ‘fundamental fairness’ in the arbitration proceedings.” The court also concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority and, in response to Phyto-Charter’s argument about the arbitrator not following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence, stated that “an arbitrator need not follow all the niceties observed by the federal courts.”

Spliethoff Transport B.V. v. Phyto-Charter Inc., No. 23-7308 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2024).

 

SDNY Confirms Arbitration Order, Holding Order Was Final and Arbitrator Did Not Exceed Authority

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In Subway Franchise Systems of Canada ULC v. Subway Developments 2000 Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York addressed whether an arbitrator exceeded her authority when ordering that one of the parties to the arbitration must continue making interim payments during the pendency of the arbitration, and whether the arbitrator’s order was final and subject to appeal.

The underlying arbitration involved claims brought by Subway Developments 2000 Inc. against Subway Franchise Systems of Canada ULC alleging that Subway Franchise wrongfully terminated two development-agent agreements between the parties. The development-agent agreements included a mandatory arbitration provision that covered disputes regarding the termination of the agreements. The agreements further provided that any arbitration initiated under the agreements is limited to a determination by the arbitrator of the validity of the termination of the agreement by Subway Franchise, potential reinstatement of Subway Development if the termination is found to be invalid, and for a determination of damages. The agreements also included a provision requiring Subway Franchise to make 50% of the periodic payments due to Subway Development during the pendency of the arbitration until the arbitrator issued a decision. Subway Franchise initially took the position that it was excused from making the required payments but later made the payments either directly to Subway Developments or to Subway Franchise’s attorney trust account. Subway Developments objected and brought the matter to the arbitrator’s attention. After a hearing, the arbitrator issued an order requiring Subway Franchise to resume making the payments required under the development-agent agreements directly to Subway Developments during the pendency of the arbitration. Three months later, the arbitrator entered another order imposing sanctions if Subway Franchise failed to comply with the prior order and denying Subway Franchise’s motion to stay the order.

Subway Franchise then filed a petition in the district court seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s order, contending that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by compelling it to make interim payments directly to Subway Developments during the pendency of the arbitration. Subway Developments opposed the petition, arguing that the arbitrator’s order was not final and thus not subject to appeal, or in the alternative, to confirm the arbitrator’s order. In reviewing the petition, the court noted that the case is governed by the New York Convention since both parties to the proceeding maintained their principal place of business outside the United States and that the domestic provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) also applied since the arbitration was being conducted in the United States. The court then addressed whether the arbitrator’s order was final and subject to appeal, concluding that since the order “determines temporary control over the money that would be used to secure any potential judgment” the order is “final for the purpose of judicial review.” The court then addressed Subway Franchise’s petition to vacate the order under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which allows a party to seek to vacate an arbitration award when the arbitrator “exceeded her powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” After a thorough review of applicable case law and the record submitted, the court concluded that Subway Franchise “fails to meet the high standard to demonstrate that the arbitrator exceeded her authority here” and denied Subway Franchise’s petition to vacate the order. The court then addressed Subway Developments’ petition to confirm the arbitration order, concluding that it must confirm the arbitration order under the New York Convention since no grounds exist to vacate the award.

Subway Franchise Systems of Canada, ULC v. Subway Developments 2000, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-00593 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2024).

Seventh Circuit Refuses to Vacate Arbitration Award Under Public Policy Exception

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently refused to invalidate an arbitration award in a breach of contract case involving patent royalties based on purported violations of public policy.

Dr. John Insall patented various knee replacement devices and licensed them to medical device company Zimmer Biomet Holdings Inc. Zimmer paid Dr. Insall, and later his estate, royalties in return. Dr. Insall’s last patent expired in 2018, and Zimmer informed his estate it would be ceasing royalty payments because it believed further payments ran “counter to the policy and purpose of patent laws.” The estate claimed that was improper and the parties arbitrated the matter. An arbitration panel concluded that the payments could continue and thus ruled for the estate. Zimmer moved to vacate the award on public policy grounds. The district court confirmed the award.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It noted that even if Zimmer’s arguments that there is a “well-defined public policy that a party may not be compensated for patent rights after the patent’s expiration,” the arbitration award still needed to be confirmed because “the panel determined that the royalty payments in question were not grounded in any patent rights” but were instead “untied” to Dr. Insall’s “patents, products, or technology.” Put differently, the panel interpreted the contract as providing for payments for “non-patent rights” that were “closely related” to patents. The court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act does not allow it to question whether the arbitrators erred or even clearly erred in interpreting a contract, but to only determine whether it interpreted the contract.

Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. v. Insall, No. 23-1888 (7th Cir. July 12, 2024).