Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

REINSURER’S LIABILITY CAPPED AT AMOUNT STATED IN LIABILITY CLAUSES

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In a case on which we previously reported on January 29, 2014, a federal court in New York recently ruled that a reinsurer was not required to pay amounts in excess of the sums stated in the Liability Clauses of two facultative certificates, even though the word “limit” was not used. Rather, the reinsurer’s liability was stated as a percentage share of the underlying policy limit. The reinsured argued that certain defense expenses must be reimbursed, even though they exceeded the agreed-upon percentage share, because the facultative certificates were silent on whether defense expenses count toward the amount reinsured. Applying Second Circuit and New York law, the court concluded that the contract was unambiguous and that the reinsurer’s overall liability for both indemnity and defense expenses was capped at the amount stated in the Liability Clauses of the facultative certificates. The Court ruled that a percentage share of an underlying policy limit is itself a limit on liability. The court also denied the reinsured’s request for discovery regarding the “custom and practice” related to limit-of-liability provisions in reinsurance contracts. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Clearwater Insurance Co., Case No. 6:13-cv-01178 (USDC N.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2014).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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COURT REVERSES DENIAL OF PETITION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

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In Mahmud v. Ralph’s Grocery Company, No. B237636 CA 2/4 (Nov. 10, 2014), the California Second Appellate District reversed and remanded a trial court denying the petition of an employer (Ralph’s) to compel arbitration of a wage dispute with its former employee (Mahmud), which also includes certification of multiple classes of similarly situated Ralph’s employees. The California Second Appellate District relied upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___,131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), which effectively overruled Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 443 (2007) and concluded that the National Labor Relations Act did not override the FAA. Furthermore, the Court determined that Mahmud would not prevail on demonstrating that Ralphs’ arbitration policy was unconscionable on both procedural or substantive grounds because she presented no evidence of the circumstances surrounding her application for employment or her decision to sign the arbitration agreement and failed to cite to any provisions of the arbitration policy to explain how the arbitration procedures set forth in the policy demonstrate unconscionability.

This post written by Kelly A. Cruz-Brown.

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COURT REJECTS CLAIMS OF ATTORNEY CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN INSURER AND REINSURER

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An Iowa federal district court addressed the alleged privileged relationship between an insurer and its reinsurer in the context of two discovery requests involving communications between Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and its reinsurers. Progressive disputed coverage under a directors and officers policy issued to its insured, Vantus Bank, following a suit by the FDIC against Vantus Bank’s directors and officers.

The first discovery issue involved Progressive-redacted portions of pre-litigation communications with its reinsurers on the basis of attorney-client and work-product privileges in response to the FDIC’s discovery requests. Progressive argued the communications contained opinion work-product information pertaining specifically to anticipated, and ultimately filed, coverage litigation involving Vantus, its officers and directors, and the FDIC. The documents included litigation and mediation strategies and reserve information which had previously been held as protected from disclosure. In response, the FDIC claimed the documents were prepared in the ordinary course of business and therefore not protected. Both the court disagreed with Progressive, holding that the documents were not protected from discovery because were not prepared in anticipation of litigation nor did they contain the lawyer’s mental impressions. The court cited Progressive’s admission that the documents were prepared in the ordinary course of business; that the documents at issue were in the nature of business planning documents; that neither Progressive nor the reinsurers were involved in giving legal advice or in mapping litigation strategy; and the communications served numerous business functions. The court also held that the same rationale applied to specific portions of the documents which Progressive argued were protected even if the entire document was not.

The second discovery issue concerned the production of certain documents which Progressive asserted were protected by the attorney-client privilege but which Progressive had previously disclosed to its reinsurers and brokers. Progressive asserted it shared a common interest with its reinsurers such that its voluntary disclosure of those documents did not waive the privilege. The court again disagreed, holding that Progressive and its reinsurers did not hold a common legal interest. The relationship between them was a commercial and financial one – not legal. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that “if Progressive loses, so do its reinsurers,” concluding that the nature of the reinsurance business in and of itself did not give rise to a common legal interest. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. FDIC, No. C12-4041-MWB (USDC N.D. Iowa Aug. 22, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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U.K. TRIBUNAL FINDS BROKER ALLIANCE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN VAT EXEMPTION FOR INSURANCE-RELATED SERVICES BY BROKERS AND AGENTS

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An upper tribunal in the United Kingdom has dismissed an appeal brought by Westinsure, an alliance of brokers formed to provide introductions and improve the business terms of its members, where Westinsure argued its services were tax exempt under a VAT Directive. That Directive exempts insurance and reinsurance transactions including “related services performed by insurance brokers and insurance agents.” The issue was whether Westinsure, which provides its member brokers commercial buying power, regulatory compliance assistance, and other business support, acts as a broker or agent when supplying these services. The tribunal found Westinsure’s services are not of a broker or agent and therefore not exempt under the VAT Directive or the Value Added Tax Act of 1994 (VATA). The tribunal further found that while Westinsure’s services are related to the supply of insurance, they did not have a sufficiently close connection to the insurance transactions themselves to come within the VAT exemption. Westinsure Group Ltd. v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2014] UKUT 00452 (TCC) Appeal No. FTC/96/2013 (Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) Oct. 13, 2014).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

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DELAWARE SUPREME COURT REVERSES LOWER COURT AND AFFIRMS ARBITRATOR’S AWARD

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Reversing the Court of Chancery’s ruling vacating an arbitration award, the Delaware Supreme Court held in SPX Corporation v. Garda USA, Inc. that the arbitrator’s decision should have been affirmed because the arbitrator’s decision did not manifestly disregard the law. The award under review concerned whether SPX Corporation properly stated certain reserves on its balance sheets in connection with the sale of one of its subsidiaries to Garda World Security Corporation. The net purchase price for the subsidiary was subject to certain adjustments to the SPX balance sheets as set forth in the parties’ Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”). SPX was to provide Garda with a pre-closing balance sheet and an “Effective Date Balance Sheet” reflecting those adjustments. Post-closing, Garda challenged SPX’s calculation of the workers compensation reserve on the balance sheet and submitted the matter to arbitration, arguing the reserve calculation violated the SPA. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and addressing several rounds of questions to the parties, the arbitrator determined that SPX had not failed to comply with the SPA and that the balance sheets did not need to be restated. The arbitrator did not provide an explanation for its decision. Garda asked the Court of Chancery to vacate the award, which found that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the SPA’s terms.

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court applied the Delaware Arbitration Act which provides that an arbitration award will be vacated when “the arbitrators exceeds their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” The high court interpreted this provision as analogous to the Federal Arbitration Act which authorizes vacatur of an award where the arbitrator acts in “manifest disregard of the law.” This standard requires a party seeking vacatur to provide that the arbitrator was “fully aware of the existence of a clearly defined governing legal principle but refused to apply it, in effect, ignoring it.” The parties had submitted to the arbitrator two colorable interpretations of the relevant SPA provisions. While the arbitrator’s interpretation of those provisions may have been wrong, it was not without basis in the contract. Accordingly, under the “manifest disregard” standard, the arbitrator’s award was not subject to vacatur. SPX Corporation v. Garda USA, Inc., No. 332, 2013 C.A. No. 7115-VCL (Del. June 16, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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