Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

COURT DENIES SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS DESPITE AN EXPRESS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE

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A New York federal district judge denied Plaintiffs McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP (“McKenna”) and Vincent W. Sedmak (“Sedmak”) motions for summary judgment which sought to stop an arbitration action from Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company (“Ironshore”).

Five years ago, Eidos, LLC (“Eidos”), with McKenna serving as counsel, obtained a $20 million loan from Stairway Capital Management II LP (“Stairway”) to finance an enforcement litigation program. As a precondition for the issuance of the loan, Ironshore provided a loss reimbursement policy in case the original loan was not paid back. The arbitration provision in that policy provided the framework for this litigation. Ironshore refused to pay Eidos pursuant to the loss reimbursement policy due to the alleged misuse of loan funds from Sedmak. Ironshore sued to compel arbitration under the policy and McKenna and Sedmak simultaneously moved for summary judgment. As both McKenna and Sedmak did not sign the loss reimbursement policy agreement, the court noted that the arbitration provision therein would only be enforced under the following theories–1) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency; 4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and 5) estoppel.

The court found “no triable issue as to whether plaintiffs have directly benefited from the Policy, or as to whether McKenna was an intended third-party beneficiary of the Policy and knowingly accepted benefits stemming from the Policy.” The court noted that McKenna was estopped from denying arbitration as they were the direct recipient of over $11 million in legal fees. Furthermore, as part of the loan was used to pay Sedmak’s salary and certain loan proceeds were transferred to a corporation owned by Sedmak, Sedmak was a third party beneficiary and therefore could not contest Ironshore’s right to arbitration. McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., No. 14-CV-6633 KBF, 2015 WL 144190, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

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ARBITRATION ROUNDUP

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Award Authorizing Class Action Litigation

Emilio v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., Case No. 14-732-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2014) (affirming denial of motion to vacate award; district court did not err by finding that arbitrator did not exceed powers nor manifestly disregard law when it ruled that Sprint could not be compelled to proceed with class arbitration and plaintiff could not be compelled to proceed with bilateral arbitration under state law, which the arbitration agreement stated would govern);

Emilio v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., Case No. 1:11-cv-03041 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss class action or strike class allegations; defendant collaterally estopped from relitigating basis for prior arbitration rulings authorizing class action litigation)

Manifest Disregard

NDV Investment Co. v. Apex Clearing Corp., Case No. 1:14-cv-00923 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2015) (denying motion to vacate FINRA award; granting cross-motion to confirm award; no manifest disregard of the law for misapplying FINRA rule or for the panel’s failure to permit a full hearing; no arbitrator “misconduct” for refusing to hear evidence);

Power Partners Mastec, LLC v. Premier Power Renewable Energy, Inc., Case No. 1:14-cv-08420 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2015) (granting petition to confirm nearly $3 million award; no manifest disregard of law; arbitrator’s findings were supported by the record);

Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc. v. Relocation Group, LLC, Case No. 14-253-cv (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 2015) (reversing district court’s order that vacated award as manifest disregard of law; court failed to apply test, which includes finding that relevant law was “clear,” determining that no “barely colorable justification” for the panel’s decision existed, and addressing alternate readings of the relevant law that might have supported the arbitrators’ decision)

Exceeding Authority

Seagate Technology, LLC v. Western Digital Corp., Case No. A12-1944 (Minn. Oct. 8, 2014) (affirming appellate court’s order reinstating $500 million arbitration award; defendants did not waive their rights to challenge the award, but a review of the merits of the award showed that arbitrator did not exceed authority by issuing punitive sanctions for defendants’ fabrication of evidence, which included excluding defendants’ evidence and defenses);

BNSF Railway Co. v. Alstom Transportation, Inc., Case No. 13-11274 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2015) (reversing order vacating arbitration award; court improperly reviewed merits of arbitrators’ interpretation of contract instead of limiting review to “whether the arbitrators even arguably interpreted the Agreement in reaching their award”)

Scope of FAA

Wiand v. Schneiderman, Case No. 14-11203 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2015) (affirming district court’s order compelling arbitration and denying motion to vacate award; court-appointed receiver’s “clawback” action against estate of investor in Ponzi scheme is not exempt from FAA; court did not err in referring validity of contract to arbitration; court did not err in holding arbitrator did not exceed powers; court would not review arbitrator’s evidence-based rulings)

This post written by Michael Wolgin.
See our disclaimer.

COURT APPLIES CONCEPCION AND COMPELS ARBITRATION, REJECTING CLAIM THAT AGREEMENT PRECLUDED “EFFECTIVE VINDICATION OF STATE STATUTORY RIGHTS”

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In a putative class action alleging violation of Pennsylvania labor laws, unfair trade practices, and other state law claims brought by a franchisee against the franchisor and two subsidiaries, the court stayed the proceedings and compelled individual arbitration. The franchise agreement contained an arbitration clause and a class arbitration waiver provision, among other provisions limiting litigation, discovery, and certain damages, and shifting certain fees and costs. The plaintiff franchisee argued that the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it prevented him from effectively vindicating his state statutory rights. The court rejected this argument, holding that Concepcion and other U.S. Supreme Court precedent confirmed that there is “absolutely no rule that prevents arbitration when a person cannot effectively vindicate his or her state statutory rights,” and that the “effective-vindication” rule may apply only when the FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law. The court also applied equitable estoppel to reject the franchisee’s alternative argument that only the franchisor, the sole signatory to the franchise agreement, could compel arbitration; the court found that the franchisee relied on the franchise agreement in his pleading, and that a close relationship existed among the defendant entities. The court also construed the agreements between the parties to find that the claims asserted by the franchisee fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Last, the court construed the scope of the arbitration provision and held that it applied to the franchisee’s claims, notwithstanding the franchisee’s argument that his claims did not arise out of the franchise agreement. The provision covered disputes “arising out of or relating to” the “rights and obligations of the parties,” which clearly applied. Moreover, “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so” (citing Stolt-Nielsen). Torres v. Cleannet, U.S.A., Inc., et al., Case No. 2:14-cv-02818 (USDC E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2015).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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APPELLATE COURT RULES ON LOSS ALLOCATION AND NOTICE DISPUTES CONCERNING REINSURANCE CLAIM

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A New York appellate court affirmed the denial of summary judgment but with modifications. New Hampshire Insurance Company (“New Hampshire”) together with other insurers, settled with Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation (“Kaiser”) for asbestos personal injury related claims. The settlement allocated 100% of the asbestos liability to New Hampshire and their excess reinsurance carrier, Clearwater Insurance Company (“Clearwater”). New Hampshire sought indemnification from Clearwater pursuant to a reinsurance agreement.

Clearwater challenged the allocation in the settlement arrangement alleging that it forced New Hampshire to bear costs associated with other settled claims including bad faith, which was not covered in the excess policy. Clearwater further alleged that New Hampshire breached its notice and reporting duties under the terms of the reinsurance contract. In the very early stages of discovery, New Hampshire moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that Clearwater was bound by the allocation settlement under reinsurance principles. The trial court denied summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed, finding an allocation decision was not immune from scrutiny. Therefore, New Hampshire’s settlement would be judged on its reasonableness, which at this stage of the litigation was “undeveloped.”

Furthermore, the court found another triable issue as to New Hampshire’s notice to Clearwater on loses sustained by Kaiser. Clearwater alleged that it had been prejudiced by New Hampshire’s late notice resulting in “disadvantageous communication agreements” with its reinsurers. Based on these facts, the appellate court found New Hampshire’s summary judgment motion premature.

New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. 12779 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

MONTANA AMENDS EXPANDS SURPLUS LINES STATUTE

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Effective February 25, 2015, Montana’s surplus lines law, Section 33-2-301 and 33-2-302, M.C.A., (the “Surplus Lines Insurance Law”) was expanded to authorize natural disaster multi-peril insurance to be sold as surplus lines insurance in the State of Montana. House Bill 94, passed by the 64th Montana Legislature and signed into law, expanded the Surplus Lines Insurance Law to include natural disaster multi-peril insurance, a new type of insurance defined by House Bill 94 as “any bundled flood, earthquake, and landslide insurance.”

This post written by Kelly A. Cruz-Brown.

See our disclaimer.