• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar

Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

  • About
    • Events
  • Articles
    • Treaty Tips
    • Special Focus
    • Market
  • Contact
  • Exclusive Content
    • Blog Staff Picks
    • Cat Risks
    • Regulatory Modernization
    • Webinars
  • Subscribe

COURT DIRECTS CEDENTS TO INDICATE WHETHER THEY WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE AGAINST THE FINALITY OF AN ARBIRATION AWARD TO PRECLUDE ITS CONFIRMATION

April 9, 2015 by Carlton Fields

In a pending dispute in the Southern District of New York arising from a quota share contract of reinsurance between Employers Insurance of Wausau, as reinsurer, and Nutmeg Insurance and Twin City Fire, as cedents, Nutmeg and Twin City argue that issues relating to the parties’ obligations with respect to specific claims arising out of the parties’ reinsurance treaties, and a process to resolve issues relating to those claims, are not yet final and the court therefore lacks jurisdiction to confirm those portions of an arbitration award. The petition to confirm the award, found here, sought to confirm, in part, the arbitration panel’s directive that Nutmeg and Twin City produce certain information and documentation to Wausau supporting the claimed loss at issue. Specifically, the panel directed Nutmeg and Twin City to produce evidence of proof of payment of the loss at issue, copies of the underlying policies at issue, and a narrative and reasonable documentation demonstrating that the loss was within the treaty’s terms.

At issue was the quantum and type of information that must accompany billing in order to trigger Wausau’s payment obligations and whether Wausau may withhold payment pending its request for additional, sometimes privileged, information and documentation. Wausau informed the court that Nutmeg and Twin City’s objections were moot because all parties had performed their obligations and the entire award was now final. The court directed Nutmeg and Twin City to file a letter with the court within five days from the date of its order indicating whether they will persist with their objections to the court’s confirmation of the entire arbitration award. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Nutmeg Insurance Co., No. 14-CV-9284 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

COURT AFFIRMS REINSURANCE ARBITRATION AWARD IN FAVOR OF FIRST STATE INURANCE COMPANY AND NEW ENGLAND REINSURANCE CORPORATION

April 8, 2015 by Carlton Fields

Phased arbitration proceedings involving First State Insurance Company and New England Reinsuance Corporation against Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company addressed claims arising under numerous reinsurance agreements between First State and Nationwide. The arbitration panel entered three orders, one as to each phase, in favor of First State and, as part of its decision, crafted certain remedial measures under the reinsurance agreements between the parties. The arbitration panel’s rulings engendered additional litigation on both procedural and substantive grounds before the federal court. Procedurally, the federal court ruled that First State’s motion to confirm the award as to the first phase was premature when filed because the arbitration panel had not yet ruled on the remaining phases. On reconsideration of its prior order dismissing the motion to confirm as premature, the court ruled that the motion should have been deferred and not dismissed as premature. The court consolidated the motion with First State’s other motions seeking to confirm the awards on the subsequent phases of the arbitration proceedings. Substantively, the court rejected Nationwide’s argument that the panel exceeded its authority in crafting the remedial measures in light of the high level of deference given to arbitral awards by reviewing courts. First State Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., Case No. 13-cv-11322-IT (USDC D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2015).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reinsurance Claims

NATURE OF REINSURANCE RELATIONSHIP PRECLUDES DISMISSAL OF NEGLIGENCE CLAIM BROUGHT BY REINSURER AGAINST CEDENT

April 7, 2015 by Carlton Fields

A federal district court has denied a cedent’s motion to dismiss a negligence claim brought against it by its reinsurer, Old Republic National Title Insurance. The dispute between Old Republic and First American Title arose out of a reinsurance agreement where Old Republic agreed to assume a specified share of First American’s contractual liability under certain title insurance policies. First American negotiated a settlement of claims brought under those title policies and then asserted that Old Republic was obligated under the reinsurance agreement to pay its proportionate share of that sum. Old Republic paid the amount under a full reservation of rights, then sued First American for several causes of action, including negligence. The negligence claim alleged that when Old Republic made the offer for the reinsurance agreement, “First American undertook a duty to underwrite the Title Policies in a reasonably prudent manner and created a special relationship” with Old Republic that First American then breached.

First American moved to dismiss the negligence claim, arguing that the “gist of the action” doctrine precludes it. That doctrine states that an action in tort will not arise for breach of contract unless the tort action arises independent of the existence of the contract. First American argued that its liability stems from the parties’ reinsurance agreement and any duty owed by First American to Old Republic arises solely out of that contractual relationship. The court rejected that argument and the doctrine’s application, stating that the nature of the relationship between reinsurers and cedents, including the exercise of utmost good faith between them, supported a duty grounded in social policy, not solely in contract. The court further found that irrespective of the source of the duty owed, the negligence claim would not be dismissed because Old Republic, in the alternative, sought to rescind the reinsurance agreement and if the rescission claim ultimately prevailed, then the “gist of the action” would no longer be contractual. Old Republic National Title Insurance Co. v. First American Title Insurance Co., No. 8:15-cv-126 (USDC M.D. Fla. March 25, 2015).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reinsurance Claims, Week's Best Posts

COURT FINDS IN FAVOR OF HARBINGER ON $50 MILLION CLAIM INVOLVING PURCHASE OF OLD MUTUAL FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

April 6, 2015 by Carlton Fields

In a lengthy opinion detailing extensive findings of fact and law, a New York federal district court entered its order in favor of Harbinger F&G, LLC and against OM Group (UK) Limited in an action stemming from claims arising from the stock purchase agreement for the purchase of Old Mutual Financial Life Insurance Company by Harbinger from OM Group. Under the Agreement, Harbinger was entitled to a $50 million purchase price reduction if the Maryland insurance regulators did not approve a post-closing transaction between Old Mutual and Front Street Re, a reinsurance company owned indirectly by Harbinger, and if Harbinger fulfilled certain other conditions precedent. Harbinger was required to prepare and file certain approval documentation in the form agreed to by the parties, to use reasonable best efforts to obtain governmental approval for the reinsurance transaction and, if the transaction was not approved, Harbinger was required to engage in certain remedial efforts. When the post-closing transaction was not approved but OM Group failed to make the purchase price reduction payment, Harbinger sued. After holding a bench trial on those issues not disposed of on summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Harbinger but found OM Group was entitled to the payment of certain fees from Harbinger. “>Harbinger F&G, LLC v. OM Group (UK) Limited, Case No. 12 Civ. 05315 (CRK) (USDC S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2015).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Accounting for Reinsurance, Reinsurance Claims, Week's Best Posts

COURT DENIES SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS DESPITE AN EXPRESS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE

April 2, 2015 by Carlton Fields

A New York federal district judge denied Plaintiffs McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP (“McKenna”) and Vincent W. Sedmak (“Sedmak”) motions for summary judgment which sought to stop an arbitration action from Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company (“Ironshore”).

Five years ago, Eidos, LLC (“Eidos”), with McKenna serving as counsel, obtained a $20 million loan from Stairway Capital Management II LP (“Stairway”) to finance an enforcement litigation program. As a precondition for the issuance of the loan, Ironshore provided a loss reimbursement policy in case the original loan was not paid back. The arbitration provision in that policy provided the framework for this litigation. Ironshore refused to pay Eidos pursuant to the loss reimbursement policy due to the alleged misuse of loan funds from Sedmak. Ironshore sued to compel arbitration under the policy and McKenna and Sedmak simultaneously moved for summary judgment. As both McKenna and Sedmak did not sign the loss reimbursement policy agreement, the court noted that the arbitration provision therein would only be enforced under the following theories–1) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency; 4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and 5) estoppel.

The court found “no triable issue as to whether plaintiffs have directly benefited from the Policy, or as to whether McKenna was an intended third-party beneficiary of the Policy and knowingly accepted benefits stemming from the Policy.” The court noted that McKenna was estopped from denying arbitration as they were the direct recipient of over $11 million in legal fees. Furthermore, as part of the loan was used to pay Sedmak’s salary and certain loan proceeds were transferred to a corporation owned by Sedmak, Sedmak was a third party beneficiary and therefore could not contest Ironshore’s right to arbitration. McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., No. 14-CV-6633 KBF, 2015 WL 144190, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Page 1
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 270
  • Page 271
  • Page 272
  • Page 273
  • Page 274
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 678
  • Go to Next Page »

Primary Sidebar

Carlton Fields Logo

A blog focused on reinsurance and arbitration law and practice by the attorneys of Carlton Fields.

Focused Topics

Hot Topics

Read the results of Artemis’ latest survey of reinsurance market professionals concerning the state of the market and their intentions for 2019.

Recent Updates

Market (1/27/2019)
Articles (1/2/2019)

See our advanced search tips.

Subscribe

If you would like to receive updates to Reinsurance Focus® by email, visit our Subscription page.
© 2008–2025 Carlton Fields, P.A. · Carlton Fields practices law in California as Carlton Fields, LLP · Disclaimers and Conditions of Use

Reinsurance Focus® is a registered service mark of Carlton Fields. All Rights Reserved.

Please send comments and questions to the Reinsurance Focus Administrators

Carlton Fields publications should not be construed as legal advice on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended for general information and educational purposes only, and should not be relied on as if it were advice about a particular fact situation. The distribution of this publication is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship with Carlton Fields. This publication may not be quoted or referred to in any other publication or proceeding without the prior written consent of the firm, to be given or withheld at our discretion. To request reprint permission for any of our publications, please contact us. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the firm. This site may contain hypertext links to information created and maintained by other entities. Carlton Fields does not control or guarantee the accuracy or completeness of this outside information, nor is the inclusion of a link to be intended as an endorsement of those outside sites. This site may be considered attorney advertising in some jurisdictions.