Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

CENTURY INDEMNITY ENTERS STIPULATED JUDGMENT PRESERVING RIGHT TO APPEAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF REINSURER

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A New York federal court entered a stipulated judgment in favor of the plaintiff reinsurer that prevailed on its declaratory claim in a summary judgment previously ordered, which judgment capped its exposure to the dollar amount stated in the “Reinsurance Accepted” portion of the reinsurance contracts at issue.  The litigation had remained ongoing due to the cedant’s remaining counterclaims, but it agreed to forego pursuing those claims in favor of a strategy allowing it to pursue appeal of the prior summary judgment order.

Global Reinsurance Corporation of America v. Century Indemnity Company, No. 1:13-cv-6577, (USDC S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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LOUISIANA AND NORTH DAKOTA ADOPT AMENDMENTS RELATED TO NONADMITTED AND REINSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2010

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Louisiana and North Dakota amended their surplus lines statutes in line with the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 (the “NRRA”), which was included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DFA”), signed into law in July 2010. Under the North Dakota amendment (HB 1146), definitions of “reciprocal state” were removed from the statute, and portions of the statute applying to taxes on out-of-state surplus lines insurance were removed. Under the Louisiana amendment (HB 259), portions of its statute were removed that dealt with collecting premiums based on risks located in Louisiana but insured by out of state surplus lines insurers.  The Louisiana bill repeals the authority for the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner to enter into NIMA, the Nonadmitted Insurance Multi-state Agreement compact, as to which we have posted, reducing the efficacy of the compact in achieving the premium tax provisions of the DFA.

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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PROCEDURAL ODDITIES RESULT FROM SIMULTANEOUSLY SEEKING VACATUR OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD AND RELIEF ON THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE

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The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a claim for vacatur without prejudice, which had been based on the panel’s finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction. The Second Circuit examined the merits of the vacatur claim and ruled that it should have been dismissed with prejudice. Based on that determination, the Second Circuit then affirmed the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of the second claim filed in the district court for relief on the merits of the dispute (a claim for breach of contract). The Second Circuit explained that dismissal of this claim without prejudice was appropriate due to the preclusive effect of the ruling in arbitration that personal jurisdiction was lacking. The court noted: “Although it may seem odd to deny the award preclusive effect over one claim and to grant it preclusive effect over another in the same suit, that is the logical result anytime a suit includes both a claim to vacate an award and other claims that might be precluded by a final award.” Global Gold Mining, LLC v. Ayvazian, Case No. 13-4759-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2015).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION GRANTED IN HURRICANE SANDY ROW

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A New York district court granted Hudson Specialty Insurance Company’s (“Hudson”) petition to compel arbitration against New Jersey Transit Corporation (“N.J. Transit”) after determining that the parties had agreed to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy damaged N.J. Transit’s facilities and equipment triggering policies issued by Hudson and various other property casualty insurance companies. The original action was submitted to New Jersey state court to interpret “Flood Sublimit” and “Named Windstorm” provisions in the policies, the former of which limited Hudson’s flood damage liability to $100 million. Hudson sought to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision within the policy. N.J. Transit argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable as it never assented to the provision, and furthermore, never saw the arbitration provision until the policy was issued. It alleged that they relied on a prior draft of the policy without such a provision.

The court rejected N.J. Transit’s arguments for a number of reasons. The arbitration provision was included in the policy quote accepted by Hudson’s insurance broker, which referenced arbitration. The court noted that N.J. Transit “cannot have it both ways.” Either N.J. Transit assented to the policy in 2012 or it did not. Instead, “N.J. Transit is clearly seeking to benefit from the Policy by demanding coverage for its losses after Hurricane Sandy and has thus manifested its assent.” The court also rejected N.J. Transit’s final effort to oppose arbitration alleging that the provision was unenforceable because it lacked certain key terms. Here, the arbitration provision was a complete form where the alleged missing terms had no bearing on the enforceability of the provision. Hudson Specialty Ins. Co. v. N.J. Transit Corp., No. 15-cv-89 (ER) (USDC S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

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COURT REVERSES DISMISSAL OF INSURED’S CLAIM AGAINST REINSURER ASSERTING TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH INSURANCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

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Gardner Denver, Inc. (“Gardner”), had entered into a settlement agreement with its liability insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“NUF”) to resolve a dispute over Gardner’s coverage under various indemnity agreements. NUF honored the settlement agreement for several years, paying Gardner’s claims. However, once NUF entered into a “retroactive reinsurance” agreement with National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), in which NICO assumed NUF’s obligations and liabilities, NICO delegated the claims handling to another entity, which asserted a coverage defense and ceased paying Gardner’s claims under the settlement agreement. Gardner sued NICO and the claims administrator for tortious interference with a contract, and NICO countered with a motion to dismiss. NICO contended that the tortious interference claim failed because NICO had a qualified privilege as NUF’s agent (similar to the protection afforded to corporate officers under the “business judgment” rule) to handle claims on behalf of NUF. The trial court agreed with NICO and found that the complaint failed to overcome the privilege by sufficiently alleging that NICO acted without justification and with malice, and dismissed the case.

The appellate court, however, reversed the dismissal, holding that it was a factual question whether NICO’s actions were in fact unjustified or malicious, based on interpretation of the underlying insurance and settlement agreements and other evidence not before court, and thus it was not a decision for the court to resolve on a motion to dismiss. “Until the court answers whether NICO’s defense was frivolous, it could not determine whether NICO acted in good faith or, alternatively, acted without justification or malice, in its failure to pay claims pursuant to the settlement agreement.” Gardner Denver, Inc. v. National Indemnity Co., et al., Case No. 4-14-0713 (Ill. App. Ct. May 21, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

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