New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields
In a Special Focus article Rollie Goss previews another arbitration case coming before the United States Supreme Court involving the issue of whether a class arbitration waiver is unconscionable, and the impact of such a finding on the viability of the agreement to arbitrate.
This post written by Rollie Goss.
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The court confirmed an arbitration decision awarding damages in favor of workers compensation insurers against various insured employee-staffing companies. One of the defendant companies contended that it never executed the underlying agreement with the insurers, that the panel thus exceeded their powers in entering the award, and that the award should be vacated. The court rejected this argument, agreeing with the panel’s determination that the company waived its non-signatory defense. The court examined the procedural history of the arbitration and held that the arbitration proceeding continued for twenty-six months before the defendant asserted its defense. The court found that the company was “represented by legal counsel throughout the dispute resolution process,” that as “a matter of law, litigants are bound by the acts and omissions of their chosen agents, including lawyers,” and that “legal bungling” did “not justify reopening a judgment.” The court was further persuaded by the fact that the company first raised the defense only after a partial final award was entered, ordering the company to post a bond. While the court noted that it did “not take lightly” the company’s sworn statement that it did not authorize its purported attorney to represent that it approved or ratified the underlying arbitration agreement, the court explained that this was an alleged legal malpractice matter and not a basis to vacate the arbitration award. Zurich American Insurance Co., et al. v. Staffing Concepts International, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-03454 (USDC N.D. Ill. July 23, 2015).
This post written by Michael Wolgin.
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A Texas appeals court affirmed a summary judgment that rejected an attempt by two insurers to recover more than $1.1 million for taxes, penalties, and interest on certain reinsurance agreements. Argonaut Insurance Company and Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company (jointly “Argonaut”) provided insurance to two self-funded government risk pools formed on behalf of Texas counties and school districts. These risk pools provided various insurance products to their membership. As part of a reinsurance arrangement with these risk pools, Argonaut agreed to provide indemnity for losses accumulated under member insurance policies in return for member premium payments. Argonaut considered these premium payments non-taxable “reinsurance income,” but the Texas Comptroller rejected this classification finding that “for premiums to qualify as paid for reinsurance, the transaction must occur between two licensed insurance companies.”
On appeal, all parties agreed that the main issue centered on “whether the premiums received by Argonaut from [the risk pools] are premiums received from another insurer for reinsurance.” Argonaut argued that the agreements with the risk pools have reinsurance characteristics, a factor that outweighs whether or not the risk pools are licensed insurance companies. The court found that while a risk pool “is expressly authorized to purchase reinsurance, it is also expressly declared not to be insurance or an insurer” under Texas insurance and tax codes. For these reasons, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the Texas Comptroller. Argonaut Ins. Co. et al. v. Hegar et al., No. 03-13-00619-CV (Tex. Ct. App. June 24, 2015).
This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.
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The Fourth Circuit considered whether an arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by failing to find actual damages and failing to award sufficient attorney’s fees against certain non-profit credit repair companies, despite the arbitrator’s finding that the companies had made inadequate disclosures under the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA). Regarding damages, the arbitrator had determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to “amount[s] paid” under the CROA as damages, because plaintiffs made “voluntary contributions” to the non-profit credit repair organizations, rather than actual payments contemplated within the meaning of the CROA. The Fourth Circuit held that, given the absence of binding precedent requiring a contrary interpretation of the CROA, the arbitrator’s ruling “did not constitute a refusal to heed a clearly defined legal principle.” The court further noted that it was not for it “to pass judgment on the strength of the arbitrator’s chosen rationale.” Similarly, with respect to the arbitrator’s ruling on attorney’s fees, the Fourth Circuit held that while “it may be debatable whether the arbitrator performed [the] task ‘well,’ the record in this case shows that the arbitrator undertook a careful analysis of the applicable legal principles and reached a decision supported by his interpretation of our precedent.” In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit considered certain U.S. Supreme Court rulings in making clear that the “limited review” of an arbitration award is appropriate even when “the arbitrator considered remedies created by statute, rather than rights established by contract.” Jones, et al. v. Dancel, et al., Case No. 14-2160 (4th Cir. July 6, 2015).
This post written by Michael Wolgin.
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The Second Circuit affirmed a New York district court ruling that found that the FINRA arbitration rules, one of which prohibits arbitration of putative or collective class actions, was incorporated within the subject employment agreement. Former financial advisers of the progeny of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. sued J.P. Morgan under state and federal law for violations of overtime laws. J.P. Morgan moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause within the advisers’ employment contracts. In denying their motion, the district court reasoned “that the arbitration clause requires arbitration of only those claims required to be arbitrated under the FINRA Rules and that, under New Rule 13204, Plaintiffs’ claims cannot be arbitrated.”
On appeal, J.P. Morgan argued against the trial court’s interpretation of the phrase “required to be arbitrated by the FINRA Rules” as well as the court’s use of the amended version of Rule 13204, which was not in effect when the parties originally entered into their contract. The court used a grammatical and definitional analysis to determine that the phrase applies to all claims and controversies. They also found that when JP Morgan agreed to arbitrate according to the FINRA rules, they also took on the risk that these rules may change. Regardless of that risk, the court noted that under either the original version of Rule 13204 or the amended version, FINRA prohibits the arbitration of collective class actions claims. Lloyd et al. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. et al., No. 13-3963-cv (2d Cir. June 29, 2015).
This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.
See our disclaimer.