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COURT RULES PANEL MUST DETERMINE WHETHER ARBITRATORS OR ACTUARIES DETERMINE AMOUNT OF DISPUTED REINSURANCE PAYMENT

September 9, 2015 by Carlton Fields

In a dispute involving an earlier arbitration ordering American United Life Insurance Company (“AUL”) to make a commutation payment to The Travelers Indemnity, the parties filed cross petitions for arbitration pursuant to different clauses of a reinsurance contract. AUL argued arbitration should proceed pursuant to the Article 16 in the contract requiring all disputes between the company and the reinsurer be submitted to arbitration. It further argued that Travelers had forfeited its right to name umpire candidates, and that the court should appoint an umpire from the names submitted by AUL. Travelers, for its part, argued that the matter should proceed pursuant to Article 6 of the contract that required actuaries to make the determination concerning the amount of the loss.

The Court sided with AUL stating that an arbitration panel needed to decide the threshold issue of whether the matter should proceed pursuant to Article 16 or Article 6. The court reasoned that in order to determine whether to proceed by a panel of actuaries, the reinsurance contract had to be interpreted and that Article 16 was clear that “any dispute between the Company and the Reinsurer arising out of, or relating to the formation, interpretation, performance or breach of this Contract, whether such dispute arises before or after termination of this Contract, shall be submitted to arbitration.” Regarding AUL’s request that the court appoint an umpire from its list of candidates, the court noted that the parties were engaged in settlement discussions and Travelers had offered to name umpire candidates but AUL never responded. Based on this, the court held that Travelers never knowingly waived its right to name umpire candidates, and ordered Travelers to comply with Article 16. American United Life Insurance Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., et al., Case No. 3:14-cv-1339 (USDC D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

FEDERAL LAW MUST GOVERN ARBITRABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE, NOTWITHSTANDING CHOICE OF STATE LAW IN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

September 8, 2015 by Carlton Fields

The Ninth Circuit held that an arbitration agreement between Opus Bank and its former executive vice president Carey Brennan should be interpreted under federal, not state, law unless the parties unambiguously agreed otherwise. While Brennan’s employment contract contained a California choice-of law clause, his arbitration agreement required any employment-related dispute be resolved “by binding arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association.” Brennan argued that the arbitration agreement’s clause was substantively and procedurally unconscionable, while Opus moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that because the contract involves interstate commerce, the FAA applies. Further, because the arbitration agreement, did not incorporate California law expressly, federal law applies. “While the Employment Agreement is clear that California’s procedural rules, rights, and remedies apply during arbitration, it says nothing about whether California’s law governs the question whether certain disputes are to be submitted to arbitration in the first place. Further, the incorporation of the AAA rules constituted “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties intended to have an arbitrator decide the threshold question of arbitrability. Brennan v. Opus Bank, Nos. 13-35580, 13-35598 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2015).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

SECOND CIRCUIT RULES FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT REQUIRES STAY, NOT DISMISSAL, OF LITIGATION

September 3, 2015 by Carlton Fields

In Katz v. Cellco Partnership, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted the question of “whether district courts retain the discretion to dismiss an action after all claims have been referred proceedings,” or should stay the litigation. Acknowledging a split in the circuits, the court, in the context of an order compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act answered, “stay.”

Katz sued Cellco (better known as Verizon) on behalf of a putative class of Verizon subscribers. Katz’s contract with Verizon contained an arbitration clause that required arbitration under the FAA. Verizon moved to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. Katz sought to void the arbitration provision on constitutional grounds. The district court (1) rejected Katz’s constitutional argument; (2) granted Verizon’s motion to compel arbitration; and (3) having compelled arbitration, dismissed Katz’s claims. The sole issue addressed by the Second Circuit was whether the case should have been dismissed or stayed.

The Second Circuit outlined the divide among federal circuit courts on the stay versus dismiss question. The federal courts of appeals requiring a stay include the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits; those allowing dismissal include the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits; the Fourth Circuit remains uncommitted. The Second Circuit then analyzed the question in the light of the Act’s language, which states that if a suit is “referable to arbitration,” the court “shall … stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had….” That language, along with the Act’s underlying policy, makes a stay mandatory. Thus, the Second Circuit joined the circuit’s ruling in favor of a stay over dismissal. Katz v. Cellco Partnership, No. 14-138 (2d Cir. July 28, 2015).

This post written by John A. Camp.

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Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues

NEW HAMPSHIRE COURT APPROVES COMMUTATIONS CONCERNING THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY

September 2, 2015 by Carlton Fields

A superior court in New Hampshire has entered two orders – one concerning Arrowood Surplus Lines Insurance Company, the other concerning Providence Washington Insurance Company – approving commutations regarding The Home Insurance Company. Separate motions – one for Arrowood, the other for Providence Washington – were brought by New Hampshire’s Insurance Commissioner as Home’s liquidator regarding liabilities ceded from Home to Arrowood and Providence Washington to Home. Home has been in liquidation since 2003. In the Matter of the Liquidation of the Home Insurance Co., No. 03-E-0106 (N.H. Super. Ct. June 15, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reorganization and Liquidation

NEW YORK FEDERAL COURT ORDERS END TO ARBITRATION FIGHT OVER DOCUMENT ALLEGEDLY WITHHELD PRIOR TO ARBITRATION

September 1, 2015 by Carlton Fields

A federal district court in New York entered an order enjoining an attempt at a second arbitration initiated by Equitas Insurance Limited and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London against Arrowood Indemnity Company. The second attempt at arbitration comes after five years of dispute, which resulted in a $45 million arbitration award in favor of Arrowood. After the arbitral award and a court order confirming the award, the Underwriters filed a motion for post-judgment discovery and relief from judgment based on a document that the Underwriters had obtained in another proceeding against Arrowood that purportedly showed the disingenuity of Arrowood’s stance in the arbitration. The court denied the motion, finding that such a motion “cannot be used to collaterally attack an arbitration award for misconduct in the arbitration in the guise of an attack on the judgment confirming it.” Following the court’s order, the Underwriters demanded a second arbitration. In response, Arrowood filed a motion seeking to enforce the court’s earlier order.

The court held that Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides “the exclusive means of addressing and redressing wrongdoing in an arbitration proceeding” and that any such grounds must be raised within three months of the award. Finding that the Underwriters’ second attempt at arbitration was “in direct contravention of the FAA” and that a second arbitration cannot be used to undo the award of the first, the court enjoined the Underwriters’ attempts at a second arbitration—perhaps bringing the dispute to a conclusion. Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. Equitas Insurance Limited, No. 1:13-cv-07680-DLC (USDC S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

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