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ACTION TO VACATE ARBITRAL AWARD DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

September 22, 2015 by Carlton Fields

A disappointed claimant in a FINRA arbitration filed suit under section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in United States District Court to vacate the arbitral award.  The court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The court noted the well established principle that the FAA is not itself a source of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Stating that the parties were not diverse, the court proceeded to evaluate whether it could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction based upon the existence of a federal question.  The plaintiff proposed two bases for federal question jurisdiction: (1) the failure of its opponent to produce certain documents, which it argued constituted a violation of FINRA rules, or a disregard by the panel of FINRA rules; and (2) the fact that the claims pursued in the arbitration included claims under federal securities laws and SEC regulations.  The court rejected both  contentions, finding with respect to the first issue that many courts have held that “manifest disregard” of FINRA or NASD rules do not constitute manifest disregard of federal law for purposes of the FAA.  With respect to the second contention, the court followed a Second Circuit opinion which held that a court may not “look through” the petition to the claims in the underlying arbitration for a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.  The court rejected the argument that jurisdiction was supported by Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), which held that, with respect to petitions to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA, courts may look through the petition to determine whether it is predicated on an action that “arises under” federal law. Citing textual differences between sections 4 and 10 of the FAA, the court held that Vaden did not provide support for looking through the petition for purposes of evaluating whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over an action predicted on section 10 of the FAA. Doscher v. Sea Port Group Securities, LLC, Case No. 15-cv-384 (USDC S.D.N.Y. August 5, 2015).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Jurisdiction Issues, Week's Best Posts

IN REINSURANCE-RELATED COMMISSION DISPUTE, COURT GRANTS DEFENDANT LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER RATHER THAN GRANT PLAINTIFF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

September 21, 2015 by Carlton Fields

A lawsuit filed in the United States Court for the District of Connecticut between Odyssey Reinsurance Company and Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corporation involves a dispute over commission payments in a reinsurance scheme with State National Insurance Company, Inc. According to Odyssey, Cal-Regent has not made the appropriate commission payments for 2003 to 2007. According to Cal-Regent, however, Odyssey failed to perform the contracts and Cal-Regent is entitled to a set-off. In its complaint, Odyssey alleged that it “has performed all of its obligations under the Reinsurance Agreement” and had performed all conditions precedent to bringing suit. Odyssey moved for summary judgment, and Cal-Regent argued that Odyssey was not entitled to summary judgment, among other reasons, because of the dispute over whether the Odyssey had first breached the reinsurance contracts. However, in its answer to Odyssey’s complaint, Cal-Regent had the burden “to deny Odyssey’s performance with particularity, which Cal-Regent failed to do.” Rather than granting summary judgment to Odyssey on this issue, the court issued a decision allowing Cal-Regent to amend its answer and affirmative defenses, including granting leave to add an affirmative defense of material breach.

In another decision issued on the same day, however, the court dismissed Cal-Regent’s counterclaim for a setoff, finding that it had been brought under Connecticut law, rather than Texas law, when the parties had agreed to Texas law in the reinsurance agreement. Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corp., No. 3:14-cv-00458-VAB (USDC D. Conn. Aug. 20, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Contract Interpretation, Week's Best Posts

SENATE BILL 900 AMENDS OPERATIONS OF TEXAS STATE BACKED INSURER

September 18, 2015 by Carlton Fields

On September 1, 2015, Texas Senate Bill 900 went into effect after passing both the Texas House and Senate this past summer. The bill amends the operation of the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (“TWIA”), a state backed insurer of last resort. The TWIA was created in 1971 to fill in coverage gaps for windstorm and hail protection when private insurance became too expensive or when private insurance simply failed to provide coverage. The goal of the TWIA is to make coverage affordable for residential and commercial properties in areas prone to claims, most notably in certain coastal counties.

Senate Bill 900 makes a few important changes to the association. The insurer’s board of directors will now encompass three members from the insurance industry, three members from coastal Texas counties, and three members from inland Texas. It requires that the insurer maintain “available loss funding” to cover a once in a 100 year storm disaster. It also clarifies the purchasing requirements of reinsurance and alternative risk financing, both used in order to limit payout risk. Finally, Senate Bill 900 allows for the appointment of an administrator to run the insurer.

Texas Senate Bill 900 (2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reinsurance Regulation

INSURER AND REINSURER LOCKED IN DISCOVERY ROW

September 17, 2015 by John Pitblado

In a row between Granite State Insurance Company (“Granite”) and R & Q Reinsurance Company (“R & Q”), a New York trial court denied R & Q’s attempt to (1) vacate a prior court order, (2) appoint a special referee, and (3) dismiss counts in the complaint.

By way of history, the court previously found that certain discovery documents were protected under attorney-client privilege. Looking for reconsideration of this order, the court construed R & Q’s motion to vacate as a motion to renew and/or reargue. The court denied R & Q’s motion to renew as it failed to present a change in law or present new facts that would necessitate an alteration of the prior discovery order. The court also denied R& Q’s motion to reargue finding the “common interest” exception to attorney-client privilege inapplicable between an insurer and reinsurer. Without a relevant exception, the court held that R & Q “failed to demonstrate that [the court] overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts.”

The court also denied R & Q’s attempt to appoint a special referee because an appointment would only extend an already prolonged discovery process without “special circumstances.” Finally, the court noted that Granite and R & Q engaged in a considerable “meet and confer” process in an effort to narrow the scope of discovery, and thus instead of dismissing claims for which discovery had not yet been provided, the court directed R & Q to re-serve its discovery requests directed to those claims, as appropriately revised based on the parties’ “meet and confer” process.

Granite State Ins. Co. v. R & Q Reinsurance Co., No. 654494/2013 (Sup. Ct. July 22, 2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Discovery

SENATE BILL 900 AMENDS OPERATIONS OF TEXAS STATE BACKED INSURER

September 16, 2015 by John Pitblado

On September 1, 2015, Texas Senate Bill 900 went into effect after passing both the Texas House and Senate this past summer. The bill amends the operation of the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (“TWIA”), a state backed insurer of last resort. The TWIA was created in 1971 to fill in coverage gaps for windstorm and hail protection when private insurance became too expensive or when private insurance simply failed to provide coverage. The goal of the TWIA is to make coverage affordable for residential and commercial properties in areas prone to claims, most notably in certain coastal counties.

Senate Bill 900 makes a few important changes to the association. The insurer’s board of directors will now encompass three members from the insurance industry, three members from coastal Texas counties, and three members from inland Texas. It requires that the insurer maintain “available loss funding” to cover a once in a 100 year storm disaster. It also clarifies the purchasing requirements of reinsurance and alternative risk financing, both used in order to limit payout risk. Finally, Senate Bill 900 allows for the appointment of an administrator to run the insurer.

Texas Senate Bill 900 (2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reinsurance Regulation

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