Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

DISTRICT COURT RECOGNIZES THE VIABILITY OF MANIFEST DISREGARD OF LAW DOCTRINE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT

by

The Eastern District of New York recently denied plaintiff’s request to vacate an arbitration award in a contractual dispute between Incredible Foods Group, LLC, (“IFG”) and Unifoods, S.A. de C.V., (“UF”) over a shared Sub-License Agreement (the “Agreement”). Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff and sub-licensee IFG were licensed to “manufacture, market, distribute and sell” a fruit beverage in various states throughout the United States. IFG identified an American manufacturer to manufacture the beverage, and sub-licensor UF approved the selection. Shortly after manufacturing commenced, the bottles containing the beverage bulged and leaked, affecting sales.

Once it was determined that the presence of yeast at the manufacturing site was interacting with the beverage recipe to cause the bottles to bulge, IFG commenced arbitration, alleging breach of contract over lost profits. The Arbitrator denied IFG’s claims in full because he found that IFG had failed to establish that any act or omission by UF breached the Agreement. IFG requested in district court that the award be vacated, arguing that the Arbitrator’s determination fails “to draw its essence from the agreement.” The district court noted that beyond the four grounds pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) on which a court may vacate an arbitration award, the Second Circuit has “recognized a judicially-created ground, namely that an arbitral decision may be vacated when an arbitrator has exhibited a manifest disregard of law.” Nevertheless, the district court held that the arbitration award should stand because IFG had failed to demonstrate any of the five grounds for vacatur were implicated on these facts.

Incredible Foods Group, LLC v. Unifoods, S.A. de C.V., No. 14-cv-5207 (USDC E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

SECOND CIRCUIT FINDS ARBITRATOR DID NOT EXCEED AUTHORITY BY ISSUING AWARD, CONTRARY TO EARLIER AWARD

by

This appeal is from a judgment entered by a district court in New York, denying a petition of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (“UBC”) to enforce a May 4, 2014 arbitration award (“May 4 Award”) and to vacate a subsequent award on May 13, 2014 (“May 13 Award”), and granting Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC’s cross petition, seeking enforcement of the May 13 Award. UBC appealed the district court’s conclusion that the May 4 Award was not final and that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by issuing the May 13 Award.

The contract at issue provided that the arbitrator must “render a short-form decision within 5 days of the hearing based upon the evidence submitted at the hearing, with a written decision to follow within 30 days of the close of the hearing”. The Second Circuit, under the “heightened standard of deference” courts apply to arbitration awards, concluded that it must defer to the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract as allowing him to alter the earlier short‐form decision when rendering his later written decision. The Court noted that the contract does not define the term “short‐form”, nor does it specifically require that the second decision echo the result of the first. Thus, the Court held that, absent any such definitions or provisions, the arbitrator had the authority to interpret the contract as allowing him to change or alter the first award in consideration of certain criteria under the National Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry, which governed the arbitration. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, confirming the May 13 Award and vacating the May 4 Award.

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC, No. 15-1002 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2015).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

See our disclaimer.

SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARILY AFFIRMS DENIAL OF PETITION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD BASED ON PARTIALITY CLAIM

by

Late last month, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals summarily affirmed denial of a petition to vacate an arbitration award where a party was arguing that the arbitrator was biased. The case involved a dispute between an Israeli medical device company and a New York-based investment company and whether the medical device company owed a fee when it located an investor. The investment company argued that “the Arbitrator’s procedural rulings and fee award in [the medical device company]’s favor, along with her professional affiliations, evince[d] partiality.” The investment company attempted to point to the facts that (i) the arbitrator struck six of its ten document requests and refused to grant it an extension of time to engage an expert witness and (ii) the arbitrator came from the International Chamber of Commerce, where two attorneys of the medical device company were affiliated, neither of which the trial court accepted as bases for vacating the arbitration award. The Second Circuit entered an order summarily affirming. Landmark Ventures, Inc. v. InSightec, Ltd., No. 14-4599-cv (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

See our disclaimer.

VERMONT REVISES CREDIT FOR REINSURANCE REGULATION

by

The Vermont Department of Financial Regulation recently amended its regulation pertaining to credit for reinsurance. As we detailed on June 16, 2015, the amendment follows a proposal issued by the Department of Financial Regulation earlier this year. This follows a 2014 amendment to Vermont’s Credit for Reinsurance Act and brings the regulations in compliance with that act. Specifically, the amended regulation sets forth the procedural requirements through which a Vermont insurance company may take credit for insurance ceded to a reinsurer in line with the amended Credit for Reinsurance Act, as well as requires specific clauses in the reinsurance agreements in order for ceding insurers to receive credit for reinsurance.  4-3 Vt. Code R. § 32 (Oct. 28, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.
See our disclaimer.

COURT FINDS THAT FOLLOW THE FORTUNES DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS AGAINST A REINSURANCE PROGRAM’S TPA, BUT DISMISSES SUIT AGAINST IT ON OTHER BASES

by

A New York federal district court recently held that the follow the fortunes doctrine does not govern certain claims brought against a third-party administrator of a reinsurance program, but otherwise granted the administrator’s motion to dismiss on various grounds. AmTrust North America, Inc. and its affiliate, Technology Insurance Company, Inc., brought suit against certain individuals and companies in which those individuals were purportedly involved (the “Third-Party Plaintiffs”) seeking a declaratory judgment and monetary damages arising from a reinsurance venture. The gist of the insurers’ claims was that the Third-Party Plaintiffs fraudulently induced the insurers to act as “middle men” in a reinsurance program that was supposed to be structured so that the insurers avoided risk, when in fact they were exposed. The Third-Party Plaintiffs, in turn, sued Network Adjusters, Inc., the claims administrator for the program, alleging that its conduct inflated the insurers’ purported losses.

The factual background discussing the complex transactions involved in the lawsuit is described here. Network moved to dismiss the third-party complaint. The court denied the prong of Network’s motion that sought dismissal under the follow the fortunes doctrine, finding the doctrine inapplicable to the claims alleged against Network, which did not arise from a cedent/reinsurer relationship. Dismissal was nonetheless warranted because: (a) the Third-Party Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim was not actionable, as they were not parties to or third-party beneficiaries of the contract under which the claims against Network arose; (b) Network owed no duty of care to the Third-Party Plaintiffs, defeating the cause of action for negligence; (c) the Third-Party Plaintiffs’ contribution claim sought only economic/contract damages, and was not cognizable under New York law; and (d) the causes of action for common law and contractual indemnification failed because Network owed no independent duties to the Third-Party Plaintiffs, nor did they plead facts alleging that Network’s contractual duty to indemnify was triggered. Amtrust North America, Inc. v. Safebuilt Insurance Services, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-09494 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2015).

This post written by Rob DiUbaldo.

See our disclaimer.