Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA AWARDS BROAD FEE AWARD WHERE THERE WERE COMPETING MOTIONS TO CONFIRM ARBITRAL AWARD

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On March 31, 2016, we wrote regarding an arbitration confirmation fight between the Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”) and the John Deere Insurance Company (“John Deere”) in a reinsurance dispute relating to whether there was a computation error in the award’s calculation. Both sides sought confirmation of the arbitral award, but Scottsdale sought to increase the award, alleging a miscalculation. John Deere prevailed in the confirmation fight, and John Deere filed an application for attorneys’ fees and costs. On July 22, 2016, the District Court of Arizona largely granted that application over Scottsdale’s objections.

The reinsurance agreements between the parties provided that if a court confirmed an arbitration award, “the attorneys’ fees of the party so applying and court costs will be paid by the party against whom confirmation is sought.” John Deere sought all of its fees from the confirmation proceeding, including responding to Scottsdale’s motion to modify or correct the arbitration award. Scottsdale opposed the fee request, arguing that John Deere was limited to seeking reimbursement for attorneys’ fees incurred “solely in connection with its cross-motion to confirm the arbitration award.” The Arizona federal court disagreed, finding that the parties’ agreement was not so limited, although the Court reduced a portion of the award sought due to redaction of time entries and failure to comply with a local rule.

Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Case No. CV-15-00671-PHX-PGR (USDC D. Az. July 22, 2016).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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NEW YORK FEDERAL COURT REFUSES TO ENFORCE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN INTERNET CONTRACT

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This case involves a putative class action filed in federal court in New York in 2015 by Spencer Meyer against Travis Kalanick, the founder of Uber Technologies, Inc., alleging that Kalanick “orchestrated and participated in an antitrust conspiracy arising from the algorithm that [Uber] uses to set prices.” Kalanick did not move to compel arbitration at the outset based on Uber’s arbitration clause, but instead filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied, as well as a motion to reconsider the court’s determination that plaintiff could seek to proceed via class action, which was also denied. Uber then moved successfully to intervene, and moved to compel arbitration, to which Kalanick joined.

The New York federal court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that during Uber’s registration/contract formation process, the parties had not actually formed an enforceable agreement, and thus the plaintiff did not agree to arbitrate his claims.

Uber’s contracting process at the time required a potential Uber rider to input contact information and their payment details, and then “register” to form an account. There was text under the “register” button which said “[b]y creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy.” Although the “Terms of Service,” which contained the arbitration clause, and the “Privacy Policy” were hyperlinked, a user could register without clicking the links. Plaintiff said he did not recall the hyperlink or clicking it, which Uber did not contest. Thus, the court found that there was no basis for a claim that plaintiff had “actual knowledge of the agreement.”

In its analysis, the court looked at different types of electronic contract formation. First, it noted that there were “clickwrap” or “click-through” agreements, in which website users are required to click on an “I agree” box after presented with a list of terms and conditions of use. Next, it looked at “browsewrap” agreements, in which a website’s terms and conditions of use are generally posted on the website via a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen, but a user can continue to use the website or services without visiting the page hosting the agreement or even knowing it exists. The court noted that Uber’s agreement was not a clickwrap agreement, which the court stated were “more readily enforceable,” but was more akin to a browsewrap agreement as an Uber user could access Uber’s services without clicking the hyperlink to the page hosting the agreement or even knowing that such an agreement exists. The court also noted that the Uber agreement could be a “sign-in wrap agreement” since a user was allegedly notified of the existence of the “terms of use” when signing in. Ultimately the court noted that these contract formation labels “can take courts only so far” and the issue of whether plaintiff agreed to arbitrate his claims “turns more on customary and established principles of contract law than on newly-minted terms of classification,” and is a fact-specific inquiry. The court, noting that the key question is the conspicuousness of the terms, found that Uber’s account creation process did not provide plaintiff with “reasonably conspicuous notice” of Uber’s User Agreement, including the arbitration clause, or evince “unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms.” Thus, in light of the facts, the court found that plaintiff did not form an agreement to arbitrate, and denied the motion to compel arbitration.

Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15 Civ. 9796 (USDC S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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FEDERAL COURT CONFIRMS ARBITRATION AWARD DESPITE DISSENTING ARBITRATOR’S “FAR MORE PERSUASIVE” ANALYSIS

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Although a New York federal district court would have found the same result as the dissenting arbitrator if it were resolving this case as an original matter, the limited scope of judicial review of arbitral decisions prevented the court from vacating the arbitration award. The petitioner and respondent were parties to a license agreement concerning the operation of a Benihana restaurant. The respondent allegedly committed various breaches of the license agreement, and petitioner exercised its option to terminate the agreement. The respondent commenced arbitration to declare it was not in default. The panel construed the license agreement “to permit termination only when reasonable,” finding the petitioner was not reasonable as respondent’s breaches were “trivial” and it had taken corrective measures to cure them. A dissenting arbitrator concluded that the petitioner had been justified as a result of the numerous material breaches by the respondent, as New York law holds “a non-breaching party may terminate a contract where the other party committed a material breach” – precisely what occurred here.

The court was unable to review the panel’s findings of fact, even for manifest disregard, nor can a claim of factual error support vacatur. As to the petitioner’s challenge that principles of equity were not properly considered, it fell “short of showing either that the panel ‘ignored’ these principles where their application was clear, or that this misapplication ‘led to an erroneous outcome.’” Nor did the court find the panel exceeded its authority by construing the license agreement as it did, as the license agreement did not define “reasonableness,” a term the arbitration panel was left to determine. As to the petitioner’s last challenge – that the panel refused to hear evidence by rejecting the petitioner’s request to submit a decision in a separate case between the parties relating to similar misconduct of the respondent – such conduct did not rise to the level of a violation of fundamental fairness. Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, Case No. 15 Civ. 7428 (USDC S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016).

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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FIFTH CIRCUIT CONFIRMS AWARD UNDER FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT’S “EXCEEDINGLY DEFERENTIAL” STANDARD

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently confirmed an arbitration award in an underlying employment dispute, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the award was the product of corruption and adhering to the “exceedingly deferential” standard of review of an arbitrator’s factual findings required by the Federal Arbitration Act.

Plaintiff Tommy L. Parker brought suit against his former employer, ETB Management, L.L.C., alleging age discrimination and retaliation. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas compelled arbitration of the dispute, and an arbitrator found in ETB’s favor after hearing witness testimony and analyzing documentary evidence and briefing. After the District Court confirmed the award, Parker appealed seeking vacatur under the FAA on the grounds that the award was “procured by corruption” and that the arbitrator acted with “evidence of partiality or corruption.” Specifically, Parker argued that the arbitrator ignored conflicting statements given by ETB’s witnesses regarding the events that immediately preceded Parker’s firing, and thus that there was no factual basis to support the arbitrator’s findings. The Fifth Circuit rejected Parker’s arguments, declining to reexamine the witness credibility determinations of the arbitrator pursuant to the deferential standard of review afforded to arbitral decisions under the FAA, and noting that Parker had failed to make any showing that the arbitrator or the process was corrupt. Parker v. ETB Management L.L.C., No. 15-11128 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2016).

This post written by Rob DiUbaldo.

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