Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

TENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS DENIAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AS TO THE CLAIMS OF NON-SIGNATORY PLAINTIFFS

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A buyer of a manufactured home sued the manufacturer, seller and lender in connection with toxic mold that was found in the home’s water system. The underlying retail installment contract contained an arbitration agreement which included a provision providing, “[t]his Arbitration Agreement also covers all co-signors and guarantors who sign this Contract and any occupants of the manufactured Home (as intended beneficiaries of this Arbitration Agreement).” Notwithstanding that provision, the buyer, along with her husband and children, brought a civil action for damages against the manufacturer, seller, and lender. The manufacturer and seller (the “Defendants”) moved to compel arbitration and stay the court proceedings pursuant to the arbitration agreement in the installment contract. The trial court granted the motion as to the buyer’s claims, but denied the motion as to her husband and children, finding that they were not parties to the installment contract, and as such, were not bound by the arbitration provision.

The Defendants appealed the denial of their motion to compel the claims of the husband and children to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed. The court rejected both of Defendants’ arguments – first, that the husband and children were third party beneficiaries and were therefore bound to arbitrate, and second, that they were bound to arbitrate under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. As to the first argument, the court found unpersuasive Defendants’ reliance on the arbitration provision which defined occupants of the home as third party beneficiaries. Specifically, the court found that Defendants did not meet their burden of establishing that the non-signatory plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate and declined to bind “unwitting third parties” to a contract without their first knowing of its terms or ever realizing some benefit. As to Defendants’ second argument, the court rejected Defendants’ equitable estoppel theories asserting “intertwined claims” and “direct benefits.” The former does not govern a case “where a signatory-defendant seeks to compel arbitration with a non-signatory-plaintiff,” and the latter is not a recognized doctrine under Oklahoma law. Jacks v. CMH Homes, Case No. 15-6197 (10th Cir. May 17, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

FIRST CIRCUIT FINDS FAA APPLICABILITY A QUESTION FOR COURT AND HOLDS FAA EXEMPTION APPLICABLE TO INDEPENDENT-CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP

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The case presented two issues to the court: 1) whether a court must determine the applicability of the FAA to the case when asked to compel arbitration, where parties delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator; and 2) whether the FAA’s transportation worker exemption applies to independent contractors. The court answered both questions in the affirmative.

Oliveira, a truck driver, participated in an apprenticeship program established by New Prime (“Prime”), a trucking company. Upon completion of the program, Prime told Oliveira that he would make more money as an independent contractor than as a company driver. Thereafter, Oliveira signed an independent contractor operating agreement with Prime. Oliveira brought suit against Prime for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). He claimed that the FAA transportation worker exemption covers his contract, and Prime moved to compel arbitration under the FAA arguing that applicability of the FAA exemption is a question the parties had delegated to the arbitrator. The district court held that the applicability question was for the court and that the section 1 exemption does not apply to independent contractors. Prime appealed.

On the first issue, Prime relied on the Eighth Circuit’s holding that “application of the FAA’s transportation worker exemption is a threshold question of arbitrability” which the parties delegated to an arbitrator. However, the court found the Eighth Circuit’s characterization of the issue as “a question arbitrability” a flawed premise. In doing so, the court borrowed the reasoning of a Ninth Circuit case and explained that for a district court to compel arbitration, the FAA must first apply to the case and confer on a district court the authority to compel arbitration. Following this reasoning, the First Circuit held that the question of the court’s authority to act under the FAA is an antecedent determination for the district court before it can compel arbitration.

On the second issue, Prime argued that the exemption does not apply to independent contractors, citing numerous district court decisions. The First Circuit disagreed, noting that statutory interpretation is not simply a “numbers game.” The court explained that the ordinary meaning of “contracts of employment” is simply “agreements to do work,” which encompasses works of independent contractors and that such interpretation is consistent with Congress’s concern with transportation workers and their necessary role in the free flow of goods at the time Congress enacted the FAA. As such, the court affirmed denial of Prime’s motion to compel arbitration. Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., Case No. 15-2364 (1st Cir. May 12, 2017).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

See our disclaimer.

COURT DECLINES TO QUASH SUBPOENA ISSUED TO SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE IN COMPANION PROPERTY CASE

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We previously reported on this case on January 5, 2016, June 28, 2016, July 20, 2016, and December 14, 2016. The case concerns Companion Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s participation in a fronted insurance program with two reinsurers. Reinsurance collateral trusts were established for Companion’s benefit and maintained by defendant U.S. Bank as trustee. In 2015, Companion filed a complaint against U.S. Bank, alleging that, it, as trustee, negligently permitted the reinsurers to replace $180 million in assets held in trust accounts with worthless and defective assets. Companion asserted that U.S. Bank was liable for these substitutions because certain assets in the trust accounts violated the terms of the Trust Agreements. U.S. Bank then made claims against several third-parties, some of which have since been dismissed from the case.

Recently, Companion moved to quash U.S. Bank’s subpoena to the South Carolina Department of Insurance requesting production of “all documents and communications” related to information about Companion’s finances that it reported to the SC DOI. Companion argued that the subpoena sought confidential information protected as privileged by the South Carolina Insurance Holding Company Regulatory Act (the “Act”), as well as the production of documents and materials that were overly broad and previously produced. The court declined to quash the subpoena, but did modify its terms. The court found it significant that both parties stipulated that the Act did not protect as privileged a number of requested documents. The court also found that the South Carolina Department’s promise to review the documents prior to production and ensure that privileged documents were not produced was insufficient to adequately address Companion’s concerns. The Court accorded Companion reasonable time to review the documents that the Department identified as responsive to the subpoena and raise document-specific objections to the production of documents that it determined were privileged under the Act. Companion Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 3:15-cv-01300 (USDC D.S.C. Apr. 10, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

PENNSYLVANIA FEDERAL COURT FINDS CONTINUING VIOLATIONS DOCTRINE APPLICABLE TO RESPA CLAIMS

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A Pennsylvania federal court applied the continuing violations theory to RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations, and allowed Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to modify their RESPA claim.

The Court recognized that “ordinarily RESPA’s statute of limitations begins running on the date that a homeowner closes on his or her home loan. However, the question of when a statute of limitations begins to run (by default) is entirely separate from the question of whether or not subsequent kickbacks, fees, and referrals are violations of RESPA that can trigger new limitations periods. This is because under the continuing violation theory, the statute of limitations runs from the date of the last alleged violation rather than the first.”

The Court found “RESPA would be violated each and every time an unlawful fee or kickback was delivered or accepted. Each alleged violation, in turn, reset RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims would be untimely only if there had been no alleged kickback, fee or referral within the one year leading up to the day they filed their complaint.” The RESPA kickbacks and fees alleged in this case were explicitly prohibited by statute, thus making them “all a part of one reinsurance scheme, the very nature of which requires the defendants to make continuous and periodic illegal kickbacks.”

In discussing Cunningham v. M & T Bank Corp., 814 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2016), the Court noted the Third Circuit “spoke only to the application of equitable tolling” and “did not address whether RESPA may be violated each time there is an illegal kickback, fee or referral.” As noted in the decision, the Third Circuit has never spoken on the continuing violations doctrine’s applicability to RESPA.

Blake, et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., 5:13-cv-06433 (USDC E.D. Pa. April 26, 2017)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

See our disclaimer.

FIRST CIRCUIT FINDS FAA APPLICABILITY A QUESTION FOR COURT AND HOLDS FAA EXEMPTION APPLICABLE TO INDEPENDENT-CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP

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The case presented two issues to the court: 1) whether a court must determine the applicability of the FAA to the case when asked to compel arbitration, where parties delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator; and 2) whether the FAA’s transportation worker exemption applies to independent contractors. The court answered both questions in the affirmative.

Oliveira, a truck driver, participated in an apprenticeship program established by New Prime (“Prime”), a trucking company. Upon completion of the program, Prime told Oliveira that he would make more money as an independent contractor than as a company driver. Thereafter, Oliveira signed an independent contractor operating agreement with Prime. Oliveira brought suit against Prime for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). He claimed that the FAA transportation worker exemption covers his contract, and Prime moved to compel arbitration under the FAA arguing that applicability of the FAA exemption is a question the parties had delegated to the arbitrator. The district court held that the applicability question was for the court and that the section 1 exemption does not apply to independent contractors. Prime appealed.

On the first issue, Prime relied on the Eighth Circuit’s holding that “application of the FAA’s transportation worker exemption is a threshold question of arbitrability” which the parties delegated to an arbitrator. However, the court found the Eighth Circuit’s characterization of the issue as “a question arbitrability” a flawed premise. In doing so, the court borrowed the reasoning of a Ninth Circuit case and explained that for a district court to compel arbitration, the FAA must first apply to the case and confer on a district court the authority to compel arbitration. Following this reasoning, the First Circuit held that the question of the court’s authority to act under the FAA is an antecedent determination for the district court before it can compel arbitration.

On the second issue, Prime argued that the exemption does not apply to independent contractors, citing numerous district court decisions. The First Circuit disagreed, noting that statutory interpretation is not simply a “numbers game.” The court explained that the ordinary meaning of “contracts of employment” is simply “agreements to do work,” which encompasses works of independent contractors and that such interpretation is consistent with Congress’s concern with transportation workers and their necessary role in the free flow of goods at the time Congress enacted the FAA. As such, the court affirmed denial of Prime’s motion to compel arbitration. Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., No. 15-2364 (1st Cir. May 12, 2017).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

See our disclaimer.