Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

TENTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRAL AWARD IN LLC DISSOLUTION DISPUTE

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The Tenth Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s confirmation of an arbitration award in a dispute regarding the dissolution of Knowledge Strategy Solutions, LLC (“KSS”). KSS was a partnership between the professional corporations of Anne Kershaw (“Kershaw”) and Shannon Spangler (“Spangler”). On less than amicable terms, the two negotiated a withdrawal from KSS effective June 30, 2014, but Kershaw filed the necessary paperwork terminating the corporation four days early without Spangler’s knowledge. Kershaw did not tender to Spangler PC its share of KSS’s capital account or other assets, and instead created a new LLC (“KSS-New York”) and placed KSS’s assets into that company, prompting Spangler to file suit.

Kershaw moved to compel arbitration, which a Missouri state court ordered for some of the claims regarding the alleged breach of KSS’s operating agreement and breach of fiduciary duties, but retained jurisdiction over other counts. Arbitration was temporarily delayed when KSS-New York filed for bankruptcy and a bankruptcy court issued an automatic stay, but after the stay was lifted the arbitrator issued an award in Spangler’s favor. The award encompassed Spangler’s share of KSS’s capital account, but did not include any award for KSS’s intangible assets which were then in possession of KSS-New York in bankruptcy. A district court confirmed the arbitral award, and Kershaw appealed.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s confirmation over Kershaw’s three objections: that the district court’s decision demonstrated (1) disregard for the bankruptcy court’s order, (2) disregard for the Missouri state court’s order, and (3) disregard of a Missouri statute.

First, the appeals court upheld the lower court’s finding that the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his arbitral authority by awarding Spangler its value of KSS’s capital account upon termination. Despite Kershaw’s argument that the capital account money was transferred to KSS-New York and thus subject to bankruptcy protection, the court explained that money is fungible and Kershaw retained liability for the undistributed capital account even though it transferred the actual money to KSS-New York. Unlike money, however, KSS’s intangible assets now in KSS-New York’s possession were not fungible and the arbitrator thus appropriately refrained from awarding any part of those assets subject to bankruptcy protection. The Tenth Circuit specifically noted that this differential treatment of monetary and intangible assets demonstrated the arbitrator was aware of the limits of his authority imposed by the bankruptcy proceeding and fastidiously adhered to those limits.

Second, the court rejected Kershaw’s argument that the arbitrator disregarded the state court’s order compelling arbitration by improperly including compensation in the arbitral award. Inclusion of compensation via revenue, Kershaw argued, encroached upon the Missouri court’s retention of jurisdiction over compensation-based claims, which were excluded from the arbitration provision. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that this argument impermissibly challenged the arbitrator’s legal conclusions and factual findings.

Third, the appeals court declined to decide whether Kershaw’s argument that the omission of a statute’s complete language in a quotation by the district court was manifest disregard of the law. The court noted that the lower court’s statutory analysis was an alternative finding, and thus even a favorable ruling for Kershaw would not require reversal of the award’s confirmation, because the lower court’s primary holding is undisturbed.

A. Kershaw, P.C. v. Shannon L. Spangler, P.C., No. 16-1483 (10th Cir. July 10, 2017).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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NINTH CIRCUIT FINDS INCORPORATION OF ICC RULES INTO ARBITRATION AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE EVIDENCE OF DELEGATION OF ARBITRABILITY TO ARBITRATOR

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In a case involving three related contracts, only one of which contained an arbitration agreement, the Ninth Circuit has held that incorporation of the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) into an arbitration agreement constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of delegation of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The first contract was one between Portland General Electric Company (PGE) and a contractor to build a power plant. It required the contractor to obtain a performance bond, which was issued by two insurers (the Sureties). Neither the construction contract nor the bond contained arbitration provisions. The construction contract also required the contractor to obtain a guaranty of performance from Abengoa S.A. Abengoa issued a guaranty to PGE, under which Abengoa and PGE agreed to submit any disputes to arbitration conducted by and under the rules of the ICC. The guaranty further stated that once arbitration commenced, either party could implead or raise any claim against any other entity, provided the claim arose out of or in connection with an agreement with a subcontractor or the guaranty.

Subsequently, PGE declared the contractor in default and terminated the construction contract, prompting Abengoa to file a request for arbitration with the ICC, naming PGE as respondent and the contractor as an impleaded party. Abengoa then moved to join the Sureties in the arbitration. The Sureties denied liability under the performance bond, and PGE sued them in federal court and moved to enjoin them from arbitrating their claims against PGE. The Sureties argued that PGE had expressly agreed in the guaranty that the ICC tribunal would decide whether Abengoa could join the Sureties and for what purposes, but the court granted PGE’s request for a preliminary injunction and refused to stay the litigation.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the parties, by agreeing to arbitration under the ICC Rules, had delegated the authority to decide the “gateway” questions of arbitrability at issue because the ICC rules expressly vest arbitrators “with the authority to determine questions of arbitrability.” The Ninth Circuit thus vacated the District Court’s order, concluding that the litigation must be stayed while the tribunal determined whether PGE was required to arbitrate its claims against the Sureties.

Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 16-35628 (9th Cir. July 10, 2017)

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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MF GLOBAL HOLDINGS REINSURER’S $15 MILLION BOND STRUCK BY BANKRUPTCY COURT AND LEAVE TO APPEAL REJECTED BY NEW YORK FEDERAL COURT

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Two courts in New York recently issued decisions concerning Allied World’s ongoing coverage dispute with MF Global Holdings Ltd. over the former’s bankruptcy. As previously reported on this blog, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, in a series of opinions, has found that Allied World and other re/insurers violated the Barton Doctrine by initiating suits in Bermuda which resulted in anti-suit injunctions, granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the insurers from enforcing those injunctions, and ordered Allied World to post a $15 million bond as an unauthorized foreign insurer. Late last month, the Southern District of New York—with appellate jurisdiction over Bankruptcy Court decisions—denied Allied World’s motions seeking leave to appeal the court’s order granting a preliminary injunction, the contempt order for violating a prior temporary restraining order, and the Barton violation order. In another ruling last week, the Bankruptcy Court struck a $15 million bond posted in response to that court’s earlier order.

In part, the Southern District rejected Allied World’s argument it was entitled to an appeal as of right regarding the Barton order because, as an automatic stay, it was akin to a permanent injunction which qualifies as a final order subject to interlocutory review. The court found the Barton order was not an appealable final order. Although in certain circumstances a Barton violation order could constitute a final order, the court held that as a “practical matter” it was not final because the Bankruptcy Court intended to reconsider the propriety of the order imminently. Indeed, the parties had submitted additional briefing on the issue and an opinion on the matter was pending in the Bankruptcy Court at the time. Additionally, the court rejected Allied World’s alternative ground for appeal under the collateral order doctrine because it failed the doctrine’s third prong that the order at issue be effectively unreviewable.

Next, the court addressed Allied World’s motions for leave to appeal the preliminary injunction, contempt order, and Barton order. In regards to Allied World’s argument that the Bankruptcy Court lacked personal jurisdiction for the preliminary injunction and Barton order based upon insufficient service, the court found the record was incomplete on the service and thus interlocutory review was inappropriate. In regards to Allied World’s argument that the Bankruptcy Court applied the Barton doctrine in novel ways by extending the types of defendants covered and by applying it extraterritorially, the court noted the Barton order was hardly a “controlling issue of law” for the overarching litigation because proceedings in the matter would continue even if it were reversed. Additionally, the court concluded Allied World did not demonstrate any substantial ground for differences of opinion aside from mere conjecture on either supposedly novel application. In regards to Allied World’s argument for pendent jurisdiction over the contempt order, the court denied that motion because it had denied leave to appeal either of the other two orders.

The Bankruptcy Court also struck Allied World’s bond filed in response to the court’s June 12 order. After Allied World posted the bond, MF Global moved to strike the bond on the grounds that it inappropriately conditioned performance upon the exhaustion of any appeal filed by Allied World from a final judgment of the Bankruptcy Court. The court found that the statute requiring the bond imposed no such requirement for exhaustion of appeals and the statute’s trigger—a “final judgment”—includes final judgment of trial courts notwithstanding ongoing appeals. Further, the court found Allied World’s proposed modifications to the bond were likewise unacceptable, noting the only way Allied World could avoid or delay payment would be a stay of enforcement pending appeal and subsequent posting of a supersedeas bond. Allied World must now post a compliant $15 million bond by July 21, 2017.

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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EIGHTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION, REJECTING CONTRACT DEFENSES OF UNCONSCIONABILITY AND LACK OF CONSIDERATION

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed an order compelling arbitration in a case filed by a volunteer concession worker against an operator of concessions at a sports stadium in St. Louis. The concession worker had volunteered to work at the stadium to raise funds for Washington University. The worker sued in state court claiming that the amount of the donation made by the concession operator violated the federal and state minimum wage, and that the operator committed fraud. The operator moved to compel arbitration based on a release the volunteer signed that included an agreement to submit any dispute arising from the volunteer activities to arbitration. The trial court compelled arbitration and the volunteer appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and lacked consideration. The Eighth Circuit rejected both arguments. The agreement was not unconscionable because it was “easy to understand, with no evidence that it [was] non-negotiable,” and the agreement did not contain onerous provisions. And the agreement was supported by consideration, namely, the volunteer’s release of his right to sue the operator in exchange for the opportunity to volunteer at the sports stadium and procure a donation to Washington University. The Eighth Circuit also found that the arbitration agreement, which encompassed “any dispute arising from the [volunteer] Activity,” is broad and encompassed the volunteer’s claim that he was defrauded from the alleged insufficient wage. The claim depended on whether the plaintiff was “a volunteer or an employee, and the underlying factual allegations touch matters covered by the arbitration provision.” Leonard v. Delaware North Companies Sport Service, Inc.a>, Case No. 16-3246 (8th Circuit June 27, 2017).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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COURT FINDS NO EXCEEDING OF POWERS OR MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW IN CONFIRMING ALLEGEDLY SPECULATIVE ARBITRATION AWARD

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This case concerned an agreement by which Clos La Chance Wines, Inc., a wine producer, appointed AV Brands, Inc., a wine importer and wholesaler, as the exclusive brand agent and distributor of its wine products for the United States and Puerto Rico for a five year period. Pursuant to the agreement, AV Brands was required to use “best efforts” and “commercially reasonable efforts” in staffing the account and selling product, and was subject to yearly goals dictating the number of wine cases it was required to purchase. Several years into the arrangement and pursuant to the agreement’s dispute resolution provision, Clos La Chance Wines filed a demand for arbitration alleging that AV Brands breached the agreement by failing to meet those marketing requirements.

In a final arbitration award, Retired Judge William J. Cahill found, among other things, that Clos La Chance Wines was entitled to damages in the amount of $1,739,681, which included $200,000 to compensate it for future time and costs associated with recapturing its market position. Clos La Chance Wines then sought confirmation of the award and this decision followed.

AV Brands challenged Judge Cahill’s $200,000 award for lost market share, primarily arguing that in doing so, Judge Cahill (1) exceeded his powers, since contracts generally permit only the recovery of foreseeable damages, and (2) manifestly disregarded California law prohibiting breach of contract damages based on speculative evidence. With regard to the first ground, the court rejected AV Brands’ argument, likening it to a claim that Judge Cahill misunderstood the applicable law, which the Court stated is not a valid reason for vacatur. Regarding the latter ground, the Court found that AV Brands overlooked Judge Cahill’s finding that while much of the testimony regarding market share damages was speculative, some was not speculative and thus persuasive. Therefore, the Court refused to “re-weigh the evidence” and confirmed the award. Clos La Chance Wines, Inc. v. AV Brands, Inc., Case No. 5:16-cv-04047 (USDC N.D. Cal. June 23, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.
See our disclaimer.