Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

MF GLOBAL HOLDINGS REINSURER’S $15 MILLION BOND STRUCK BY BANKRUPTCY COURT AND LEAVE TO APPEAL REJECTED BY NEW YORK FEDERAL COURT

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Two courts in New York recently issued decisions concerning Allied World’s ongoing coverage dispute with MF Global Holdings Ltd. over the former’s bankruptcy. As previously reported on this blog, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, in a series of opinions, has found that Allied World and other re/insurers violated the Barton Doctrine by initiating suits in Bermuda which resulted in anti-suit injunctions, granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the insurers from enforcing those injunctions, and ordered Allied World to post a $15 million bond as an unauthorized foreign insurer. Late last month, the Southern District of New York—with appellate jurisdiction over Bankruptcy Court decisions—denied Allied World’s motions seeking leave to appeal the court’s order granting a preliminary injunction, the contempt order for violating a prior temporary restraining order, and the Barton violation order. In another ruling last week, the Bankruptcy Court struck a $15 million bond posted in response to that court’s earlier order.

In part, the Southern District rejected Allied World’s argument it was entitled to an appeal as of right regarding the Barton order because, as an automatic stay, it was akin to a permanent injunction which qualifies as a final order subject to interlocutory review. The court found the Barton order was not an appealable final order. Although in certain circumstances a Barton violation order could constitute a final order, the court held that as a “practical matter” it was not final because the Bankruptcy Court intended to reconsider the propriety of the order imminently. Indeed, the parties had submitted additional briefing on the issue and an opinion on the matter was pending in the Bankruptcy Court at the time. Additionally, the court rejected Allied World’s alternative ground for appeal under the collateral order doctrine because it failed the doctrine’s third prong that the order at issue be effectively unreviewable.

Next, the court addressed Allied World’s motions for leave to appeal the preliminary injunction, contempt order, and Barton order. In regards to Allied World’s argument that the Bankruptcy Court lacked personal jurisdiction for the preliminary injunction and Barton order based upon insufficient service, the court found the record was incomplete on the service and thus interlocutory review was inappropriate. In regards to Allied World’s argument that the Bankruptcy Court applied the Barton doctrine in novel ways by extending the types of defendants covered and by applying it extraterritorially, the court noted the Barton order was hardly a “controlling issue of law” for the overarching litigation because proceedings in the matter would continue even if it were reversed. Additionally, the court concluded Allied World did not demonstrate any substantial ground for differences of opinion aside from mere conjecture on either supposedly novel application. In regards to Allied World’s argument for pendent jurisdiction over the contempt order, the court denied that motion because it had denied leave to appeal either of the other two orders.

The Bankruptcy Court also struck Allied World’s bond filed in response to the court’s June 12 order. After Allied World posted the bond, MF Global moved to strike the bond on the grounds that it inappropriately conditioned performance upon the exhaustion of any appeal filed by Allied World from a final judgment of the Bankruptcy Court. The court found that the statute requiring the bond imposed no such requirement for exhaustion of appeals and the statute’s trigger—a “final judgment”—includes final judgment of trial courts notwithstanding ongoing appeals. Further, the court found Allied World’s proposed modifications to the bond were likewise unacceptable, noting the only way Allied World could avoid or delay payment would be a stay of enforcement pending appeal and subsequent posting of a supersedeas bond. Allied World must now post a compliant $15 million bond by July 21, 2017.

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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EIGHTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION, REJECTING CONTRACT DEFENSES OF UNCONSCIONABILITY AND LACK OF CONSIDERATION

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed an order compelling arbitration in a case filed by a volunteer concession worker against an operator of concessions at a sports stadium in St. Louis. The concession worker had volunteered to work at the stadium to raise funds for Washington University. The worker sued in state court claiming that the amount of the donation made by the concession operator violated the federal and state minimum wage, and that the operator committed fraud. The operator moved to compel arbitration based on a release the volunteer signed that included an agreement to submit any dispute arising from the volunteer activities to arbitration. The trial court compelled arbitration and the volunteer appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and lacked consideration. The Eighth Circuit rejected both arguments. The agreement was not unconscionable because it was “easy to understand, with no evidence that it [was] non-negotiable,” and the agreement did not contain onerous provisions. And the agreement was supported by consideration, namely, the volunteer’s release of his right to sue the operator in exchange for the opportunity to volunteer at the sports stadium and procure a donation to Washington University. The Eighth Circuit also found that the arbitration agreement, which encompassed “any dispute arising from the [volunteer] Activity,” is broad and encompassed the volunteer’s claim that he was defrauded from the alleged insufficient wage. The claim depended on whether the plaintiff was “a volunteer or an employee, and the underlying factual allegations touch matters covered by the arbitration provision.” Leonard v. Delaware North Companies Sport Service, Inc.a>, Case No. 16-3246 (8th Circuit June 27, 2017).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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COURT FINDS NO EXCEEDING OF POWERS OR MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW IN CONFIRMING ALLEGEDLY SPECULATIVE ARBITRATION AWARD

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This case concerned an agreement by which Clos La Chance Wines, Inc., a wine producer, appointed AV Brands, Inc., a wine importer and wholesaler, as the exclusive brand agent and distributor of its wine products for the United States and Puerto Rico for a five year period. Pursuant to the agreement, AV Brands was required to use “best efforts” and “commercially reasonable efforts” in staffing the account and selling product, and was subject to yearly goals dictating the number of wine cases it was required to purchase. Several years into the arrangement and pursuant to the agreement’s dispute resolution provision, Clos La Chance Wines filed a demand for arbitration alleging that AV Brands breached the agreement by failing to meet those marketing requirements.

In a final arbitration award, Retired Judge William J. Cahill found, among other things, that Clos La Chance Wines was entitled to damages in the amount of $1,739,681, which included $200,000 to compensate it for future time and costs associated with recapturing its market position. Clos La Chance Wines then sought confirmation of the award and this decision followed.

AV Brands challenged Judge Cahill’s $200,000 award for lost market share, primarily arguing that in doing so, Judge Cahill (1) exceeded his powers, since contracts generally permit only the recovery of foreseeable damages, and (2) manifestly disregarded California law prohibiting breach of contract damages based on speculative evidence. With regard to the first ground, the court rejected AV Brands’ argument, likening it to a claim that Judge Cahill misunderstood the applicable law, which the Court stated is not a valid reason for vacatur. Regarding the latter ground, the Court found that AV Brands overlooked Judge Cahill’s finding that while much of the testimony regarding market share damages was speculative, some was not speculative and thus persuasive. Therefore, the Court refused to “re-weigh the evidence” and confirmed the award. Clos La Chance Wines, Inc. v. AV Brands, Inc., Case No. 5:16-cv-04047 (USDC N.D. Cal. June 23, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.
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TEXAS AND WISCONSIN JOIN LIST OF STATES PERMITTING DOMESTIC SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE

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On June 15 and 22, 2017, respectively, the Governors of Texas and Wisconsin approved new laws permitting domestic surplus lines insurers in those states (i.e., insurers domiciled in Texas and Wisconsin) to conduct business within those states. Texas and Wisconsin join a growing list of states, including Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Oklahoma, that have passed similar legislation. Previously, a surplus lines carrier would be admitted in one state and be eligible to sell surplus lines coverage only in the other 49 states. This model is gradually changing. Domestic surplus lines insurers in states with laws similar to Texas and Wisconsin are now authorized to issue domestic coverage provided that they satisfy certain eligibility requirements, including minimum capital and surplus requirements. Domestic surplus lines carriers may still not issue coverage in admitted markets. The Texas law is effective January 1, 2018, and the Wisconsin law was effective on June 22, 2017. Texas H.B. No. 2492; Wisconsin 2017 S.B. No. 77.

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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COURT FINDS CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CODE SECTION 11658.5 REVERSE-PREEMPTS SECTION 4 OF THE FAA

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National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA provided Seneca Family of Agencies with workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurance for Seneca’s operations in California from 2004 to 2013. The parties entered into a payment agreement that governed the parties’ financing and credit obligations with respect to the insurance policies. The agreement’s arbitration provision provided that, among other things, “any action or proceeding concerning arbitrability, including motions to compel or to stay arbitration, may be brought only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the City, County, and State of New York.” In 2013, the parties amended the arbitration provision to include: “any action or proceeding concerning arbitrability, including motions to compel or to stay arbitration, may be brought only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the City, County, and State of New York.”

Years later, a dispute over the amount of collateral to be paid under the payment agreement arose and National Union moved to compel arbitration. At issue before the court was Seneca’s objection based on the application of Cal. Ins. Code § 11658.5, which requires arbitration provisions in workers’ compensation policies to be disclosed to potential insureds. The court approached this issue in two parts— first, addressing claims related to policies issued on or after July 1, 2012, the effective date of § 11658.5, (the “Post-July 2012 policies”) and second, addressing claims related to policies issued prior to July 1, 2012 (the “Pre-July 2012 policies”).

With regard to claims related to the Post-July 2012 policies, the Court denied National Union’s motion to compel arbitration. The Court analyzed an issue not previously addressed in the case of Monarch Consulting (see blog post dated March 15, 2016)— that is, whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act reverse-preempts the FAA with respect to § 11658.5. Applying the three-prong test to determine if a state statute reverse-preempts a federal statute, the Court found all prongs to be met: (1) the FAA did not specifically relate to insurance; (2) § 11658.5 was enacted to regulate the business of insurance; and (3) the FAA would invalidate, impair, or supersede § 11658.5 because § 4 of the FAA directly conflicted with § 11658.5 in this case.

With regard to the Pre-July 2012 policies, the Court found that any claims related to those policies must be arbitrated, primarily because § 11658.5 did not apply to those policies, and any claims related to Pre-July 2012 policies plainly fell within the scope of the payment agreement’s arbitration provision. As such, the Court granted National Union’s motion to compel arbitration of claims related to the Pre-July 2012 policies. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Seneca Family of Agencies, Case No: 17-cv-01061 (USDC S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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