Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

TAX COURT DISALLOWS DEDUCTIONS FOR PAYMENTS TO CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY

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A husband and wife who paid $1.54 million in premiums to their captive insurance company and $720,000 in premiums to another insurer over two years, almost all of which ended up back in their bank accounts, have had their tax deductions for those payments disallowed in a lengthy opinion by the United States Tax Court.

The couple, Benyamin and Orna Avrahami, own a set of businesses and commercial properties in the Phoenix, Arizona area. In 2007, they set up a captive insurance company called Feedback, incorporated in St. Kitts and for which they elected treatment as a small insurance company under Internal Revenue Code section 831(b).  While their total insurance expense in the year before they set up Feedback was $150,000, the Avrahamis’ businesses paid Feedback insurance premiums of $730,000 in 2009 and $810,00 in 2010.  One of those businesses also paid Pan American Reinsurance Company $360,000 in both years for terrorism risk insurance, while Feedback participated in a “risk distribution program,” under which Pan American paid Feedback $360,000 in both years.  The Avrahamis then deducted all of these premiums—$1.09 million in 2019 and $1.17 million in 2010—as business expenses.

The IRS began an audit of the Avrahamis in 2012, ultimately disallowing their deductions for insurance expenses paid to Feedback and Pan American. The IRS took the position that the payments to Feedback and Pan American were not actually insurance premiums, and the Tax Court agreed.  The court found that Feedback did not meet the essential insurance characteristic of distributing risk because it only issued 7 policies insuring 3 stores, had 2 key employees, 35 other employees, and 3 commercial properties, all in the Phoenix area, in the relevant years.  Feedback’s purported reinsurance relationship with Pan American did not help to distribute that risk, the court found, because Pan American was not a bona fide insurance company.  The Court based this on its findings that: (1) the premiums Pan American charged were “grossly excessive” when compared with what was available on the market—particularly when the Avrahamis’ own witness could not identify a single event in history to which its terrorism insurance would provide coverage; (2) Pan American distributed virtually all of the premiums it received back to its policyholders or related entities; and (3) it was unlikely that it could actually pay claims if they arose.  The court also found that Feedback did not operate like an insurance company—it issued policies with unclear and contradictory terms, paid no claims until the IRS began its audit, unreasonably invested the premiums in unsecured loans to related parties, and charged “utterly unreasonable” premiums—and thus the premiums paid to it were not actually for insurance.

As a result, the court sustained the IRS’s finding that the Avrahami’s could not deduct the premiums they paid to Feedback and Pan American. However, the court found that these disallowed deductions did not justify imposing penalties on the Avrahamis, despite the fact that much of the advice they received was from an attorney who qualified as a promoter of these transactions, because, in setting up Feedback and taking those deductions, they also reasonably relied on the advice of another attorney who was not a promoter.   The court also found that, because it was not actually an insurer, Feedback did not qualify for treatment as a small insurer under section 831(b), but this also meant that, as a St. Kitts entity, it did not owe any U.S. taxes.

Avrahami et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Docket Nos. 17594-13 and 18274-13 (U.S. Tax Ct. Aug. 21, 2017).

This post written by Jason Brost.
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DESPITE HEAVY CRITICISM OF THE RATIONALE, BRITISH COURT REFUSES TO ENFORCE ARBITRAL AWARD SET ASIDE BY RUSSIAN COURT

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The British High Court of Justice recently decided not to enforce an arbitral award in a dispute over the calculation of the purchase price of a Russian metallurgical company where a Russian court set aside that award and Russian appellate courts affirmed the decision. The plaintiff had argued the British court should not recognize the Russian judgments setting aside the award because it was the result of bias, while the defendant argued under the doctrine of ex nihilo nihil fit that because the award had already been set aside there was nothing for the British court to enforce.

The court started its analysis by observing the heavy burden borne by the party challenging the foreign court decision. Not only must the party show the decision is wrong or manifestly wrong, they must also show the decision is “so wrong as to be evidence of bias, or be such that no court acting in good faith could have arrived at it.” 

The original Russian judge decided to set the award aside on three grounds: (1) the non-disclosure of potential bias because of the arbitrator’s relationships with expert witnesses was non-waivable; (2) the arbitrators’ method of calculating the purchase price violated public policy because it did not follow the purchase agreement’s terms; and (3) the dispute involved a “corporate claim” which is non-arbitratable under Russian law. It is noteworthy that the latter two grounds were not ones raised by the parties and were only raised by the judge in her written opinion.

In a lengthy opinion, the British High Court criticized the Russian court’s decision on all three grounds. On the non-disclosure issue, the British court took issue with the Russian court’s failure to address the appropriate test for waiver (actual or constructive notice), and failure to reach any factual conclusions. The court also took issue with the sua sponte nature of the latter two grounds. On the public policy issue in particular, the court found it difficult to see how the arbitrators acted in contravention of the agreement terms in arriving at a price calculation. Moreover, even if it were in contravention, that would amount to an error of law at most, not an act against public policy. On the non-arbitrability issue, the court determined that the Russian judge might have been a pioneer in concluding that corporate disputes are not arbitrable, because it could not find any record of cases holding applying that rule. However, a number of Russian courts since have followed her ruling.

Despite taking issue with the “shaky” grounds upon which the Russian court decided to set aside the award, and with the Russian appellate courts’ decisions affirming, the High Court nevertheless refused to enforce the award. It held that the decisions were not “so extreme and perverse that they can only be ascribed to bias” against the Plaintiff. For that reason, the court dismissed the application to enforce the award and did not reach the ex nihilo nihil fit argument.

Maximov v. Open Joint Stock Co., [2017] EWHC 1911 (Comm) July 27, 2017.

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .
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SECOND CIRCUIT AFFIRMS ARBITRATION AWARD FINDING NO DISREGARD OF MERGER AGREEMENT OR MANIFEST DISREGARD OF DELAWARE LAW

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In a summary order, the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment confirming an arbitral award of damages for breach of a merger agreement between respondents Sirona Dental Systems, Inc. and Arges Imaging Inc. (“Sirona”) and petitioners, former shareholders of Arges Imaging Inc. On appeal, Sirona argued that the lower court should have vacated the award because the arbitrator (1) disregarded the plain terms of the agreement when it concluded that petitioners were entitled to recover a $3 million bonus based on the proven accuracy of their dental-imaging product and (2) manifestly disregarded Delaware’s prohibition on speculative damages in awarding petitioners approximately $4 million under a provision tied to the dental-imaging product’s expected revenues.

The Second Circuit found that the arbitrator did not disregard the plain terms of the agreement and similarly did not manifestly disregard Delaware law in its damages calculation. On the first issue, the Second Circuit found that “[w]hether or not we would ourselves construe the Agreement” as the arbitrator did was inapposite; “the arbitrator’s interpretation was supported by at least a ‘barely colorable justification,’ which suffices to confirm the award.” On the second issue, the Second Circuit rejected Sirona’s argument that the arbitrator ignored Delaware law, instead finding that the arbitrator cited Delaware precedent proscribing awards of “speculative” damages and concluding that petitioners’ damages calculations met Delaware’s requirement that “damages be shown with reasonable certainty.” Moreover, the Second Circuit found that the arbitrator did not disregard the general rule in Delaware prohibiting damages based on evidence of expected profits from a new business or technology. Bergheim v. Sirona Dental Systems Inc., Case No. 17-548-cv (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM REAUTHORIZED THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 2017

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On September 8, 2017, Congress passed legislation extending the National Flood Insurance Program until December 8, 2017. The program was set to expire at the end of September. The extension was part of a continuing resolution raising the debt limit and funding the U.S. government. No changes to the flood insurance program were made, although reforms may be coming in the future. US HR 601 (Sept. 8, 2017).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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COURT CONFIRMS ARBITRATOR’S ENTRY OF INTERIM PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, HOLDING THAT THE AWARD WAS SUFFICIENTLY “FINAL”

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This case concerns a 10-year agreement by which plaintiff, an endodontist, contracted to perform consulting services for defendant Dentsply, a business that manufactured and sold endodontic products for the dental industry. The agreement prohibited plaintiff from disclosing any confidential information about Dentsply’s business affairs or from competing with Dentsply for three years after the termination of the agreement. But immediately prior to the end of the 10-year term of the agreement, plaintiff brought suit contending that the confidentially and non-compete provisions of the agreement were unenforceable, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The case proceeded to arbitration during which the arbitrator sided with Dentsply and enjoined plaintiff from breaching the confidentiality and non-compete provisions. Dentsply then filed a motion to confirm the arbitrator’s preliminary injunction award.

Plaintiff opposed Dentsply’s motion, asserting a number of arguments based on the notion that the preliminary injunction was not sufficiently final to be confirmed by the court. The court rejected each of plaintiff’s arguments and then considered “whether, in the absence of binding Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent, the Court should join the district and circuit courts that have considered interim arbitral awards final for the purposes of judicial review and confirm the Ruling.” The court decided to join those courts and confirmed the arbitrator’s preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that the interim arbitration ruling “finally and definitively enjoin[ed] plaintiff from breaching the 2007 agreement’s confidentiality and non-compete provisions during the pendency of the arbitration, and if the Ruling [was] not enforced, a subsequent award of injunctive relief to defendant may be rendered meaningless.” Moreover, the Court reasoned that the Ruling was “not a preliminary or procedural trifle, and expending the judicial resources to confirm it does not frustrate our arbitration system’s goal of expediency.” Instead, the Court found, “confirming the Ruling [gave] teeth to the arbitrator’s interim award of equitable relief, thereby promoting arbitration as an efficacious and reliable alternative to the litigation process.” Johnson v. Dentsply Sirona Inc., Case No. 16-CV-0520-CVE-PJC (USDC N.D. Okla. Sept. 27, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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