Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

ARBITRATION AGREEMENT SELECTING MARYLAND LAW HELD UNENFORCEABLE AS TO PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW

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A choice of law provision within an arbitration agreement selecting Maryland law was held unenforceable in so far as it would result in waiver of claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), contrary to California’s “fundamental policy.”

Because the diversity action was brought in federal court in California, the court was required to follow California’s choice-of-law rules. California law provides that application of choice of law provisions that would yield results conflicting with California’s fundamental policy is error. The Ninth Circuit stated that PAGA represents a “fundamental California policy.” Therefore, the arbitration agreement’s choice of law rules selecting Maryland law could not be enforced, because they would waive the plaintiff’s PAGA claims.

However, the plaintiff’s claims for unpaid wages under California law were distinguishable from her PAGA claims. Arbitration of the unpaid wages claims was not contrary to any fundamental policy. As a result, the court ordered arbitration of the plaintiff’s personal unpaid wages claims, while prohibiting arbitration of her PAGA claims. Mandviwala v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc., No. 16-55084 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.
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NINTH CIRCUIT REAFFIRMS THAT WASHINGTON STATE’S PROHIBITION OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS REVERSE-PREEMPTS FAA

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This case concerned a coverage dispute between Technical Security Integration Inc. and its insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity. The District Court for the District of Oregon denied Philadelphia Indemnity’s motion to compel arbitration, which prompted this interlocutory appeal. Because Washington Code § 48.18.200 prohibits mandatory arbitration agreements in insurance contracts, while Oregon lacks any analogous provision, the issue on appeal was whether the district court erred when it applied Washington law, rather than Oregon law, to the dispute. Reviewing de novo and applying Oregon’s multi-factor test for determining “the most appropriate” law in the absence of an effective choice of law provision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that Washington law applied, and therefore, it affirmed the denial of Philadelphia Indemnity’s motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the district court properly followed Washington Supreme Court precedent interpreting Washington’s statute as prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, and moreover, that the statute “reverse-preempts” the Federal Arbitration Act, rather than being preempted by it.  Tech. Sec. Integration, Inc. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., No. 15-35683 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.
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PARTICIPATION IN LITIGATION TO AVOID A DEFAULT JUDGMENT DOES NOT WAIVE A PARTY’S RIGHT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

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An employer did not waive its right to compel arbitration under an employment agreement by seeking to set aside a default in an employment discrimination suit brought against it by its employee. Due to an “administrative oversight,” the employer’s counsel did not become aware it had been served with a complaint until after a default had been entered. The employer was successful in its effort to set aside the default, however, the employee argued that the employer’s participation in the litigation resulted in a waiver of its right to compel arbitration.

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. A two-part test controls whether a party has waived its right to arbitration. The first prong inquires whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the party has “acted inconsistently with the arbitration right.” This occurs when the party “substantially invokes the litigation machinery prior to demanding arbitration.” The second prong asks whether the invocation of litigation has prejudiced the other party.

The employer’s participation in the litigation was not substantial enough to be considered inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. In so holding, the court noted that moving to set aside the default was the only procedure the employer could have used to permit it to seek arbitration of the employee’s claims. Because the employer’s participation in the litigation failed to satisfy the first prong of the two-part test, the employer did not waive and was permitted to enforce its right to compel arbitration.  Sherrard v. Macy’s Sys. and Tech. Inc., Case No. 17-11766 (11th Cir. Feb. 5, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.
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U.K. COURT FINDS ARBITRATION RESPONDENT DID NOT WAIVE OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION OF ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

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The Queen’s Bench Division of the U.K.’s High Court of Justice has reversed a partial award by a tribunal of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), which held that an arbitration respondent lost its right to challenge the validity of a request for arbitration by failing to object until after serving its Response and shortly before its Statement of Defence was due. The court agreed with the tribunal that the request for arbitration violated LCIA Rules by seeking to join two disputes arising under separate contracts in a single proceeding. The court disagreed, however, with the conclusion that the respondent untimely challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction based on the invalid request. Reading Section 31 of the 1996 Arbitration Act together with Article 23.3 of the LCIA Rules, the court found that objections to jurisdiction must be made no later than the time for the Statement of Defence.

A v. B, [2017] EWHC 3417 (Comm)

This post written by Alex Silverman.

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CALIFORNIA FEDERAL COURT CONFIRMS ARBITRATION AWARD BENEFITTING THIRD-PARTY

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The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied a petitioner’s motion to vacate an arbitration award on the grounds of the award being “irrational and illogical,” erroneous, and that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law and engaged in prejudicial misconduct.

The Court found the arbitration award was not irrational or erroneous because the parties’ agreement provided authority for the arbitrator’s decision to order petitioner to pay money to a third-party (which was an affiliate of the respondent). With respect to the argument that the arbitration award was erroneous, the Court noted that “neither erroneous legal conclusions nor unsubstantiated factual findings justify federal court review of an arbitral award under the [Federal Arbitration Act] statute, which is unambiguous in this regard.”

The Court also found the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law, as petitioner did “not cite any clear and established law that prohibits arbitrators from issuing awards that benefit third parties. Moreover, even if there were an applicable law prohibiting arbitration awards to third parties, [petitioner] does not show that the arbitrator ‘recognized’ and ‘ignored’ that law.”

Lastly, the Court found the arbitrator did not engage in prejudicial misconduct or misbehavior, finding that the parties received a fundamentally fair hearing. While petitioner argued that it was prejudiced because it did not have notice of the third-party claims against it for unpaid premiums, the Court noted that petitioner did “not identify any other evidence it would have attempted to introduce, or other arguments it would have made, had it known that the arbitrator contemplated ordering [petitioner] to pay [the third-party] for the outstanding premiums. In essence, [petitioner] takes issue with the arbitrator’s factual findings and legal conclusions, and not the fairness of the proceeding.”

American, Etc., Inc., v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc., No. 17-cv-03660-DMR (USDC N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2017)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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