Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Minor Not Bound—Directly Or Indirectly—By Arbitration Agreement In Mother’s Credit Card Agreement

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Last month the Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court order enforcing an arbitration agreement contained in cardholder agreement as applied against the minor daughter (“A.D.”) of the cardholder, rejecting the bank’s attempt to compel arbitration of the daughter’s Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) putative class action lawsuit. The trial court ruled A.D. was bound by the arbitration agreement as an “authorized user” of the card—where she, on at least one occasion, used the credit card to make a purchase as instructed by her mother—and was bound under the direct benefits estoppel theory.

First, the Seventh Circuit held A.D. was not bound by the cardholder agreement and its arbitration clause. The court emphasized the specific procedures in the cardholder agreement for designating authorized users which the parties did not follow: A.D.’s mother never notified the bank or paid an annual fee, the bank never issued a new card, and A.D. was not even old enough at the time to qualify as an authorized user. The court also found A.D. never manifested consent to be bound by the arbitration agreement, did not have legal capacity as a minor to enter into a contract, and actively disaffirmed consent by filing a lawsuit.

Second, the court concluded equitable estoppel was inapplicable and did not bind A.D. to the cardholder agreement. Any benefit A.D. received was derived from her relationship with her mother, not any relationship with the bank. Nor, the court held, did A.D.’s lawsuit center on rights or benefits under the cardholder agreement. The court rejected the bank’s argument that its affirmative defense based on A.D.’s mother’s consent qualified the case as one “relying” on the agreement because the bank, not A.D., bore the burden of establishing that defense. Simply put, A.D.’s lawsuit asserted rights under the TCPA and was therefore not premised on the cardholder agreement.

Because A.D. was not bound to the cardholder agreement directly as a signatory nor indirectly through estoppel, the court reversed and refused to compel arbitration.

A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., No. 17-1486 (7th Cir. Mar. 22, 2018).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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Court Vacates Arbitration Award In Crop Insurance Dispute That Awarded Remedies Preempted By Federal Law

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The plaintiff, a farming company, demanded arbitration against Diversified Crop Insurance Services over the nonpayment of federally reinsured claims. The plaintiff brought several claims under policies it had purchased from Diversified, to which Diversified denied coverage, due to a misstatement of the farm’s location and a separate clerical omission as to the number of acres covered, both of which were allegedly errors committed by Diversified’s agent. The arbitrator found for the plaintiff and trebled damages against Diversified.

When the plaintiff moved to confirm the award, the court considered whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority by basing her decision on extra-contractual state law remedies, which are preempted by federal law associated with Diversified’s reinsurance coverage from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. The court found that the arbitrator did exceed her authority by finding that “the farm was uninsured, and therefore not covered by the policy, yet award[ing] damages in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud because she attributed the lack of coverage to Diversified and its agents.” The court found further evidence of the arbitrator’s exceeding the scope of her authority in the fact that she trebled the awards under North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. As such, the court vacated the award. Williamson Farm v. Diversified Crop Insurance Services, Case No. 5:17-CV-513-D (USDC E.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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West Virginia Amends Credit For Reinsurance Statute To Conform To NAIC Model, Effective January 1, 2019

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West Virginia House Bill 4230, approved by Governor Justice on March 27, amends the statutory requirements relating to when an insurer may claim credit for reinsurance to conform to the NAIC model law. The bill establishes requirements for:

  • Domestic insurers to be allowed credit;
  • Reinsurers to meet in order for credit to be granted to ceding insurers;
  • The location where assets that provide security to fund United States obligations must be maintained by a non-United States insurer or reinsurer;
  • The filing and valuation of claims; and
  • Provision of an asset or reduction from liability for reinsurance ceded by a domestic insurer.

The bill also provides for the distribution of assets of an insolvent non-United States insurer or reinsurer, in addition to providing the Insurance Commissioner with authority to promulgate related legislative and emergency rules.

The bill takes effect January 1, 2019 and applies to all cessions under reinsurance agreements that have an inception, anniversary, or renewal date on or after that date.

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.
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Fourth Circuit Dismisses Appeal Of Order Compelling Arbitration In Voluntarily Dismissed Class Action

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This case arose from a putative class action alleging claims against Groupon on the basis of its reimbursement policies. After the trial court ordered the parties to arbitrate pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties’ agreement, the plaintiff moved to amend the arbitration order, requesting that the district court dismiss her complaint with prejudice, advising the court that she would not pursue arbitration due to its costs outweighing her potential recovery. After the court dismissed the case, the plaintiff appealed the arbitration ruling, contending that the Fourth Circuit had jurisdiction over her appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which gives appellate courts jurisdiction of appeals from “final decisions” of district courts.

The plaintiff’s appeal was stayed pending a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker as to whether a voluntarily dismissed action is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling that a voluntary dismissal does not qualify as a final decision, the Fourth Circuit followed the high court’s precedent and dismissed the appeal. Keena v. Groupon, Inc., Case No. 16-1973 (4th Cir. Mar. 27, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

Court Applies The “Intertwined-Ness Test” To Find That A Non-Signatory Could Invoke Equitable Estoppel To Compel Arbitration

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The court applied a two-part “intertwined-ness test” to determine whether an arbitration agreement allowed a non-signatory to invoke equitable estoppel to compel arbitration. The first prong of the test examines whether the claims advanced by the signatory to the arbitration agreement arise under the same subject matter of the agreement. The second prong asks whether the non-signatory has a “close relationship” to a signatory of the agreement.

The first prong is heavily fact dependent. Here, the court held it was met because the “bulk of Plaintiffs’ claims … [arose] from the formation, execution, and existence of the Reinsurance Agreements,” which contained the arbitration agreement. The court was also influenced by the fact that the plaintiffs simultaneously filed a complaint in court and a demand for arbitration, both of which provided nearly identical factual allegations, alleged injuries, and theories of the case.

The second prong “is centered on the role of the non-signatory defendants when the misconduct occurred.” The court noted that an agency relationship between the non-signatory and a signatory may be sufficient to permit the non-signatory to compel arbitration. The fact that the plaintiffs also connected the non-signatory defendants to a signatory through conspiracy allegations clinched the matter for the court. The defendants had the requisite “close relationship” with a signatory to allow them to compel arbitration. Bankers Conseco Life Insurance Company v. Feuer, Case No. 16-Civ-7646 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

See our disclaimer.