Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Third Circuit Compels Arbitration Finding that Failure to Carefully Read Arbitration Agreement Does Not Vitiate Assent

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Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Kaplan University (Kaplan) as part of registration for online courses through the university’s website portal. After entering the necessary information, Plaintiff electronically signed an “Enrollment Packet,” which included an arbitration agreement and a waiver of a jury trial. When Plaintiff later brought suit against Kaplan for various causes of action relating to false advertising and violation of copyright laws, Kaplan moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, asserting that Plaintiff’s claims fell within the arbitration agreement. In an attempt to avoid dismissal, Plaintiff argued that she was never made aware of the arbitration agreement and did not consent to the use of her electronic signature for that agreement. Despite this, the District Court for the District of Pennsylvania entered an order compelling arbitration, finding that because Plaintiff acknowledged her participation in the enrollment process, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether she assented to arbitration.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that Kaplan employed a deceptive practice by attaching the arbitration agreement to the Enrollment Packet without making Plaintiff fully aware of its contents. However, the Third Circuit found this argument unavailing, noting that the arbitration agreement was “clearly labeled” within the Enrollment Packet, and that Plaintiff conceded that she electronically signed the packet. The Third Circuit ultimately affirmed the District Court’s judgment, finding that Plaintiff’s failure to carefully read the information could “not save her from her obligation to arbitrate.”

Dicent v. Kaplan University, No. 18-2982 (3d. Cir. Jan. 10, 2019).

Second Circuit Affirms Order Compelling Arbitration, Rejects as Waived Arguments Not Made Before Trial Court

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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had no difficulty affirming a district court’s order compelling the executor of an estate to arbitrate his claims based on an arbitration clause contained in an IRA application signed by the deceased.

At oral argument, the executor (an attorney appearing pro se) admitted that he had forfeited any argument that the arbitration provision itself was invalid, and thus was left to rely on the theory that the contract as a whole was invalid. The Second Circuit easily rejected this, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “unless [a] challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.” Thus, the Court found that the matter should go to arbitration where the arbitrator could decide the question of the contract’s validity.

The executor also argued that the district court erred in even considering the motion to compel due to an “electronic filing error” not specified in the opinion. However, in addition to being waived for not having been raised before the district court, the Court found that this argument lacked all merit because the executor knew about the motion, responded to it, and could not show any prejudice.

Aretakis v. First Financial Equity, Corp., Hilltop Securities, Inc., No. 17-3649 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 2018)

11th Circuit Compels Arbitration Despite Allegation that Arbitration Agreement was Procedurally and Substantively Unconscionable

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This case involves a dispute between American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus (“Aflac”) and a group of independent contractors (“associates”), arising out of alleged misrepresentations by Aflac. Pursuant to their contracts with Aflac, the associates agreed to arbitrate any claims against the company, and after learning of the associates’ plans to file a class action, Aflac filed a motion to compel arbitration in Georgia state court. In response, the associates removed the case to federal court and sought to void the arbitration agreement by arguing that it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

Specifically, the associates argued that (1) they did not have a sufficient opportunity to review the arbitration provision before executing the agreement, (2) that the agreement was one-sided because it required the associates to arbitrate claims against Aflac, but did not include the same requirement for Aflac, and (3) the costs and fees to be paid by the associates were so great that it would effectively deny the associates a forum to bring their claims. The district court for the Middle District of Georgia found these arguments unavailing and entered an order compelling arbitration.

The associates moved for reconsideration, but were denied. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s order to compel arbitration de novo. However, the court’s analysis did not progress past the associates’ failure to produce any evidence in support of their unconscionability claims at the briefing and hearing stage. For some of their arguments, the Eleventh Circuit noted that even if the associates had produced evidence, Georgia law governing mutuality of remedies and confidentiality provisions in arbitration agreements still would not support a finding that the agreement was unconscionable. As such, the panel affirmed the district court’s judgment compelling arbitration and denying the motion for reconsideration.

American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Hubbard, et al., No. 18-11869 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019).

National Council of Insurance Legislators Calls upon Federal Reserve to Limit Examinations of State-Regulated Insurers

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The Dodd-Frank Act provided the Federal Reserve Board with limited authority over certain insurance holding companies with federally regulated banking subsidiaries, creating some tension with the general rule, embodied in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, that insurance is regulated at the state level. The National Council of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) has issued a resolution critical of the Federal Reserve Board’s use of that authority, stating that, in exercising its limited authority over these entities, “the Federal Reserve Board has over-extended its examination powers by routinely requiring insurance companies to supply information and responses to inquiries of the sort in practice that are the province of” state insurance regulators, “on whose work Federal Reserve Board examiners are statutorily required” to rely. This, the NCOIL resolution states, “will most likely conflict with, the jurisdiction of State insurance regulators over solvency and market conduct regulation or, at best, will be duplicative.”

The NCOIL resolution further:

  • “calls upon the Federal Reserve Board to direct its examiners that the insurance operations of state-regulated insurers . . . are regulated by the individual states and that the Federal Reserve Board’s examinations are, to the fullest extent possible, to rely upon the examination reports and other work of state insurance regulators and not to duplicate and/or conflict with the states’ regulatory powers over the insurers’ market conduct or solvency”;
  • “encourages Congress to provide oversight and, if necessary, enact legislation to ensure” that the Federal Reserve Board abides by these limits; and
  • “calls upon the Federal Reserve Board to consult with, defer to, and rely on to the fullest extent possible, and to avoid, to the fullest extent possible, duplication of, the work of state insurance regulators on matters involving the regulation of insurance operations and solvency of insurers, regardless of the insurers’ affiliations with federally-regulated financial institutions.”

Resolution Asserting McCarran-Ferguson Reverse Preemption over the Supervision of Insurance Companies by the Federal Reserve Board and Its Examiners (Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators, Dec. 8, 2018)

DC District Court Permits Vantage Commodities To File Amended Complaint And Denies Reinsurer Defendants’ Motion For Interlocutory Appeal

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The District Court for the District of Columbia issued an order denying a motion to reconsider its prior order allowing Vantage Commodities to file an amended complaint and denying the reinsurer defendants’ motion for interlocutory appeal. In the underlying decision, the court determined that, while Vantage had not stated a claim for breach of contract because it had failed to allege facts showing a contractual relationship, the complaint adequately stated claims for breach of implied contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment.

The court found that Vantage had alleged enough facts to survive a motion to dismiss, noting that the court was required to draw all reasonable inferences in Vantage’s favor at the motion to dismiss stage. That determination was limited to the specific allegations in Vantage’s amended complaint, and did not “create new law.”

The court refused to exercise its discretion to allow an interlocutory appeal of its non-final order, finding that the questions of law the reinsurers presented were “tied up in the specific facts of this case.” Furthermore, while the reinsurers argued that the court’s prior order “goes against the weight of authority in reinsurance law that an insured cannot maintain a direct action against a reinsurer,” they failed to cite any specific case law showing that the court’s order was in conflict with other authorities. The court concluded that the reinsurer defendants did not meet their burden of showing that the circumstances of this case justified a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of final judgment. For more information regarding this case, see our prior posts here and here.

Vantage Commodities Financial Services I, LLC v. Assured Risk Transfer PCC, LLC, Case No. 1:17-CV-01451 (USDC D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2019).