Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Applied Underwriters Defeats Class Certification in Long-Running Worker’s Compensation Reinsurance Dispute

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Applied Underwriters beat back an attempt by plaintiffs to certify a class in their lawsuit related to Applied Underwriters’ “EquityComp” and “SolutionOne” workers’ compensation programs. We previously reported on this case, which involves a disputed Reinsurance Participation Agreement used to control worker’s compensation rates, on July 21, 2016, December 1, 2016, November 15, 2017, January 31, 2018, and August 30, 2018. The court has now determined that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a class action would be “superior” to individual actions, as required by four factors under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), and denied class certification.

In determining that the first factor of the class members’ interest in individually controlling the litigation, weighed against certification, the court noted that the individual damages alleged by claimants in this action were large and there was no evidence that any class member would be unable to bring an action absent class certification. The second factor of the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by class members, weighed “strongly” against certification, as more than “100 separate arbitrations, lawsuits, and California Department Insurance appeals involving 67 California participants in the program” were already pending. On that basis, the court determined that a substantial number of putative class members had an interest in controlling their own litigation and that “realistic alternatives” to a class action exist.

The third factor of the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum, weighed “slightly” against certification, where the remaining claims were all brought under California law (which weighed in favor of certification), but the many potential claimants were “located throughout the state,” including some that were “far from this court.” Additionally, certifying the class would automatically select federal court as the preferred forum for all class members even though the previously filed actions discussed above had demonstrated otherwise.

Finally, the court determined the “manageability” factor of the likely difficulties in managing a class action, also weighed against certification, where the court would have to determine the extent of overlap between the class action and the many previously filed actions, as well as how to properly formulate a class notice that accounts for the potentially overlapping and differing claims brought in the various actions and the class action. “These difficulties would only be magnified where many similar actions have already concluded and others have progressed substantially.”

Shasta Linen Supply, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-1222-WBS-AC (USDC E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019).

Ninth Circuit Affirms Order Vacating Arbitration Award, Faults Arbitrator’s Disregard of Contract’s Plain Language

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The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed a district court order vacating an arbitration award arising from the termination of subcontracts for the construction of army buildings and facilities in Afghanistan. Defendants ECC Centcom Constructors, LLC and ECC International, LLC (together, “ECC”) had two prime contracts with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE”) for the construction of army buildings and facilities in two provinces in Afghanistan. ECC in turn awarded two subcontracts to Aspic Engineering and Construction Company (“Aspic”) for the completion of those projects. Relevant to this dispute, the subcontracts incorporated many Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) clauses by reference, including those governing termination for convenience, and mandated that Aspic owe to ECC the same obligations that ECC owed to the United States government.

After USACE terminated ECC’s prime contracts for convenience, ECC and Aspic could not agree on a termination settlement amount for both contracts, particularly after USACE refused to pay for any of Aspic’s claimed termination costs. ECC and Aspic proceeded to arbitration to resolve the termination of both subcontracts, and the arbitrator awarded Aspic just over $1 million. Although the award was initially confirmed in California state court, a California federal court later vacated the award, reasoning that it conflicted with contract language. The federal court reasoned that the arbitrator “voided and reconstructed parts of the Subcontracts based on a belief that the Subcontracts did not reflect a ‘true meetings [sic] of the minds.’” Aspic appealed, and the Ninth Circuit framed the issue as “whether the Arbitrator exceeded his powers in finding that Aspic need not comply with the FAR provisions.”

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order vacating the award. Specifically, it took issue with the arbitrator’s reasoning that “[t]here was not a true meeting of the minds when the subcontract agreements were entered. Hence, ASPIC was not held to the strict provisions of the subcontract agreements that ECC had to the USACE.” In so finding, the Panel reasoned, “[w]hen an arbitrator disregards the plain text of a contract without legal justification simply to reach a result that he believes is just, we must intervene.” Specifically, it found that the arbitrator’s award in this case was “irrational” because it “directly conflicted with the subcontracts’ FAR-related provisions, without evidence of the parties’ past practices deviating from them, in order to achieve a desired outcome.”

Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors, Case No. No. 17-16510 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2019).

Private Arbitrators Do Not Qualify as a “Tribunal” under 28 U.S.C. § 1782

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Section 1782 allows a district court to order a person who resides in the court’s district to provide testimony or documents to be used in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal. When presented with a section 1782 discovery application, a district court must engage in two inquiries: first, whether the court has authority to grant the application, and second, whether to exercise its discretion to grant the application. As part of the first inquiry, the court must determine whether the foreign body conducting the arbitration qualifies as a “tribunal” under section 1782.

Since the United States Supreme Court decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), courts have split on whether private arbitral bodies qualify as a tribunal for purposes of section 1782. In Intel, the Supreme Court discussed the definition of “tribunal” in dicta. A number of courts have relied on this discussion for the proposition that private arbitrations are covered by section 1782. However, in two pre-Intel cases, the Second and Fifth Circuits held that section 1782 does not apply to private arbitrations. Some district courts have stuck to the pre-Intel rule, noting that Intel does not necessarily extend the reach of section 1782 to purely private arbitrations. Of particular note, the Supreme Court’s discussion in Intel did not actually specify whether the term tribunal, as used, in section 1782, included private arbitrations, in addition to state-sponsored arbitrations, or if it only included the latter.

The District Court for South Carolina recently sided with the courts holding that Intel did not expand the scope of section 1782 to apply to purely private arbitrations. As such, the court relied on the Second and Fifth Circuit opinions, which were squarely on point. Those cases noted that “references in the United States Code to ‘arbitral tribunals’ almost uniformly concern an adjunct of a foreign government or international agency” as well as the “silence” of section 1782’s legislative history with regard to whether Congress intended such a “significant … expansion of American judicial assistance to international arbitral panels created exclusively by private parties. . . .” As a result, the court determined that parties to an arbitration before a foreign, private arbitral body may not utilize section 1782 to obtain testimony or documents for use in the foreign arbitration.

However, the court’s determination has been appealed to the Fourth Circuit, so watch this space for further developments.

In re: Servotronics, Inc., Case No. 2:18-mc-00364-DCN (USDC D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2018) (Order);
In re: Application of Servotronics, Inc., Case No. 2:18-mc-00364-DCN (USDC D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2018) (Notice of Appeal).

Non-signatory Third-Party Cannot Enforce Arbitration Clause in Contract

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SBS is a staffing company that provides personnel to various retail services, such as SPAR. SBS engaged Paradise Hogan (“Hogan”) and assigned Hogan to SPAR. Hogan and SBS entered into an Independent Contractor Master Agreement with SBS (the “Agreement”). The Agreement required the parties to resolve disputes through arbitration; SPAR was not a party to the Agreement. Hogan later sued SBS and SPAR for unpaid wages and benefits and both SBS and SPAR sought to compel arbitration. The district court compelled arbitration as to Hogan’s claims against SBS but denied the motion to compel arbitration as to SPAR. SPAR appealed.

The First Circuit affirmed holding that there was no legal basis to compel Hogan to arbitration where the clear terms of the agreement showed that Hogan did not consent to arbitrate his claims against SPAR. The Court explains that SPAR was not a third-party beneficiary of the Agreement. To determine if a party is a third-party beneficiary a court looks to the specific terms of the contract to ascertain the intent of the parties. Here, the court explained that the clear language of the arbitration clause limited its applicability to the signatories by only covering disputes between “the Parties,” so it is clear that it did not confer arbitration rights to SPAR or any other third party. Moreover, the court determined that Hogan was not equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration of his claims against SPAR. Federal courts have been willing to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration with a non-signatory when the issues to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed. The court explained that Hogan’s claims were based upon Massachusetts wage and hour law and not the Agreement and therefore, not sufficiently intertwined.

Hogan v. Spar Group, Inc., No. 18-1286 (1st Cir. Jan. 25, 2019)