Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Second Circuit Rejects Claims Against Insurer for Settlement Using Policy Funds

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Three plaintiffs—a subcontractor (HBI), an affiliated entity (Keller Foundations), and their parent (Keller Group)—brought a claim against Zurich, which had issued a liability policy (the Policy) to the Keller Foundations for which HBI was an additional insured. A general contractor (Diaz) sued HBI in one lawsuit and Zurich in another, claiming that Zurich should defend it in the first lawsuit because it was an additional insured under the Policy. Zurich settled the lawsuit by paying Diaz $450,000. Zurich then sought and received reimbursement from Capital, a captive reinsurer owned by plaintiff Keller Group. Claiming that Zurich’s payment to Diaz was not covered by the Policy, plaintiff brought causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith, and declaratory relief. Zurich filed a motion to dismiss all claims, which the trial court granted, and plaintiffs appealed.

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. First, the court found that plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged a breach of the Policy, as Zurich had broad discretion to settle claims and plaintiffs were not directly harmed by Zurich’s decision to settle the claim, even if they had to reimburse Capital for its reimbursement of Zurich. As the court explained, plaintiffs’ payments to Capital did not relate to Zurich’s duties under the Policy, but instead “flow from Capital’s choice to reimburse Zurich under the Reinsurance Agreement, as well as whatever arrangements exist for inter-company reimbursements between Keller Group and its subsidiaries.” Any complaint regarding Capital’s obligation to reimburse Zurich was Capitals’ to make, not Plaintiffs’.

Second, as to the claim for breach of the duty of good faith, the court found that Zurich’s decision to settle the Diaz claim was not arbitrary and unreasonable, and again emphasized that plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that this decision deprived them of the benefits of the Policy. Finally, the court rejected the request for declaratory relief, finding that plaintiffs had failed to plead any facts demonstrating even a possibility that Zurich’s payment to Diaz would cause the Policy’s $5 million cap to be exhausted and thus cause plaintiffs to lose the benefit of the Policy.

Keller Foundations, LLC et. al v. Zurich American Insurance Company, 18-1280-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2018)

First Circuit Affirms Denial of a Motion to Compel Arbitration Based on Principles of Collateral Estoppel

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In a procedurally complex case, the First Circuit reviewed the lower court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration based on principles of collateral estoppel. In 2007, two plaintiffs sought legal representation to pursue a products liability claim. They signed an Attorney Representation Agreement (“ARA”) with the Johnson Law Firm (“JLF”), who later involved local counsel to assist them with the matter. Importantly, the ARA contained an arbitration provision, although the paragraphs related to arbitration in the ARA were not initialed by the plaintiffs. After the case settled, a dispute arose between the plaintiffs, JLF, and local counsel John Deaton (“Deaton”).

JLF initiated an arbitration proceeding with the plaintiffs in Texas. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the arbitration agreement because the “uninitialed arbitration paragraphs in the ARA were of no effect.” The arbitrator agreed and dismissed the proceeding, finding that the arbitration provision was not valid and enforceable.

The plaintiffs later sued JLF and Deaton in Rhode Island state court, bringing malpractice and other tort claims. The defendants removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island and moved to compel arbitration. The district court found that the validity of the arbitration agreement was previously addressed during the initial arbitration proceeding, and principles of collateral estoppel precluded any attempts to invoke the arbitration provision of the ARA. The motion to compel arbitration was denied.

On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding that the district court properly applied the principles of collateral estoppel to the issue of arbitrability, and that the arbitrator had the proper authority to make a determination about the arbitrability of the claims at issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Patton v. Johnson, Case No. 18-1750 (1st Cir. Feb. 11, 2019).

Fifth Circuit Affirms Order Compelling Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims by Physician Against Medical Center

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Plaintiff, an emergency room physician, was employed by Defendants, a hospital and its affiliates, pursuant to an employment agreement and subsequent independent contractor agreement, both of which contained an arbitration clause providing for the arbitration of disputes arising out of those agreements. Following the termination of her employment, Plaintiff filed suit in the Northern District of Mississippi alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as well as several state law claims including wrongful termination, intentional interference with contract, intentional interference with business relations, and fraud. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the district court granted, rejecting Plaintiff’s arguments that the arbitration requirements were unconscionable, that further discovery was required, and that her wrongful termination claims were not subject to arbitration.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court and consequently affirmed, compelling arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims. Concerning Plaintiff’s procedural unconscionability allegation, the panel rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the inconsistency between the term sheet (which did not mention the arbitration provision) and the employment agreements (which contained the arbitration provision) rendered the arbitration provision unconscionable, deeming it “an issue that would have been remedied by simply reading the contract.” The panel also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the arbitration clause was rendered substantively unconscionable due to the fact that the parties conceded that another provision in the employment agreement, the punitive damages waiver, was unconscionable. Instead, the panel found that the punitive damages waiver provision was severable and therefore the arbitration provision was unaffected. In addition, the panel found that Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim was predicated on her contractual relationship with Defendants and therefore arose “out of” or “under” those contracts and subject to arbitration. Last, the panel rejected Plaintiff’s equitable estoppel argument that her tort claims against her supervising physician were not subject to arbitration because he was a non-signatory to the agreements containing arbitration provisions. The Panel reasoned that those claims similarly centered around interference with her contractual, employment relationship with Defendants.

Begole v. North Mississippi Med. Ctr. Inc., Case No. 18-60369 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2019).

Applied Underwriters Defeats Class Certification in Long-Running Worker’s Compensation Reinsurance Dispute

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Applied Underwriters beat back an attempt by plaintiffs to certify a class in their lawsuit related to Applied Underwriters’ “EquityComp” and “SolutionOne” workers’ compensation programs. We previously reported on this case, which involves a disputed Reinsurance Participation Agreement used to control worker’s compensation rates, on July 21, 2016, December 1, 2016, November 15, 2017, January 31, 2018, and August 30, 2018. The court has now determined that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a class action would be “superior” to individual actions, as required by four factors under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), and denied class certification.

In determining that the first factor of the class members’ interest in individually controlling the litigation, weighed against certification, the court noted that the individual damages alleged by claimants in this action were large and there was no evidence that any class member would be unable to bring an action absent class certification. The second factor of the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by class members, weighed “strongly” against certification, as more than “100 separate arbitrations, lawsuits, and California Department Insurance appeals involving 67 California participants in the program” were already pending. On that basis, the court determined that a substantial number of putative class members had an interest in controlling their own litigation and that “realistic alternatives” to a class action exist.

The third factor of the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum, weighed “slightly” against certification, where the remaining claims were all brought under California law (which weighed in favor of certification), but the many potential claimants were “located throughout the state,” including some that were “far from this court.” Additionally, certifying the class would automatically select federal court as the preferred forum for all class members even though the previously filed actions discussed above had demonstrated otherwise.

Finally, the court determined the “manageability” factor of the likely difficulties in managing a class action, also weighed against certification, where the court would have to determine the extent of overlap between the class action and the many previously filed actions, as well as how to properly formulate a class notice that accounts for the potentially overlapping and differing claims brought in the various actions and the class action. “These difficulties would only be magnified where many similar actions have already concluded and others have progressed substantially.”

Shasta Linen Supply, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-1222-WBS-AC (USDC E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019).

Ninth Circuit Affirms Order Vacating Arbitration Award, Faults Arbitrator’s Disregard of Contract’s Plain Language

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The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed a district court order vacating an arbitration award arising from the termination of subcontracts for the construction of army buildings and facilities in Afghanistan. Defendants ECC Centcom Constructors, LLC and ECC International, LLC (together, “ECC”) had two prime contracts with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE”) for the construction of army buildings and facilities in two provinces in Afghanistan. ECC in turn awarded two subcontracts to Aspic Engineering and Construction Company (“Aspic”) for the completion of those projects. Relevant to this dispute, the subcontracts incorporated many Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) clauses by reference, including those governing termination for convenience, and mandated that Aspic owe to ECC the same obligations that ECC owed to the United States government.

After USACE terminated ECC’s prime contracts for convenience, ECC and Aspic could not agree on a termination settlement amount for both contracts, particularly after USACE refused to pay for any of Aspic’s claimed termination costs. ECC and Aspic proceeded to arbitration to resolve the termination of both subcontracts, and the arbitrator awarded Aspic just over $1 million. Although the award was initially confirmed in California state court, a California federal court later vacated the award, reasoning that it conflicted with contract language. The federal court reasoned that the arbitrator “voided and reconstructed parts of the Subcontracts based on a belief that the Subcontracts did not reflect a ‘true meetings [sic] of the minds.’” Aspic appealed, and the Ninth Circuit framed the issue as “whether the Arbitrator exceeded his powers in finding that Aspic need not comply with the FAR provisions.”

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order vacating the award. Specifically, it took issue with the arbitrator’s reasoning that “[t]here was not a true meeting of the minds when the subcontract agreements were entered. Hence, ASPIC was not held to the strict provisions of the subcontract agreements that ECC had to the USACE.” In so finding, the Panel reasoned, “[w]hen an arbitrator disregards the plain text of a contract without legal justification simply to reach a result that he believes is just, we must intervene.” Specifically, it found that the arbitrator’s award in this case was “irrational” because it “directly conflicted with the subcontracts’ FAR-related provisions, without evidence of the parties’ past practices deviating from them, in order to achieve a desired outcome.”

Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors, Case No. No. 17-16510 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2019).