Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

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Week's Best Posts

IF AT FIRST YOU DON’T SUCCEED: INSURER ESTOPPED FROM COMPELLING ARBITRATION WITH MAGELLAN REINSURANCE

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Withdrawing its earlier opinion on rehearing, the Texas Court of Appeals held that New Hampshire Insurance Company (“New Hampshire”) is judicially estopped from compelling arbitration, therefore affirming the trial courts order denying New Hampshire’s motion to compel. The dispute centers on New Hampshire and Magellan Reinsurance Company’s (“Magellan”) Reinsurance Agreement (“agreement.”) Under this agreement, Magellan agreed to assume 100% of New Hampshire’s obligations for automobile insurance policies in return for the premiums paid under those policies. New Hampshire alleges that Magellan owes 1.4 million dollars to replenish an existing trust account, now emptied. New Hampshire filed suit in Turks and Caicos Island (“TCI”) to “wind up” Magellan’s business and also filed suit in Texas and New York.

The TCI Court found that New Hampshire was not a creditor of Magellan and therefore could not wind up Magellan’s business. Later that year, New Hampshire moved to compel arbitration, for which Magellan had initially argued for at the onset of the TCI litigation. The Court found that New Hampshire’s motion to compel arbitration had numerous inconsistencies with their previous arguments made to courts in TCI and New York. The Court held (consistent with its withdrawn opinion) that New Hampshire was estopped from seeking to arbitrate Magellan’s claims. New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Magellan Reinsurance Co., No. 02-12-00196-CV (Tex, Ct. App. May 2, 2013).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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COURT OF APPEAL AFFIRMS VACATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD ON GROUNDS OF ARBITRATOR’S EVIDENT PARTIALITY

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Thomas Kinkade Company’s suit against Nancy and David White was submitted to an arbitration proceeding in which, as the Sixth Circuit noted, “the coincidences all break one way.” During the five-year arbitration, the arbitrator, Mark Kowalsky, defied his role as neutral intermediary in various ways. For example, Kowalsky provided the Whites multiple opportunities to bolster the proofs of their claims. Kowalsky allowed the Whites to submit as evidence 8,800 documents they had deliberately withheld from Kinkade for four years. On a straightforward breach-of-contract claim that went virtually uncontested throughout arbitration, he denied Kinkade any relief. When Kinkade raised objections to Kowalsky’s decisions as an arbitrator, Kowalsky gave no response. Kowalsky additionally awarded the Whites attorney’s fees of nearly $500,000 after the arbitration panel unequivocally denied those fees in the Interim Award. Finally, during arbitration, the Whites and their appointed arbitrator both retained Kowalsky’s law firm in unrelated matters, and Kowalsky made no effort to avoid receiving compensation for such matters. Kinkaid sought to disqualify Kowalsky to no avail. Both the AAA and Kowalsky denied disqualification requests. The arbitration panel entered a Final Award in favor of the Whites in an amount in excess of $1.4 million. The district court granted Kinkade’s motion to vacate due to the arbitrator’s partiality, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Thomas Kinkade Company v. White, No. 10-1634 (6th Cir. April 2, 2013).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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REINSURER CAN DENY COVERAGE BASED ON INSURER’S LATE NOTICE

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AIU brought an action against TIG asserting breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment as to coverage under nine certificates of facultative reinsurance issued by TIG’s predecessor in interest in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The parties’ dispute arose in 2007 after AIU sought coverage from TIG regarding a multimillion dollar settlement AIU had reached with its insured Foster Wheeler relating to Foster Wheeler’s exposure to numerous asbestos-related lawsuits. TIG contested coverage under the certificates, arguing that AIU had failed to provide prompt notice of Foster Wheeler’s demand for payment which AIU had received in 2003 but did not report to TIG until early 2007.

AIU contended that New York law applied, under which a reinsurer must demonstrate prejudice due to late notice in order to avoid coverage. TIG argued that prejudice to TIG need not be shown in order for it to deny coverage based on late notice under applicable Illinois law. The court determined that Illinois law applied because the certificates were issued in Illinois and AIU was required to perform under the certificates in Illinois by submitting claims to TIG’s Chicago-based intermediary. The court granted TIG’s motion for summary judgment. AIU Insurance Co. v. TIG Insurance Co., Case No. 07-civ-7052 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2013).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

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NAIC REINSURANCE TASK FORCE MEETING UPDATE

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The NAIC’s Reinsurance Task Force met on April 8, 2013, as part of the NAIC’s spring national meeting. The Task Force has published its agenda and materials for the meeting, as well as the post-meeting summary. This meeting was informational in nature, and mainly was concerned with progress in the development of the NAIC’s list of qualified jursidictions for purposes of implmenting the Credit for Reinsurance Model Law and other progress in the implementation of the revised credit for reinsurance models.

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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EIGHTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS DISMISSAL OF CONTRACT DISPUTE BETWEEN INSURER AND REINSURANCE BROKER

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In a contract dispute between an insurer and its reinsurance broker on which we previously reported, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the insurer’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The brokerage sharing agreement at issue required the reinsurance broker to pay an annual fee to the insurer in exchange for status as the insurer’s exclusive broker and included a forfeiture provision which discontinued the broker’s obligation to make the annual payment upon notice of the insurer’s decision to terminate or replace the broker. The insurer replaced the reinsurance broker, the broker refused to pay the annual fee, and the insurer sued for breach of contract. On appeal, the insurer argued that the district court misconstrued several key terms in the agreement, that the terms were ambiguous, and that theories of equity therefore applied. Applying Minnesota law, the Eighth Circuit determined that an “integrated definition” of a key term and the forfeiture provision were unambiguous, the broker was no longer obligated to make annual payments after receiving notice from the insurer that the broker was being replaced, and equitable relief was not available since the contract was clear and unambiguous. Olympus Ins. Co. v. AON Benfield, Inc., No. 12-1974 (8th Cir. Ap. 1, 2013).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

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