Reinsurance Claims

In this case, an Illinois appellate court held that Section 2-403 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-403, required the reinsurers and insurer of Developers Surety and Indemnity Co. (“DSI”) a surety, to file a complaint as plaintiffs against an attorney in their own names, or by the surety “for the use of” the reinsurers and the insurer, and thus dismissed DSI’s legal malpractice lawsuit.

The background of the case, which arose from an underlying construction dispute, can be found here. The University of Chicago hired a general contractor to construct a building, which subcontracted some of the work to F.E. Moran Inc. (“Moran”), which, in turn, subcontracted some of its work to 3D Industries Inc. (“3D”). DSI issued performance and payment bonds to 3D. 3D’s employees walked off the job, leaving 3D’s work incomplete. DSI retained Marc Lipinski as surety counsel. 3D then sued Moran in Illinois state court, claiming that Moran breached its contract by failing to make payments when due. 3D claimed that Moran’s failure to pay left 3D with inadequate funds to pay its employees, leading them to walk off the job. Moran counterclaimed against 3D for breach of contract and fraud. Moran added a third-party claim against DSI for failure to fulfill its duties as surety and for acting in bad faith. DSI’s general counsel later brought in another law firm to help with preparing for trial. DSI and Moran eventually settled, with DSI paying Moran $3.7 million. DSI then filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Lipinski and the firms at which he worked for breach of his duties as an attorney and that because of his failures, DSI lost the opportunity to settle for less than $3.7 million. In discovery, Lipinski requested information concerning DSI’s recovery from insurance and reinsurance for the settlement payment, to which DSI eventually admitted that an insurer and two reinsurers had paid a total of $2,901,914.05 of the total settlement plus costs, leaving DSI with unreimbursed damages of $1,871,378.18. Lipinski then moved in limine to bar DSI from recovering as damages amounts covered by the insurer and two reinsurers. The court held that the collateral source rule did not apply in legal malpractice actions and, thus, Lipinski could present evidence of DSI’s recovery from the insurer and the reinsurers and use that recovery to offset any damages awarded to DSI. DSI could then not prove its damage element (as it admitted it would have paid Moran an amount exceeding the amount left unreimbursed by the reinsurers and insurer), and the court dismissed the case.

DSI then appealed, arguing that the collateral source rule does not apply because the reinsurers and insurer do not count as collateral sources. The Illinois appeals court noted that DSI admitted that its reinsurers and insurer covered all of the damages it suffered due to Lipinski’s legal malpractice. Therefore, the appellate court ruled that Section 2-403(c) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure required DSI’s reinsurers and insurer to file the complaint against Lipinski in their own name, or for DSI to file the complaint ‘‘for the use of’’ the reinsurers and the insurer, as they were the real parties in interest. Thus, the court held that trial court did not err when it dismissed the complaint.

Developers Surety and Indem. Co. and Insco Ins. Services Inc. v. Lipinski, et al., No. 1-15-2658 (Ill. App. June 30, 2017).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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A Pennsylvania federal court applied the continuing violations theory to RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations, and allowed Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to modify their RESPA claim.

The Court recognized that “ordinarily RESPA’s statute of limitations begins running on the date that a homeowner closes on his or her home loan. However, the question of when a statute of limitations begins to run (by default) is entirely separate from the question of whether or not subsequent kickbacks, fees, and referrals are violations of RESPA that can trigger new limitations periods. This is because under the continuing violation theory, the statute of limitations runs from the date of the last alleged violation rather than the first.”

The Court found “RESPA would be violated each and every time an unlawful fee or kickback was delivered or accepted. Each alleged violation, in turn, reset RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims would be untimely only if there had been no alleged kickback, fee or referral within the one year leading up to the day they filed their complaint.” The RESPA kickbacks and fees alleged in this case were explicitly prohibited by statute, thus making them “all a part of one reinsurance scheme, the very nature of which requires the defendants to make continuous and periodic illegal kickbacks.”

In discussing Cunningham v. M & T Bank Corp., 814 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2016), the Court noted the Third Circuit “spoke only to the application of equitable tolling” and “did not address whether RESPA may be violated each time there is an illegal kickback, fee or referral.” As noted in the decision, the Third Circuit has never spoken on the continuing violations doctrine’s applicability to RESPA.

Blake, et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., 5:13-cv-06433 (USDC E.D. Pa. April 26, 2017)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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Relying on Federal Court precedent, a Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court resolved whether the plain language of Section 916 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) prohibits the assignment of benefits where the employer/insured entered into a reinsurance agreement with another insurer to pay the structured settlement payments. “In other words, a determination must be made as to whether [the employee’s] claim under the LHWCA was resolved when the Reinsurance Agreement was entered, and whether the settlement payouts are being made to him pursuant to a contract where he is a third party beneficiary.”

The Court ultimately reversed the lower court’s decision which had permitted the transfer, holding “it would be absurd to allow a party, who expressly settled a LHWCA claim, to avoid the anti-assignment clause of the LHWCA merely by engaging in the common practice of purchasing an annuity or having a separate insurance company pay the structured settlement payments …. [and] to utilize the [petitioner’s] interpretation of Section 916 would effectively render the LHWCA inapplicable, as any form of reinsurance agreement or annuity would be considered a payment of the outstanding claim.”

In re: C. Dwyer, No. 149 WDA 2016 (Sup. Ct. Pa. January 27. 2017)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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