Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

You are here: Home / Archives for Arbitration / Court Decisions

Arbitration / Court Decisions

Ninth Circuit Holds That Arbitration Clause in “Sign-In Wrap Agreement” Is Enforceable

by

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration after concluding, contrary to the district court’s decision, that a “sign-in wrap agreement” provided conspicuous notice of terms and that an arbitration clause in the terms was therefore enforceable.

Warners Bros. Entertainment Inc. developed Game of Thrones: Conquest, a mobile game that users could download on their phones. To play the game, users had to press a button labeled “play.” That button was directly over a notice informing users that, by pressing “play,” they agreed to the game’s terms of use. The phrase “terms of use” was a hyperlink to the terms. The first paragraph of the terms advised users in all capitals that the terms required “the use of arbitration on an individual basis to resolve disputes” and involved “waiving your right to a jury trial and class action relief.” An arbitration clause was further down in the terms.

A group of plaintiffs sued Warners Bros. for false and misleading advertising. Warner Bros. moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied that request, concluding that the notice of the terms was “insufficiently conspicuous to bind users to them.”

Warner Bros. appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the terms were “sufficiently conspicuous” under California law. The court found that the “context of the transaction” supported the enforceability of the terms because users downloaded the app to play the game rather than just accessing a website and thus knew that they would be playing the game for extended periods. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the visual placement of the notice of the terms — immediately under the “play” button — was clear and conspicuous. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the argument that the terms were substantively unconscionable because the arbitration agreement purportedly banned injunctive relief.

Keebaugh v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., No. 22-55982 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2024).

Federal Court Rejects Argument That Subsequent Opt-Out of Arbitration Clause Precluded Arbitration

by

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has rejected an argument that opting out of arbitration clauses precluded arbitration under prior arbitration agreements in a dispute between Uber drivers and Uber.

A group of Illinois Uber drivers sued Uber under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Illinois law claiming that Uber misclassified them as independent contractors. Uber moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the drivers had signed multiple platform access agreements that included broad arbitration clauses. The platform access agreements allowed drivers to opt out of the arbitration clauses if they so chose, however. The drivers had not opted out of one or more of the agreements but, when subsequent platform access agreements were presented to them, had opted out of those. They argued that the subsequent opt-outs precluded Uber from enforcing the earlier agreements to arbitrate. The district court disagreed, citing the plain language of the opt-out provision, which provided: “If you opt out of this Arbitration Provision and at the time of your receipt of this Agreement you were bound by an existing agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of or related to your use of our Platform and Driver App, that existing arbitration agreement will remain in full force and effect.” The court also concluded that the arbitration clauses were not unconscionable under Illinois law. One of the plaintiffs had previously filed suit and obtained a ruling that he was not required to arbitrate any claims, however. The district court gave effect to that decision under issue preclusion principles.

Agha v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-17182 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2024).

Michigan Supreme Court Declines Application for Leave to Appeal Lower Court’s Vacation of Arbitration Award

by

In Michigan AFSCME Council 25 v. County of Wayne, the Supreme Court of Michigan declined an application filed by Michigan AFSCME Council 25 and Affiliated Local 101 for leave to appeal a judgment of the circuit court and court of appeals vacating an arbitrator’s decision regarding an employment-related dispute. The court’s order was limited to the denial of the defendant’s application and noted, “we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.” However, a concurring opinion addressed the underlying arbitration and issues created by the court of appeals decision regarding the applicable standard of judicial review.

The underlying case involved a county employee who applied for retirement while a disciplinary action was pending against him. The employee signed a “separation waiver,” which confirmed that he was terminating his employment with no agreement concerning reemployment. The employee was then terminated by the county as a result of the disciplinary action, and he filed a grievance seeking reinstatement of his employment. While the grievance was pending, the employee’s retirement was approved. The grievance seeking reinstatement was arbitrated and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the employee, concluding that the county violated the collective bargaining agreement when it terminated the employee and that he was entitled to reinstatement. The Michigan AFSCME Council 25 labor organization filed a lawsuit in circuit court against the county to enforce the arbitrator’s award, and the county filed a counterclaim seeking to vacate the award. The circuit court ruled in favor of the county and vacated the arbitrator’s award concluding that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority “by failing to enforce the separation waiver in the retirement application and issuing an award that violated Internal Revenue Service regulations.” In an unpublished non-binding opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court opinion.

Significantly, the concurring opinion also addressed the standard of review that applies to collective bargaining arbitration decisions, noting that the court of appeals had failed to acknowledge the court’s prior decisions that expressed approval of “the policy favoring arbitration of disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements.” The court noted that the court of appeals instead applied the standard of review that the Michigan Supreme Court “adopted in the context of statutory arbitration disputes” and that “the standard of review that applies to collective bargaining arbitration decision is now called into question.” After recognizing this apparent conflict in the applicable standard of review, the concurring opinion concluded that if the court of appeals decision was published and binding precedent “this Court would be obligated to act in this case and resolve the parties’ disagreement about which standard of judicial review governs.” The concurring opinion concludes by encouraging the legislature to clarify state law addressing the standard of review that should be applied to labor arbitrations in Michigan.

Michigan AFSCME Council 25 v. County of Wayne, No. SC 164435 (Mich. May 3, 2024).

South Carolina Supreme Court Vacates Award, Finds Arbitration Panel Manifestly Disregarded Statutory Law

by

National Golf Management LLC sold 13 golf courses to a buyer represented by broker Andrew Waldo. NGM was represented in a previous transaction by Michael Cousins. Although Cousins had no written representation agreement with any of the parties involved in the 13-golf course deal, he and his real estate brokerage company sued Waldo, Waldo’s company, and NGM, among others, for a commission from the sale of the golf courses.

As a result of both Waldo and Cousins’ membership in a local realtor association, they were required to arbitrate their professional dispute. Despite South Carolina statutes stating that oral agreements for a commission from a real estate transaction were unenforceable, the arbitration panel ruled that Cousins was entitled to half of the commission Waldo earned from the sale.

Waldo petitioned the circuit court, which vacated the award. However, the court of appeals reversed, finding that there was a “barely colorable” ground for the arbitration award based on a line of cases upholding oral and implied contracts for real estate commissions that, while in conflict with statutory law, had not been directly overruled.

The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed. While acknowledging and reaffirming the “rare and narrow basis” upon which courts may disturb an arbitration award, the court found that the circumstances of this case constituted just such a “rare” occasion. The court explained that subsequent to the issuance of the opinions cited by the appellate court, the South Carolina legislature had enacted laws that “fundamentally changed real-estate licensing.” Cousins argued that he was a “cooperating broker” or a “subagent” of Waldo and therefore was entitled to a share of the commission. However, the newly enacted laws, which were in effect at the time of the transaction in question, required a subagent agreement to “be in writing” and to “set forth all material terms of the parties’ agency relationship.”

The law went further and explicitly prohibited oral or implied agency relationships, providing that “[f]or all real estate transactions, no agency relationship … exists unless the buyer, seller … and the brokerage company … agree, in writing, to the agency relationship. No type of agency relationship may be assumed … or created orally or by implication.” The court found that the arbitrators were aware of these statutes but nevertheless ordered the commission to be shared with Cousins.

The court noted that courts “may now vacate an arbitration award, but only when it is untethered from controlling legal principles known to, but shrugged off by, the arbitrator….  As we have held, ‘manifest disregard is an exacting standard, but it is not insurmountable.’” In light of the above facts, the court found that the arbitration award was in manifest disregard of the law and vacated the award.

Waldo v. Cousins, No. 2022-000134 (S.C. May 1, 2024).

Ninth Circuit Reverses Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration

by

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed a district court’s decision to deny a motion to compel arbitration in a case involving a request to refund the cost of airline tickets after a cancellation.

Winifredo and Macaria Herrera purchased airline tickets on Cathay Pacific flights through a third-party booking website, ASAP Tickets. ASAP’s terms and conditions included an arbitration clause requiring binding arbitration through the American Arbitration Association. During their trip, Cathay Pacific canceled the Herreras’ return flight and told them to talk to ASAP about a refund. ASAP apparently denied the Herreras’ request for a refund. The Herreras filed suit against Cathay Pacific, which moved to compel arbitration pursuant to ASAP’s terms and conditions. The district court denied Cathay Pacific’s motion, reasoning that the Herreras’ gripe was with Cathay Pacific, not ASAP.

Cathay Pacific appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. It first rejected the argument that federal regulations precluding arbitration provisions in “contracts of carriage” precluded arbitration in this case, explaining that the regulation in question did not prohibit “airline carriers from enforcing arbitration agreements between passengers and third parties if the applicable law permits them to do so.” The court then held that California contract law allowed Cathay Pacific to invoke ASAP’s arbitration clause because the Herreras’ breach of contract claim was “intimately founded in and intertwined with” ASAP’s terms and conditions. ASAP had effectively acted as a “middleman” for “refund-processing purposes.” The Ninth Circuit then rejected the Herreras’ arguments that it would be unfair to allow Cathay Pacific to invoke the arbitration clause because “the refund process was not clear.”

Herrera v. Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., No. 21-16083 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2024).