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Arbitration / Court Decisions

SELF-INSURER GROUP NOT ENTITLED TO COVERAGE THROUGH STATE INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION

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On February 9, 2009, we reported on a Louisiana appellate court holding that the Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund (the “Fund”) was entitled to coverage because the Fund was not an insurer and the excess coverage obtained by the Fund from Reliance Indemnity Company, which became insolvent in 2001, was not reinsurance. In this case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the judgment of the appellate court. First, the court held that the Fund was an insurer based on the court’s interpretation of state statutes and the Fund’s formative documents, which undertook to indemnify members for the full amount of workers’ compensation claims, which members paid premiums and assessments to the Fund for that purpose. Second, in finding that the excess coverage was reinsurance, the court determined that the contractual relationship between the Fund and the insolvent insurer presented a classic instance of reinsurance. Louisiana Safety Assoc. of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. Louisiana Ins. Guaranty Assoc., Case No. 2009-0023 (La. June 26, 2009).

This post written by Dan Crisp.

SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS HELD NOT TO BE “INSURERS” FOR PURPOSES OF INSURANCE GUARANTY LAWS

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The Nevada Supreme Court held that two employers (MGM and Steel Engineers), who operated as self-insured employers under the state’s workers’ compensation act, were not barred from recovering reimbursement from the Nevada Insurance Guaranty Association because they were not “insurers” for purposes of the act. Thus, they could recover payment for their covered workers’ compensation claims payable by their insolvent excess insurance carrier, for which the Association was otherwise liable. If MGM or Steel Engineers had been deemed “insurers,” their claims would have been outside the scope of “covered claims,” and the Association would not have covered them. Uncertain as to the meaning of the term “insurer,” the Association sought a declaration of its obligations. The trial court held that MG and Steel Engineers were “insurers” and precluded them from seeking reimbursement. But the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the term “insurer” has a plain meaning, and that MGM and Steel Engineers did not fall within a reasonable connotation of the term, since they were mere employers, and did not engage in the business of insurance. MGM Mirage v. Nevada Insurance Guaranty Association, No. 49445 (Nev. June 25, 2009).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

IN PARI DELICTO DOCTRINE BARS DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST ALLEGED AIG CO-CONSPIRATORS

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The AIG Consolidated Derivative Litigation continues – this time the court grants a motion to dismiss claims against alleged co-conspirator defendants. We covered a prior ruling on a motion to dismiss in our April 29, 2009 post, where the court found that the plaintiffs had stated well-pled breach of fiduciary duty claims against certain high-ranking AIG officers who were allegedly involved in two conspiracies, viz., a “bid-rigging” conspiracy and a “fake reinsurance writing” conspiracy, as well as other illegal activities. The question raised in the most recent ruling was: “may AIG sue its co-conspirators for the harm that AIG suffered as a result of two alleged, illegal conspiracies involving AIG and those third-party conspirators?” The court answered the question in the negative, holding that the in pari delicto doctrine bars this type of suit. A primary purpose of the doctrine is to prevent courts from having to engage in “inefficient” and “socially unproductive” accountings between conspirators. Rather than assessing the conspiracy and shifting responsibility, the court held that it would leave the conspirators as they are, potentially jointly and severally liable for the harms caused by their alleged conspiratorial acts. American International Group, Inc. Consolidated Derivative Litigation, Case No. 769-VCS (Del. Ct. Chanc. June 17, 2009).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

NINTH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES DOCTRINE OF FUNCTUS OFFICIO

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Last month, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an arbitration panel’s awards against Leonard Bosack and Sandy Lerner, founders of Cisco Systems. The panel issued a series of preliminary and final awards. Bosack and Lerner challenged the panel’s awards in favor of their former financial manager David Soward on three primary bases: (1) the panel violated Rule 46 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules and the common law functus officio doctrine (forbidding an arbitrator from redetermining an issue which he has already decided); (2) the panel manifestly disregarded the law; and (3) the awards were “irrational.”

The Court ruled against Bosack and Lerner on all accounts. First, as a matter of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, the Court applied the Eighth Circuit’s rule that the functus officio doctrine applies only to “final” awards, and does not bar revisiting an issue addressed in a preliminary award, which the arbitrators did not intend to be their final word on the subject. Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit held that only one of the five arbitration awards should be considered “final” for purposes of the doctrine, and the sole final award was not in violation of functus officio or Rule 46. Further, the Court concluded that in reaching the award, the panel neither acted irrationally or in manifest disregard of the law. The Court explained that Bosack and Lerner accepted the risk that goes along with arbitration, and could not avail themselves of expanded judicial review simply because the awards were unfavorable. Bosack v. Soward, Case No. 08-35248 (9th Cir. July 23, 2009).

This post written by John Black.