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Arbitration / Court Decisions

SECOND CIRCUIT REVERSES IN FAVOR OF AIG ON FRAUD CLAIMS, FINDING AXA IGNORED “STORM WARNINGS”

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The Second Circuit Court reversed a $34.3 million judgment rendered after a jury verdict against AIG on fraudulent inducement claims asserted by AXA arising from reinsurance facilities the parties entered into in or about 1998. While the Court agreed with a district court ruling that AXA’s claims sounded in fraud and not contract, and thus were properly not referable to arbitration, it nonetheless held as a matter of law that AXA failed to prove the claims were timely brought under the two-year discovery prong of the statute of limitations for fraud. The Court found that AXA was on notice of the alleged fraud as early as 1998, when it signed wordings which the Court found clearly indicated the manner in which AIG intended to operate the reinsurance facilities. AXA, despite the “storm warnings” of the wordings, and other indications of AIG’s intentions from 1998 through 2000, failed to bring suit until 2005. Because it found the claims were time-barred, the Court reversed the entry of judgment, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of AIG. AXA Versicherung AG v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., No. 08-2521 (2d Cir. Aug. 23 2010).

This post written by John Pitblado.

THIRD CIRCUIT VACATES SEVERAL SHERMAN ACT AND RICO CLAIMS IN INSURANCE BROKERAGE MDL

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We have reported several times on the ongoing developments in the Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation MDL proceeding. In the most recent development, following a third District Court dismissal of the RICO and Sherman Act claims, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a 200 page opinion affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s dismissal of the Sherman Act claims with respect to defendants alleged to have engaged in bid rigging in the Marsh-centered commercial conspiracy, the dismissal of the RICO claims based on the same issue, and the dismissal of the alleged CIAB enterprise with respect to defendant brokers. The Court also vacated the dismissal of the state law claims. The District Court’s judgment was affirmed in all other respects. The Third Circuit remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. In re: Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1663 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).

This post written by John Black.

CASE REMANDED TO NEW ARBITRATION PANEL IN LIGHT OF PRIOR PANEL’S MANIFEST DISREGARD OF LAW

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After a second trip to the First Circuit, a district court has held that remand to a new panel of arbitrators is appropriate where the panel’s vacated award was earlier held to be in manifest disregard of the law. The case involved a storied procedural history involving multiple appeals to the First Circuit. The plaintiff sought confirmation of a NASD/FINRA arbitration award, which the district court granted. After the First Circuit vacated the award as manifestly disregarding the law, and remanded the case to the district court, the district court ordered a remand of the matter to FINRA for rehearing. The defendants appealed again, arguing that the district court’s remand order “tacitly adopted” the plaintiff’s allegedly erroneous assertion that the First Circuit had condoned remand to the original arbitration panel. Although it affirmed the order remanding the case to FINRA, the First Circuit directed the district court to determine whether a new arbitration panel should be constituted, the original arbitration panel should be reconstituted, or FINRA should decide the issue in the first instance. The district court found that remand to a new panel was “most appropriate” because of the First Circuit’s earlier finding that the arbitrators had acted in manifest disregard of the law. Kashner Davidson Securities Corp. v. Mscisz, Case No. 05- 11433 (USDC D. Mass. June 25, 2010).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

FOLKSAMERICA GIVEN 60 DAYS TO PERFECT SERVICE AGAINST CONSTRUCTORA DEL LITORAL

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The US District Court for the Southern District of Florida recently issued an opinion on defendant Constructora del Litoral’s Motion to Dismiss for Insufficiency of Service of Process by plaintiff Folksamerica Reinsurance. The action arises out of defendants’ alleged failure to indemnify Folksamerica for sums paid in connection with reinsuring surety bonds issued for a construction project in Ecuador. Plaintiff served process pursuant to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory and Additional Protocol. Constructora alleged in its Motion to Dismiss that service was improper under both Ecuadorian law and under the Convention. The Court concluded that, although defendants had met the burden in establishing that service of process was insufficient, Folksamerica should be given 60 days to perfect service and file proof with the Court. Further background is available in the motion to dismiss, and the opposition to the motion to dismiss. Folksamerica Reinsurance Co. v. Constructora del Litoral, S.A., Case No. 10-20560 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2010).

This post written by John Black.

THIRD CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT A PARTY CANNOT “OPT OUT” OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT IN ITS ENTIRETY

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The Third Circuit has affirmed a judgment in favor of several foreign reinsurers confirming arbitration awards against the statutory liquidator (the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner) for two insolvent insurance companies, but reversed a sanctions award against the Commissioner. Following an arbitration award rescinding three of the four reinsurance treaties at issue, the Commissioner filed a motion in state court to confirm in part, and to vacate in part, the award as part of the liquidation proceedings. The reinsurers removed the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act’s removal provision in 9 U.S.C. § 205, and filed a motion to confirm the award. The Commissioner moved to remand the case, arguing that the parties had selected the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act to govern the arbitration and, thus, that the parties had opted out of the FAA. The district court denied the remand motion and confirmed the award, concluding that the FAA’s vacatur standards applied, not the PUAA’s standards. The district court also sanctioned the Commissioner for filing what the court perceived to be a frivolous remand motion.

On appeal, the Third Circuit initially concluded that removal was proper. That court rejected the Commissioner’s arguments that, first, the parties opted out of the FAA and, second, even if the FAA applies, the arbitration provisions at issue clearly expressed an intent to opt out of the removal provision in § 205. As a matter of law, parties cannot “opt out” of the FAA in its entirety “because it is the FAA itself that authorizes parties to choose different rules in the first place,” and the parties did not agree to waive the right of removal. Not only did the treaties’ arbitration provisions not make any mention of removal, the only provision referring to removal, a service-of-suit provision, stated that nothing in it should be understood to constitute a waiver of the reinsurers’ removal rights.

The Third Circuit next concluded that the FAA supplied the vacatur standards. In the absence of clear intent to the contrary, the FAA’s standards apply to an arbitral award rendered in favor of a foreign party and enforced in the United States. In addition, there was no clear intent to apply the PUAA vacatur standards. Although the treaties stated that “the arbitration shall be in accordance with the rules and procedures established by the [PUAA],” the service-of-suit provision specifically referred to enforcement of the arbitration award in federal courts. The award was thus confirmable under the FAA’s limited vacatur standards.

Finally, the Third Circuit reversed the order granting sanctions for the remand motion, in part because there was no basis in existing law for the district court to conclude that parties could not opt out of § 205 and divest a federal court of jurisdiction. Ario v. The Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for the 1998 Year of Account, No. 09-1921 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2010).

This post written by Brian Perryman.