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Arbitration / Court Decisions

THIRD CIRCUIT EVALUATES THE DEFINITION OF “MATERIALITY” IN RESCISSION CLAIMS

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In a case on which we previously reported, the Third Circuit recently evaluated the legal standard for determining materiality in a claim for rescission of an insurance contract.  The case involved a dispute between two reinsurers in which a federal court awarded the plaintiff $5.6 million based on breaches of the parties’ retrocession agreements.  The district court also entered summary judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the rescission counterclaim.  The Third Circuit affirmed, ruling that the information plaintiff withheld was not material so as to amount to a breach of the duty of utmost good faith, approving the following definition of materiality under New York law: “A fact is material . . . if, had it been revealed, the insurer or reinsurer would either have not issued the policy or would have only at a higher premium.”  The Third Circuit rejected the other party’s broader definition of materiality – that information is material if it “likely” would have influenced the decision.

Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 14-2045 (3rd Cir. Feb. 3, 2015)

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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REINSURER FOUND PREJUDICED BY DISADVANTAGEOUS COMMUTATIONS RESULTING FROM CEDING INSURER’S LATE NOTICE

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A legal dispute stemmed from Utica Mutual Insurance Company’s late notice of claim to Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, Utica’s reinsurer. Although the parties’ facultative reinsurance certificate required Utica to provide prompt notice “of any occurrence or accident which appears likely to involve reinsurance,” Utica did not provide notice of its claim until 2008 after it entered into a settlement agreement with its own insured surrounding litigation which commenced in 1997. Fireman’s Fund argued that it was prejudiced by Utica’s late notice of its $35 million claim because Fireman’s Fund did not take the claim into account when it negotiated thirteen commutation agreements with retrocessionaires. According to Fireman’s Fund, the retrocessionaires would have been responsible for almost $20 million of the $35 million claim had Fireman’s Fund known of the claim because those claims would have been part of their negotiations. Utica maintained that the commutations were collateral matters which did not constitute prejudice and sought partial summary judgment on the issue of late notice. The court concluded that a reinsurer may be prejudiced by its ceding insurer’s late notice which caused it to make disadvantageous commutations. However, the reinsurer must prove that it suffered tangible loss. If it can do so, then the reinsurer is entitled to complete relief from its duty to indemnify and not merely for those damages caused by the prejudice. The court also denied Utica’s motion for partial summary judgment on Fireman’s Funds bad faith defense. Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Utica was grossly negligent or reckless in failing to provide prompt notice to Fireman’s Fund. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., No. 6:09-CV-853 (USDC N.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2015).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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REINSURANCE-RELATED DISPUTE STAYED PENDING ARBITRATION DESPITE LATER EXECUTED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

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Steadfast Insurance Company entered into a settlement agreement with its insured, Barton Malow Enterprises after agreeing to pay $15 million on Barton’s claim. The settlement included a complete release of all claims by Steadfast against Barton and its affiliates and subsidiaries. Thereafter, Steadfast discovered that it had purchased reinsurance covering a portion of the settlement proceeds under a reinsurance agreement with United Integrity. United denied the claim, arguing that Steadfast released United because United was in fact a wholly-owned subsidiary of Barton’s. Steadfast then served an arbitration demand on United pursuant to the arbitration clause in their reinsurance agreement. Barton and United responded by filing suit against Steadfast, which moved to stay the action pending arbitration. Barton and United opposed the motion for stay, arguing that the later-executed settlement agreement overrode the arbitration provision. The court disagreed and stayed the case pending arbitration. The arbitration provision was not superseded by the settlement agreement because the settlement agreement did not specifically preclude arbitration. Moreover, United’s claims fell within the scope of the arbitration provision; the claims implicated both sides’ rights and obligations under the reinsurance agreement. Finally, although Barton was not a party to the reinsurance agreement, the court found that judicial economy warranted staying Barton’s claims against Steadfast pending conclusion of the arbitration. Barton Malow Enterprises, Inc. v. Steadfast Insurance Co., No. 14-cv-7347 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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COURT DENIES MOTIONS TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS UNRELATED TO REINSURANCE POLICIES AT ISSUE IN ACTION

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The dispute continues between Utica Mutual and Clearwater Insurance in the Northern District of New York where the court recently denied, in large part, the parties’ respective motions to compel discovery of insurance and reinsurance documents unrelated to the specific facultative reinsurance policies at issue in the action. In this case, on which we have previously reported, the issue is whether reinsurance is due under contracts between Utica Mutual and Clearwater for a reinsurance claim relating to a settlement with one of Utica Mutual’s insureds. Utica Mutual sought to compel Clearwater to produce unrelated reinsurance contracts, claim notices, claim files, claim billing information, and other documents concerning contractual relationships with non-parties, arguing these documents were relevant to Clearwater’s defenses and counterclaim that it was misled into paying amounts toward that settlement. Clearwater, in turn, sought to compel Utica Mutual to produce information about primary commercial insurance policies issued by Utica Mutual to a number of its commercial insureds, claiming the information was needed, in part, to determine damages relating to the underlying settlement.

The court denied the parties’ motions, finding the documents sought were not relevant and noting that any issues as to the underlying settlement were already litigated and resolved. Discovery of entirely different contracts and documents that are “not germane or are only faintly relevant” would create confusion and diversion. The court did grant that part of Utica Mutual’s motion seeking to compel Clearwater to respond to an interrogatory requesting the factual and legal bases for Clearwater’s assertions that the amounts it paid to Utica Mutual were not due and payable. That single interrogatory, the court found, sought relevant information. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Clearwater Insurance Co., No. 6:13-cv-01178 (USDC N.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2015).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

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SEVENTH CIRCUIT FINDS ATTORNEY FEE DISPUTE ARBITRABLE

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The Seventh Circuit recently held that a cost-sharing agreement (“CSA”) between Hennessy Industries Inc. (“Hennessy”) and National Union Fire Insurance Co. (“National Union”) required the parties to arbitrate a dispute over attorneys’ fees stemming from asbestos-related personal injury claims. Hennessy and National Union entered into a CSA that set forth a framework to govern asbestos claims handling and payment in 2008. The CSA was governed by Illinois law and contained an agreement that the parties would submit disputes to arbitration, though arbitrators would not have jurisdiction to award punitive damages, fines, or penalties.

Despite the language of the CSA, Hennessy sued National Union in federal court, seeking penalties, attorneys’ fees, and costs as provided by Section 155 of Illinois’s insurance law. National Union moved to compel arbitration of that claim, but the district court denied the motion, finding that the Section 155 claim was not within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement. National Union appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which reversed the district court’s ruling. Judge Posner, writing for the court, held: (1) Section 155 “regulate[s] the business of insurance” and thus could not be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act; and (2) Section 155 was within the scope of the arbitration agreement, and so it was arbitrable by its terms. Hennessy Industries, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 14-1277 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2014)

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.