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Arbitration / Court Decisions

Ninth Circuit Affirms District Order Refusing to Compel Arbitration

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In City of Laurel, Mississippi v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue whether a valid arbitration agreement existed between the plaintiff City of Laurel, Mississippi, and defendant Cintas Corporation No. 2. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Cintas’ motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, concluding that “there is no valid arbitration agreement between Cintas and the City.”

The case involved two contracts. The first contract, referred to as the “master agreement,” was between Cintas and “the lead public agency” and included an arbitration clause. The second contract was between Cintas and the city, and included provisions establishing how Cintas would deal with the city and other “participating public agencies.” The parties did not dispute that there was a valid arbitration agreement between Cintas and the “lead public agency” as stated in the first contract. Rather, the dispute focused on whether “the same [arbitration] agreement exists between Cintas and the City.”

The city brought breach of contract claims against Cintas, and the district court denied Cintas’ motion to stay the action and compel arbitration. In affirming the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit first noted that under the FAA, “the court is limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” The court found the contract between Cintas and the city did not include an arbitration clause, and instead provided that Cintas and the city would resolve disputes “directly between them in accordance with and governed by the laws of the State in which [the City] exits.” The court found that if this language compelled arbitration, “it would be superfluous in light of the arbitration agreement incorporated into the Master Agreement,” noting that courts “must avoid interpreting a contract in a way that would render provisions ‘redundant and superfluous.’” The court also rejected Cintas’ argument that the court should “harmonize” the two contracts by applying the arbitration agreement contained in the contract between Cintas and the lead public agency, citing Morgan v. Sundance Inc., which stated that “a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation.”

In a dissenting opinion, one of the circuit judges concluded that the underlying agreement between the parties compels arbitration of the dispute, and he would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case with instructions to compel arbitration.

City of Laurel, Mississippi v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, No. 22-15476 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2023).

Ninth Circuit Recognizes Precedent Restricting Arbitration-Favoring Rules, Compels Parties to Arbitrate Anyway

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In litigation “bookended by two Supreme Court decisions on arbitration,” namely, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis and Morgan v. Sundance Inc., the Ninth Circuit recognized Morgan’s holding prohibiting courts from creating “arbitration-favoring procedural rules” but nonetheless found that the lower court correctly compelled the parties to arbitrate their wage and hour dispute over the plaintiff’s protest.

Teresa Armstrong sued Michaels Stores Inc., alleging violations of California wage and hour laws on behalf of a putative class of Michaels’ employees. Michaels answered and asserted its right to arbitration as an affirmative defense. Thereafter, the parties submitted a joint case management statement listing the legal issues in the case, including whether Armstrong agreed to arbitrate her claims. Michaels represented that it planned to move to compel arbitration after conducting discovery. Michaels subsequently served five interrogatories and required Armstrong to produce 28 pages of documents relevant to certain non-arbitrable claims. Neither party filed any discovery motions.

Michaels moved to compel arbitration in August 2018, approximately 10 months after Armstrong had originally filed suit. Armstrong opposed it, arguing that Michaels had waived its right to arbitration due to delay. The district court ruled in favor of Michaels and the arbitrator awarded summary judgment to Michaels. Armstrong appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

While the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Morgan, which held that “the plain language of the Federal Arbitration Act restricts courts from creating arbitration-favoring procedural rules.” The Ninth Circuit noted that, before Morgan, “to give voice to the FAA’s policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements, we held that waiver of the right to arbitration was disfavored.” Like most other circuits, the Ninth Circuit had created “an arbitration-specific waiver test,” which imposed a “heavy burden” on parties arguing that the right to arbitrate had been waived. After Morgan, courts are now required to treat arbitration agreements just like any other contract and, as such, “may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation.”

In light of Morgan, parties asserting waiver must now demonstrate (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right. Unlike before, parties no longer have to demonstrate prejudice to the person opposing arbitration caused by such inconsistent acts.

The Ninth Circuit applied the precedent to Michaels’ actions in the litigation and found that Michaels had not intentionally acted inconsistently with its right to compel arbitration. On the contrary, Michaels consistently stated its intent to move to compel arbitration. Further, Michaels did not actively litigate the merits of the case in the district court. Its limited discovery requests were related to Armstrong’s non-arbitrable claims. Finally, Michaels’ motion to compel arbitration was filed within a year of the lawsuit originally being filed against it. Even under the post-Morgan regime for analyzing waiver of the right to compel arbitration, the Ninth Circuit held Michaels’ actions in this case insufficient to waive its right.

Armstrong v. Michaels Stores Inc., No. 21-15397 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2023)

Arbitrability Is Question for Court in Case Alleging Fraud Regarding Agreement Between Parties

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The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently held that the question of arbitrability was for a court, not an arbitrator, to decide where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had fraudulently induced them to enter agreements they did not understand contained arbitration clauses.

Several Maryland residents obtained structured settlements to compensate them for injuries allegedly caused by their purported exposure to lead-based paint. Access Funding, LLC and Assoc, LLC (collectively the “Factoring Companies”) entered into agreements with those residents whereby the Factoring Companies paid them a discounted lump sum and the residents assigned their rights to periodic future payments to the Factoring Companies. The agreements contained arbitration clauses that stated “[o]nce your transaction has closed any claim or dispute . . . shall be resolved by mandatory binding arbitration.” Under Maryland law, the agreements were contingent on court approval, which the parties obtained.

The residents subsequently filed a putative class action complaint alleging, among other things, that the Factoring Companies engaged in fraud and other misconduct in inducing them to execute the agreements. To make a procedurally complex story much more simple, the Factoring Companies moved to compel arbitration. The Maryland trial court granted the motion to compel, reasoning that arbitrability was for the arbitrator to decide, but Maryland’s intermediate appellate court reversed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed the case and agreed with the intermediate appellate court that the motion to compel should have been denied.

The court held that “the question of whether a valid arbitration agreement exists is a question for the court to determine” where a plaintiff alleges that the “approval of the transfer of their structured settlement payment rights was procured through fraud and deceit” and the plaintiff denies “the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.” The court explained, “a plaintiff’s alleged inability to understand the terms of an arbitration clause in a written agreement, on the ground that the other party procured the agreement through fraud and deceit, places the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate at issue and raises an issue to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.” In this case, the court explained that the plaintiffs allegedly suffered from cognitive deficiencies and had pleaded that the Factoring Companies and other defendants had colluded to “interfere with their ability to obtain independent professional advice and sought to prevent them from fully understanding and appreciating the agreement’s provision with respect to binding arbitration.” The court found these allegations sufficient to place the existence of a valid agreement in question.

Alternatively, the court also held that because “the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly conditions arbitration on closure of the transaction” the plaintiffs “challenge[d] the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, which is an issue for the court” not the arbitrator.

Of note, the court also explained that the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, which governed the arbitration issues in this case, was meant to mirror the FAA.

Access Funding, LLC, et al. v. Chrystal Linton, et al., No. 5, September Term 2022 (Ct. App. Md. Dec. 1, 2022).

 

Tenth Circuit Affirms Refusal to Vacate Confirmation Despite Foreign Court’s Annulment of Underlying Arbitration Award

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The Tenth Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s decision not to vacate a confirmation award even though the underlying arbitration award had been annulled by a Bolivian court following the confirmation. The Tenth Circuit agreed that public policy considerations, including concerns about encouraging endless litigation, rendered the district court’s decision not to vacate the confirmation as within that court’s discretion.

Compañía de Inversiones Mercantiles S.A. (CIMSA) and Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V. (GCC) entered into a shareholder agreement in which GCC purchased shares of a Bolivian company from CIMSA. The shareholder agreement included an arbitration clause and provided that CIMSA had a right of first refusal if GCC sought to sell its shares. CIMSA attempted to exercise that right when GCC moved to sell shares, but GCC purportedly claimed that CIMSA’s right was invalid and sold the shares to a third party. The sale triggered lengthy arbitration and court proceedings. In short, an arbitral tribunal in Bolivia awarded CIMSA approximately $34 million in damages plus $2 million in costs and fees, all subject to 6% interest. GCC moved to annul the award in Bolivia but lost. CIMSA then obtained an order from the U. S. District Court for the District of Colorado confirming the award. The Tenth Circuit affirmed that award. GCC then persuaded a different panel of the Bolivian court that had ruled against it to annul the arbitral award. With that annulment in hand, GCC moved to vacate the district court’s confirmation order. The district court denied GCC’s motion. GCC appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed.

GCC initially  argued that a U. S. court cannot confirm an arbitral award that has been annulled by the primary jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting:

[W]hen a court has been asked to vacate an order confirming an arbitral award that has later been annulled, it may balance against comity considerations (1) whether the annulment is repugnant to U.S. public policy or (2) whether giving effect to the annulment would undermine U.S. public policy.

GCC nevertheless argued that the district court erred by considering in conjunction with that analysis not only whether the orders of the Bolivian court were repugnant to U.S. public policy, but “whether giving effect to those orders through vacatur of its Confirmation Judgment would offend U.S. public policy.” The Tenth Circuit disagreed, explaining that the district court properly considered whether giving effect to orders would violate public policy (and holding that it would because doing so would “encourage ‘proceedings without end’”) in addition to the question of whether the orders themselves were repugnant to U.S. public policy. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding “that (1) giving effect to the [] Bolivian orders [annulling the arbitral award] would offend U.S. public policy and (2) GCC acted inequitably in the United States and Bolivian proceedings[:]”

The interests of the finality of judgments, respecting parties’ contractual expectations, and the U. S. policy favoring arbitral dispute resolution support the district court’s conclusion that vacatur of its Confirmation Judgment would violate U.S. public policy. These considerations correspondingly support the district court’s decision against extending comity to the [relevant] Bolivian orders.

The Tenth Circuit also rejected GCC’s arguments that the district court erred by ordering GCC to turnover property held abroad by third parties, and other challenges to turnover orders.

Compañía de Inversiones Mercantiles S.A. v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V., No. 21-1196 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2023)

SDNY Rejects Cross-Petition To Vacate Arbitration Award, Rejecting Claims of Manifest Disregard of Law and “Evident Partiality”

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Recognizing arbitration awards are subject to “very limited review” and should be confirmed, “so long as there is a ‘barely colorable justification’ for the outcome that the arbitrator reached,” the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the arbitration award in favor of the petitioners, Telecom Business Solution, LLC, LATAM Towers, LLC, and AMLQ Holdings (Cay) Ltd., and denied the respondents, Terra Towers Corp., TBS Management, S.A., and DT Holdings, Inc.’s cross-petition to vacate that award.

The petitioners and respondent, Terra Towers Corp., entered into a shareholders agreement to co-own and operate a business engaged in the operation of telecommunications towers in Central and South America (Company). Terra was the majority shareholder of the Company, and the petitioners were the minority shareholders. The shareholders agreement provided that after five years, the petitioners could unilaterally initiate a sale of the Company, which it did two weeks after the expiration of the five-year period. Terra rejected the sale proposed by the petitioners and sought to buy out the petitioners’ shares of stock in the Company. The petitioners then commenced an arbitration alleging that Terra breached the shareholders agreement “by obstructing their proposed sale of the Company.” The petitioners sought damages from the respondents or specific performance. The petitioners and respondents each appointed one arbitrator who then appointed a third arbitrator to act as chair of the panel. Phase one of the arbitration was limited to the petitioners’ claim for specific performance related to the sale of the Company. After a hearing, the panel issued a First Partial Final Award (FPFA) ordering a sale of the Company. Further disputes developed between the parties after the entry of the FPFA, resulting in the entry by the panel of interim relief, including an injunction. The respondents claimed to the ICDR that there was “‘justifiable doubt’ about their party-appointed arbitrator’s impartiality.” After further submissions on the issue, the ICDR’s International Administrative Review Council denied the respondents’ challenge.

The petitioners filed a petition to confirm the FPFA, and the respondents sought “to vacate the FPFA, asserting that the panel violated “‘fundamental fairness’ by refusing to provide them with ‘a fair opportunity to be heard’ … that the Panel acted in ‘manifest disregard of the law’ … by granting specific performance to Petitioners,” and that there was “evident partiality” by two of the three arbitrators in favor of the petitioners. After noting the grounds on which an arbitration award may be set aside, the court rejected all of the respondents’ arguments and granted the petition to confirm the FPFA. The court found “[n]either the Panel’s decision to phase the arbitration nor the Panel’s denial of discovery in Phase 1 of the Arbitration constituted misconduct that rendered the Arbitration fundamentally unfair.”  The court also rejected the respondents’ contention that the FPFA issued was in “manifest disregard of the law,” finding a court’s review under this standard is “severely limited” and a “doctrine of last resort” limited to “rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent.” Finally, the court rejected the respondents’ claim of evident partiality concluding the “ICDR already has carefully reviewed and rejected all of Respondents’ evidence of a purported disqualifying conflict.”

Telecom Business Solution, LLC et al. v. Terra Towers Corp., et al., No. 22-cv-1761 (SDNY, Jan. 18, 2023)