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You are here: Home / Archives for Arbitration / Court Decisions

Arbitration / Court Decisions

COURT REFUSES TO RECONSIDER ARBITRATOR’S FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS

January 12, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

In a case emphasizing the deference courts give to factual findings of arbitrators, a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of New York has confirmed an arbitration award granting damages and attorneys’ fees to a company that repossessed a leased car when the leasee fell behind on his payments.

The case arose out of the lease of a car by plaintiff Kevin Love and his wife Maria. After the Loves failed to make timely payments on the lease, defendant BMW Financial Services repossessed the car, sold it at auction, and sought payment of a deficiency balance. Mr. Love sued BMW in state court, where he asserted Fair Credit Reporting Act, tort, and contract claims. BMW removed the case to federal court, then successfully moved to compel arbitration per the terms of the lease agreement. The arbitrator entered an award in favor of BMW, rejecting all of Mr. Love’s claims and awarding BMW $34,826.64 in damages plus interest and $50,000 in attorneys’ fees. BMW then moved in federal court to confirm the award and sought its fees incurred in connection with that proceeding, and Mr. Love cross-moved to vacate the award.

The court confirmed the award, emphasizing that courts in the Second Circuit will not vacate an arbitration award except in narrowly-defined circumstances described in the Federal Arbitration Act or if the court finds that it was rendered in “‘manifest disregard’ of the law or the terms of the parties’ agreement.” The court further emphasized that manifest disregard of the evidence is not a grounds for vacatur within the Second Circuit. Thus, the court rejected Mr. Love’s claim that the arbitration award was too large because the arbitrator failed to properly account for the time that the car was not available to Mr. Love, finding that it had no power to review such a factual finding. The court likewise rejected Mr. Love’s argument that the arbitrator’s decision dismissing his FCRA claim should be vacated, as this was also based on a non-reviewable finding of fact. The court also found that because the plain language of the lease provided for attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with a default on the lease, BMW was entitled to recover the $12,690.02 in attorneys’ fees it incurred in seeking to have the award confirmed and responding to Mr. Love’s motion for vacatur.

Love v. BMW Financial Services NA, LLC, No. 15-cv-0124 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2017)

This post written by Jason Brost.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

MISSOURI COURT HOLDS ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN INSURANCE CONTRACT UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND UNDER GOVERNING LAW

January 11, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

A Missouri district court recently held a mandatory arbitration provision was unenforceable in an insurance coverage dispute after an electrician was injured on the job and won an uncontested judgment in state court against Solaris Power Services (“Solaris”). His employer was insured by Liberty Mutual and had excess insurance through AEGIS. The plaintiffs in the present case, including Solaris, sued both insurers and alleged they should have been additional insureds under both policies and their coverage claims were wrongly denied. AEGIS moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to a mandatory arbitration provision in its excess insurance policy. The various parties disputed which state’s law applied. The court ultimately denied the motion, holding the mandatory arbitration provision was unenforceable.

First, the court concluded the arbitration clause was unenforceable as it contravened Missouri public policy. Missouri choice of law rules allow for the application of another state’s law as long as the law “is not contrary to a fundamental policy of Missouri.” Application of North Dakota law (as advocated for by AEGIS) or any other state’s law that would enforce the arbitration provision was inappropriate as it would contravene Missouri law prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance contracts.

Next, the court concluded that even under a traditional choice of law analysis, the arbitration clause was still unenforceable. Missouri choice of law for insurance coverage disputes provides certain factors to consider in determining what law to apply, “[i]n the absence of effective choice of law by the parties.” Here, the court found the insurance policy contained an effective choice of law provision where it stated construction “in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which the situation forming the basis for the controversy arose.” The accident’s location in Kansas therefore dictated Kansas law governed. Because arbitration provisions in insurance contracts are unenforceable under Kansas law, the court reached the same conclusion it previously did that the provision was unenforceable.

Simon v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 17-152 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OF EXPENSE-INCLUSIVE CAPS IN LIABILITY LIMIT CLAUSES IN FACULTATIVE REINSURANCE CERTIFICATES

January 8, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

The New York Court of Appeals recently answered in the negative a question certified to it by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding prior precedent and whether per occurrence liability limits in facultative reinsurance contracts cap all obligations of the reinsurer, including for expenses such as defense costs. In doing so, the state’s highest court reiterated that general principles of contract construction apply to reinsurance contracts.

Specifically, the Second Circuit asked whether the New York Court of Appeals’ 2004 decision in Excess Ins. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co.:

“impose[d] either a rule of construction, or a strong presumption, that a per occurrence liability cap in a reinsurance contract limits the total reinsurance available under the contract to the amount of the cap regardless of whether the underlying policy is understood to cover expenses such as, for instance, defense costs?”

In the underlying Second Circuit case, the cedent (“Century”) billed its reinsurer (“Global”) over $82,000 in loss and over $244,000 in expenses for a particular claim, even though the certificate’s stated limit was $250,000. Citing Excess, Global argued the $250,000 limit operated as a cap on its ultimate reinsurance obligations, while Century argued the cap applied only to loss (indemnity) and that Global was still responsible to cover expenses in addition to the limit.

The court began its analysis with a detailed explanation of its decision in Excess. There, the court interpreted the limitations clause in a facultative reinsurance certificate to operate an expense-inclusive cap. In the decade-plus since the Excess decision, however, some courts have interpreted the ruling to mean that third-party defense costs incurred by a cedent are unambiguously or presumptively subject to the amount of the stated liability limits in such certificates.

Answering the certified question in the negative, the court rejected that Excess established such a per se rule on expense-inclusive caps. It distinguished the issues presented in Excess and in the underlying Second Circuit case, with the former addressing whether the reinsurance contract at issue’s limitations clause established a cap for both liability costs and expenses or merely liability costs. Specifically, the court noted, the Excess case read the limitations clause in context of the entirety of the reinsurance contract in line with general principles of contract construction. Additionally, the court distinguished Excess on the fact that the expenses incurred were in litigation between the insurer and its policyholder, not costs (such as third-party defense costs) the insurer was obligated to pay pursuant to the terms of the underlying contract itself. Thus, the court concluded that Excess did not address whether similar limitations clauses would require reinsurers cover third-party defense costs in excess of those limits.

The court “h[e]ld definitively” that Excess did not supersede the ordinary rules of contract interpretation that otherwise apply to reinsurance contracts. Thus, under the Court of Appeals holding, New York law does not impose a rule nor a presumption that a liability limitation clause automatically caps all obligations, including defense costs and other expenses, owed by a reinsurer without regard for the specific provisions in the reinsurance contract, and the court answered the Second Circuit’s question in the negative. Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Century Indem. Co., No. 124 (N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Contract Interpretation, Week's Best Posts

INSURER’S ATTEMPT TO SHIELD DOCUMENTS FROM DISCOVERY THROUGH ASSERTION OF THE MEDIATION PRIVILEGE AND A RELEVANCY OBJECTION IS UNAVAILING

January 5, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

In a breach of contract and bad faith case emanating from an insurer’s refusal to settle an underlying case within policy limits, the insurer was unsuccessful in its attempt to protect documents from discovery by assertion of a “mediation privilege” and another set of documents related to reinsurance information via a relevancy objection. The court ruled that the documents did not qualify as “mediation documents” because the insurer was not a party to the underlying litigation, which was a “requirement under the plain meaning of the definition of ‘mediation document.’” The documents also did not qualify as “mediation communications” because they involved statements “made by a person present at the mediation outside the mediation session.” As such, in order to qualify, the communications must have either been made by the mediator, or to the mediator. They were not. Another set of documents containing statements “which were made by a person who may have been present at the mediation session to someone (not the mediator) outside the mediation session” also did not qualify for protection.

With regard to the reinsurance documents, the court stated that there is “no absolute exclusion of reinsurance information.” Rather, discovery of such information may be allowed in the context of claims for bad faith involving an insurer’s failure to settle in order to “equalize the knowledge of both parties and give the plaintiff ‘assurance that there can be recovery in the event of a favorable verdict to justify the time, effort and expense of preparing for trial.’” The fact that such information may be discoverable, however, does not guarantee that it will be admissible at trial.

Subsequent to the ruling described above, the court denied a motion for reconsideration, finding that it had not committed an error of law. The court “reiterate[d] that it considers the mediation privilege a very important privilege in jurisprudence; however, for the Court to stretch the mediation privilege beyond its plain meaning and ambit of protection, in fact, would undercut the privilege itself and exceed this Court’s power and authority.” Golon, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of the Southeast, Case No. 17-cv-0819 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2017 and Dec. 14, 2017).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Discovery

NINTH CIRCUIT: UNCONSCIONABILITY ARGUMENTS DIRECTED SOLELY AT CLASS ACTION WAIVER PROVISIONS IN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS ARE FORECLOSED BY CONCEPCION

January 4, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

Utilizing a “sweeping reading of Concepcion,” as characterized by the concurring opinion, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that arguments that “a class action waiver, by itself, is unconscionable under state law or that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable solely because it contains a class action waiver” are expressly foreclosed by AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). The plaintiff did not challenge the district court’s decision to compel arbitration, but rather the decision to compel arbitration on an individual basis, arguing that the relevant agreement’s class action waiver provision was unconscionable under Nevada law.

The majority stated that, while Concepcion foreclosed the plaintiff’s unconscionability argument because it was directed only at the class action waiver provision, Concepcion “does not foreclose application of state unconscionability doctrines to arbitration agreements generally.” Were the plaintiff to contend that “the entire arbitration agreement – or any aspect of it other than the class action waiver – is unconscionable,” then his argument would be viable. However, such was not the case here. Carter v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., Case No. 16-15835 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2017).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

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