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You are here: Home / Archives for Arbitration / Court Decisions / Contract Interpretation

Contract Interpretation

New York Federal Court Holds Questions of Arbitrability to Be Resolved by Arbitrator in Labor Dispute

September 23, 2022 by Alex Bein

In a recent decision, a New York federal magistrate judge considered whether threshold questions of arbitrability were to be decided by the court or by an arbitrator in a labor dispute between a Jewish religious organization and its former employees.

Upon leaving employment at the Kabbalah Centre, the plaintiffs signed separation agreements, which included arbitration clauses providing that any disputes related to employment or to the separation agreement itself were to be decided in arbitration. The plaintiffs nonetheless brought an action against the Kabbalah Centre in federal court, arguing that the separation agreements and their arbitration clauses were the products of improper, coercive tactics by their former employer and were therefore unenforceable. The Kabbalah Centre moved to compel arbitration under the terms of the separation agreements.

As an initial matter, the court distinguished between challenges to an arbitration clause in a contract, and challenges to the contract as a whole. Citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), the court noted that the former type of challenge must be decided by the court, while the latter type of challenge was within the purview of the arbitrator.

In granting the Kabbalah Centre’s motion to compel arbitration, the court found that the plaintiffs did not challenge the facial validity of the separation agreements’ arbitration provisions but rather asserted that the contract as a whole should be deemed void. As such, the court looked to the arbitration provisions themselves to determine whether they addressed threshold issues of arbitrability. The court concluded in the affirmative, noting that the separation agreements delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator by incorporating the rules of the American Arbitration Association and JAMS. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ additional arguments and granted the Kabbalah Centre’s motion to compel arbitration accordingly.

 Greene v. Kabbalah Centre International, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-04304 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2022).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Interpretation

Sixth Circuit Holds That District Court Erred by Not Analyzing Whether Non-Signatory Consented to Arbitration

September 22, 2022 by Brendan Gooley

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently vacated and remanded an order concluding that a party was not bound by an arbitration award after concluding that the district court failed to consider whether that party may have consented to arbitration through its actions even though it was not a signatory to the collective bargaining agreement that contained the arbitration clause.

Greenhouse Holdings LLC did business as Clearview Glass and Glazing in Kentucky. Greenhouse also owned 90% of Clearview Glass and Glazing Contractors of Tennessee LLC. The International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council 91 filed a grievance against “Clearview Glass” alleging that it violated a collective bargaining agreement the union had. It was unclear whether “Clearview Glass” meant Greenhouse (based on its trade name Clearview Kentucky), Clearview Tennessee, or both. The union argued that Greenhouse was bound by the collective bargaining agreement and an arbitration clause therein. Greenhouse disputed that. The arbitrator apparently sided with the union and issued an order that affected Clearview Kentucky (i.e., Greenhouse). Greenhouse challenged that award.

The district court vacated the arbitrator’s award “to the extent it applies to Greenhouse.” The district court “held that Greenhouse wasn’t a party to the [collective bargaining agreement] and thus the arbitrator acted outside his authority to the extent the award applied to Greenhouse.”

The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s decision. It held that the district court “didn’t address this threshold question” of whether Greenhouse had consented to arbitration even though it did not sign the collective bargaining agreement that contained the arbitration clause. The Third Circuit explained that “an agreement to arbitrate need not be in writing” and that courts “may infer agreement when a party willingly participates in [an] arbitration without objecting to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.”

The Third Circuit further explained that whether a party has consented to arbitration it otherwise may not have agreed to is a fact-intensive inquiry, and it remanded the case to the district court to analyze that question under the facts of the case.

Greenhouse Holdings, LLC v. International Union of Painters & Allied Trades District Council 91, No. 21-6164 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 2022).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Formation, Contract Interpretation

Third Circuit Compels Arbitration Despite Dispute About Whether Assignment of Loan Containing Arbitration Clause Was Lawful

September 20, 2022 by Brendan Gooley

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a district court should have granted a motion to compel arbitration even though there was a dispute about the legality of an assignment of a loan agreement that contained the arbitration clause at issue. The Third Circuit explained that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate, which was sufficient to send the case to arbitration.

OneMain Financial Group, a nonbank finance company that issues consumer loans, issued a loan to Benjamin Zirpoli pursuant to the Consumer Discount Company Act (CDCA), which creates exceptions to state usury laws. That loan contained an arbitration clause that provided that “You or We have an absolute right to demand that any Claim be submitted to an arbitrator in accordance with this Arbitration Agreement.” “We” was defined to include OneMain’s “assignees.” “Claim” was meanwhile defined to include “anything related to … the arbitrability of any Claim pursuant to this Agreement” and “anything related to … any alleged violation [of a state statute], including without limitation … usury … laws.”

OneMain sold Zirpoli’s account, which was then delinquent, to Midland Funding LLC, a company that purchases consumer debt. The “CDCA prohibits CDCA licensees from ‘selling contracts to a … corporation not holding a license … without the prior written approval of the Secretary of Banking,’” but Midland apparently “did not possess a CDCA license or request approval from the Department of Banking” to acquire Zirpoli’s account.

Midland sued Zirpoli to collect the debt but later dismissed the suit and then allegedly reported Zirpoli’s delinquent debt to various consumer agencies, which purportedly negatively affected Zirpoli’s credit. Zirpoli then filed a putative class action alleging that because Midland did not have a CDCA license and did not obtain approval from the Department of Banking, it was not lawfully permitted to purchase his loan or the other CDCA-governed loans it acquired.

Midland moved to compel arbitration. The district court ultimately denied Midland’s motion based on the purported illegality of the transfer from OneMain to Midland.

The Third Circuit (with one judge dissenting) vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to grant Midland’s motion to compel arbitration.

After holding that “party” under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act “refers to a party to a litigation” and that it therefore had jurisdiction to consider Midland’s motion on appeal, the Third Circuit held that arbitration was appropriate because Zirpoli had signed a valid arbitration agreement and that agreement applied to OneMain’s assigns, which included Midland. The Third Circuit acknowledged that there was a dispute about the legality of OneMain’s assignment to Midland but explained that its analysis was limited to the threshold question of whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate in light of the delegation clause delegating issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator and that it was therefore prohibited from analyzing the merits of the dispute regarding whether that agreement should be invalidated because it violated the CDCA.

The Third Circuit alternatively held that even if it considered the merits of Zirpoli’s claim, it would reject his contention that the assignment was invalid. OneMain had “charged-off” Zirpoli’s loan, which meant that the “assignment falls outside of the CDCA’s purview.”

Zirpoli v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 21-2438 (3d Cir. Sept. 1, 2022).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Interpretation

SDNY Compels Arbitration Pursuant to ADR Provision in Contract Governing Disputed Commercial Transaction

September 13, 2022 by Kenneth Cesta

Applying the Federal Arbitration Act and recognizing that it “reflects a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration provision at issue was as expansive as similar clauses that the Second Circuit has previously described as the “paradigm of a broad clause establishing a presumption of arbitrability.”

Plaintiff Kuehne + Nagel Inc., a logistics service provider that arranges the transportation of freight, and defendant Baker Hughes were parties to a global air freight transportation contract, which included an alternative dispute resolution provision that applied “[i]n the event of any dispute between the Parties hereto arising from or relating to this contract.” After a shipment of cargo was seized by customs authorities at its destination in Brazil, Baker sent a demand letter to Kuehne to commence the claim process so Baker could be compensated for its losses. Efforts to mediate the dispute were unsuccessful and Kuehne filed an action in federal court seeking, among other relief, a declaratory judgment that the agreement did not apply to the claims at issue with Baker. Baker then moved to compel arbitration, contending that the ADR provision requires the submission of all disputes concerning the agreement to arbitration. Kuehne raised several arguments in opposition to the motion, including: (i) the issue of arbitrability should be decided by the court; (ii) the language “either party may refer the dispute to arbitration” means that the ADR provision is not mandatory; and (iii) the agreement did not apply to the transportation services at issue in the case.

The court rejected Kuehne’s arguments, finding that the ADR provision was expansive and that because the claims at issue “touch matters covered by” the agreement, the underlying dispute fell within the scope of the agreement’s ADR provision. The court also found that the agreement incorporated procedural rules that expressly empowered the arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability and concluded that although the agreement did not expressly address the matter, the parties intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Finally, the court noted the “overwhelming balance of authority in this Circuit and elsewhere” confirms that, absent language that an arbitration provision is intended to trigger “permissive” arbitration, provisions that state either party “may” refer the dispute to arbitration trigger mandatory arbitration. The court then concluded that the arbitration clause of the ADR provision of the agreement was mandatory and that the merits of Kuehne’s claims must be decided by the arbitrator. The court granted Baker’s motion to compel arbitration but denied its motion to dismiss, deciding instead to stay the case.

Kuehne + Nagel Inc. v. Baker Hughes, No. 1:21-cv-08470 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2022).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Interpretation

Seller Wins “Battle” to Apply FAA Over VUAA to Arbitration Dispute, but Loses “War” Over Award Confirmation

September 7, 2022 by Benjamin Stearns

The case involved a seller of a 91% interest in a Virginia-based government contractor that provides overseas staffing and logistics support to government agencies. The parties’ sale contract contained a choice-of-law provision that stated the agreement “shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the internal laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia without giving effect to any choice or conflict of law provision or rule.” The contract also included an arbitration provision applicable to disputes related to any adjustment payments after the closing of the sale. The parties ultimately could not agree on the amount of a post-closing adjustment payment and proceeded to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded the buyer approximately $3.1 million, after which the parties filed cross-motions to confirm and to vacate the arbitration award. In support of its motion to vacate, the seller included an argument that the award was in “manifest disregard” of the applicable law.

The federal district court first noted that “manifest disregard” is recognized by the Fourth Circuit as a valid basis under federal arbitration common law to vacate an arbitration award, but it is not under Virginia law. As a result, the court was required to determine whether the contract’s general choice-of-law provision selecting Virginia law resulted in the application of the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act to the parties’ dispute. Again relying specifically on controlling Fourth Circuit precedent, the court found that “a contract’s general choice-of-law provision does not displace federal arbitration law if the contract involves interstate commerce.” Rather, the parties “may displace the FAA only by specifying that state law should apply specifically to arbitration proceedings.” Neither party disputed that the contract involved interstate commerce. As such, the contract’s choice-of-law provision was sufficient to invoke Virginia law for issues of contract interpretation, but not for purposes of displacing the FAA, because the agreement did not specifically address the law that would govern arbitration disputes.

Having won the argument that federal arbitration law applied to the parties’ dispute regarding confirmation or vacatur of the arbitration award, the seller then lost its argument that the arbitrator “manifestly disregarded” the applicable law. The court noted that, under federal arbitration law, a party moving to vacate an arbitration award faces a “heavy burden” and that the scope of a federal court’s review of an arbitration award is “among the narrowest known at law.” The court’s review is limited to “whether the arbitrators did the job they were told to do — not whether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether they did it.” Pursuant to Fourth Circuit precedent, an arbitrator’s determination is not in manifest disregard and must be upheld “so long as it draws its essence from the agreement.” An award “fails to draw its essence from the agreement only when the result is not rationally inferable from the contract.”

After analyzing the seller’s claim, the court found that, “[d]istilled to its essence, the Seller’s argument does nothing more than challenge the arbitrator’s interpretation of applicable law.” As this argument was “plainly insufficient” to support a claim of “manifest disregard” of the law, the court confirmed the arbitration award.

Vogel v. Gracias Juan, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-01355 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2022).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Contract Interpretation

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