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Contract Interpretation

CASE UPDATE: ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL REVERSES DECISION DENYING REINSURANCE COVERAGE, MARKING DEPARTURE FROM TRADITIONAL FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS RULINGS

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In a May 23, 2007 post, we reported on a UK decision denying reinsurance coverage despite a follow the fortunes provision based on a finding that the damages occurred outside the coverage period of the reinsurance, despite the conclusion of a US court on the underlying claim finding liability for damage occurring outside the coverage period of the underlying policy. The UK Court of Appeals has allowed an appeal, finding that the coverage provision of the reinsurance should be interpreted in the same manner as the coverage provision in the underlying insurance.

The English appellate court agreed that the insurance and reinsurance contracts were not entirely “back to back” in terms of the coverage periods, but concluded that although there were some differences in the contracts, the parties intended that they should have the same effect and therefore, the reinsured’s settlement of the insurance claim did fall within the terms of the reinsurance contract. Despite the fact that the reinsurance appeared only to cover damage that occurred during the period of the reinsurance, and the trigger of coverage used by the US court permitted a broader recovery from the insurer, the Court of Appeals accepted the proposition that “the same or equivalent [coverage] wordings should be given the same meaning in the reinsurance contract as in the insurance contract.”

Explaining that the UK reinsurer had taken certain known risks in reinsuring a US insurer, the Court concluded that although the judgment against the insured was not one which the reinsurers expected, nevertheless it was one which was a possibility that they agreed to cover. This decision marks a departure from previous ‘follow the settlement’ cases involving differences in the insurance and reinsurance contracts, which have typically been resolved in favor of the reinsurers. Wasa International Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., [2008] EWCA Civ 150 (Feb. 29, 2008).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

COURT INTERPRETS REINSURANCE AGREEMENT LIABILITY LIMIT IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT SETTING

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A district court has interpreted the liability limit of a reinsurance agreement in a summary judgment setting, finding the language to be unambiguous, and finding in favor of the position advanced by the reinsured. The opinion contains a good discussion of the rules for interpreting reinsurance agreements. Princeton Ins. Co. v. Converium Reinsurance (North America) Inc., Case No. 06-599 (USDC D. N.J. Mar. 27, 2008).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

MULTI-YEAR REINSURANCE AGREEMENT REMAINS IN FORCE DESPITE LIQUIDATION OF CEDENT

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A reinsurance agreement reinsured crop insurance risks from two related cedents over a five year period, with an initial premium amount for the first two years, followed by annual premium payments thereafter. After paying the premium for the first two years, one cedent was placed in liquidation and the other was placed under supervision. Their parent filed for bankruptcy protection. The issue arose as to whether the reinsurance agreement was enforceable for the remaining three years, since the cedents had ceased writing crop insurance. While bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the cedents, a bankruptcy appellate panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the reinsurance agreement was an enforceable five year agreement, allowing a claim by the reinsurer for the remaining $9 million of premium. The court of appeals based its decision on accepted principles of contract interpretation, rejecting the contention that there was a frustration of purpose when the companies stopped issuing crop insurance. The court reasoned that the cessation of writing crop insurance was foreseeable in the event that the companies did not maintain sufficient capital, and did not amount to frustration of purpose. In re Acceptance insurance Companies, No. 07-6027/6029 (8th Cir. Mar. 12, 2008).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS STOP-LOSS POLICY NOT REINSURANCE UNDER WISCONSIN LAW

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The Seventh Circuit has reversed a federal magistrate’s ruling that defined a stop-loss policy as reinsurance under Wisconsin law.

Edstrom, a manufacturing company, had a stop loss policy in place for its group health plan with Companion Life. Prior to issuing the policy, Companion asked Edstrom to identify any participant who could reasonably be expected to incur more than $32,500 in medical expenses in 2004. Edstrom informed Companion that there was no such participant. In 2004, one of the plan participants had a child that developed a serious medical condition, which was based upon an undisclosed condition that existed prior to the issuance of the policy, and which resulted in claims of at least $890,000. When Companion discovered the child’s condition, it raised the child’s deductible to $450,000, pursuant to a policy provision that allowed the insurer to revise the deductible based on subsequent information that if known before issuing the policy would affect the rates, deductibles, and terms of the policy.

Edstrom initiated arbitration proceedings against Companion. The arbitrator found in favor of Companion finding that the terms of the policy provided the insurer with unfettered rights to raise the deductible. Edstrom unsuccessfully moved to have the award vacated by the District Court claiming that the decision violated Wisconsin Statute Section 631.11(1)(b), which provides that a misrepresentation cannot affect an insurer’s obligations unless the insured “knew or should have known that the representation was false.” Edstrom contended that since it neither knew, nor had reason to know, that the representation regarding potential claims was false, Companion could not raise the deductible. While the arbitrator did not mention this statute, the magistrate judge held that the policy was a contract of reinsurance, and that the statute did not apply to contracts of reinsurance.

The Seventh Circuit held that the federal magistrate’s definition of stop loss policy as reinsurance under Wisconsin law was incorrect. The court stated that “it is a mistake to think that anything someone does to insure someone else against a risk is ‘insurance’ within the meaning of statutes that regulate insurance.” “Stop-loss insurance is an insurance policy for losses that the insured self-insures up to the limit of the deductible,” according to the court.

The contract contained a provision which required that the arbitrator “strictly abide by the terms of this [policy] and shall strictly apply rules of law applicable thereto,” namely the rules of Wisconsin law. The Court of Appeals found this provision to be enforceable. Since there was no evidence in the record that the arbitrator had considered the applicability of the statute to this situation, the appellate court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the award and to return the case to the arbitrator for consideration of the statute and to determine whether the policyholder knew or should have known that its representation to the insurer was false. Edstrom v. Companion Life Ins. Co., No. 06 C 964 (USCA 7th Cir. Feb. 11, 2008).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

JURY FINDS AIG SUBSIDIARIES LIABLE FOR $28 MILLION PLUS PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT

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In an August 16, 2007 post, we commented on a New York district court’s denial of cross motions for summary judgment in a case seeking rescission of two reinsurance facilities. The court rejected the defendants’ statute of limitations defense on summary judgment, however, following a jury trial, the court agreed that plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation and breach of the duty of utmost good faith claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court also merged plaintiff’s claims for material nondisclosure and intentional misrepresentation into a single claim of fraudulent inducement. The bases for the claims are set out in the Second Amended Complaint and in our prior post. Shortly before trial, the court denied a motion by Axa to collaterally estop AIG from “relitigating” certain issues that had been determined in a prior arbitration between AIG and a Lloyd’s syndicate.

At trial, a jury found the defendants liable for fraudulent inducement and concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to rescission of both facilities. The defendants were ordered to remit to plaintiff $20,087,166 plus interest of $8,536,004. The jury also found defendants liable for punitive damages in the amount of $5,750,000. Defendants have posted a supersedeas bond in the amount of $36,000,000 in preparation for an appeal. Axa Versicherung Ag v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., No. 05-cv-10180 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2008).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.