Contract Interpretation

COURT DETERMINES THAT INTERPRETATION OF COURT SELECTION PROVISIONS OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS FOR ARBITRATORS TO RESOLVE

December 16, 2008 by Carlton Fields

Founders Ins. Co. entered a Reinsurance Agreement with primary insurer Lyndon Property Ins. Co. which required Founders and Lyndon to arbitrate any insurance-related disputes. A dispute regarding coverage arose, and the parties submitted to arbitration in Boston. The arbitration panel issued a ruling requiring Founders to post a sum in prejudgment security. Lyndon subsequently filed suit in the District of Massachusetts asserting that Founders had failed to comply with the panel’s order and had evidenced no intent to do so. The parties disputed the choice of the District of Massachusetts as an appropriate forum under seemingly conflicting provisions of the Reinsurance Agreement. The arbitration provision provided for the enforcement of arbitration awards in any court of competent jurisdiction, while a choice-of-law and submission-to-jurisdiction provision named Missouri law as controlling and courts in Missouri as being appropriate.

The court held that while “gate keeping” decisions relating to arbitration may be made by courts, disputes regarding the procedure to be followed in the arbitration were to be decided by the arbitrators. Because the issue here was a procedural one – the proper interpretation of the Agreement’s choice of forum clauses – the interpretation was left to the arbitrators. The court determined that the holding in Richard C. Young & Co., Ltd. v. Leventhal, 389 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004), was dispositive in the instant case as it proclaimed that a dispute between the parties over the location of the arbitration raised not a question of arbitrability but a procedural question and was appropriate for the arbitrator and not the court. The case was dismissed so that the arbitrators could decide the dispute. Lyndon Property Ins. Co. v. Founders Ins. Co., Ltd., Case No. 08-11359 (USDC D.Mass. Nov. 20, 2008).

This post written by John Black.

UPDATE: COURT SHOOTS DOWN ERC TWICE MORE

November 20, 2008 by Carlton Fields

On September 2, 2008, we reported that the District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment against Employers Reinsurance Corporation, finding that their contract with Mass Mutual did, in fact, contain a clear “follow the fortunes” clause. ERC subsequently moved for the court to reconsider its ruling, or in the alternative, to certify the “follow the fortunes” issue for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

The court ruled that ERC’s motion for reconsideration amounted to little more than a reassertion of its arguments on summary judgment. The court interpreted ERC’s motion as arguing that the court committed a manifest error of law simply because the court disagreed with ERC’s arguments. Noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) did not list “manifest error of law” as a reason sufficient for reconsideration, the court denied ERC’s motion.

The court additionally denied ERC’s motion to certify the “follow the fortunes” issue for immediate interlocutory appeal, finding that it was an issue of interpretation of the contract, and not a pure question of law, which was required for an interlocutory appeal certification. Employers Reinsurance Corporation v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., Case No. 06-0188 (USDC W.D. Mo. Oct 23, 2008).

This post written by John Black.

INSURANCE UNDERWRITER LACKED THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY STATUS UNDER REINSURANCE AGREEMENT; COUNTERCLAIMS DISMISSED

November 18, 2008 by Carlton Fields

TIG Insurance entered into an agreement with Titan Underwriting for Titan to act as managing general underwriter, soliciting and procuring stop-loss health and life insurance insureds for policies to be issued by TIG. Titan was also obligated to obtain reinsurance to cover the stop-loss policies issued by TIG. Chubb Re reinsured TIG, and TIG received a percentage of the ceding commission of the gross premiums ceded to the reinsurer, a portion of which Titan received as compensation. Subsequently, TIG terminated the stop-loss program and sued Titan for, among other things, breach of contract and fraud. TIG also sent a letter to state insurance commissioners requesting information that Titan refused to produce to TIG. In response, Titan counterclaimed for breach of the Chubb reinsurance agreement, tortious interference with a contract, tortious interference with its business relationships with policyholders, defamation and negligence. The trial court dismissed each of the counterclaims and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.

The appellate court found that Titan, which was not a party to the reinsurance agreement, could not sue in the capacity of a third-party beneficiary. Although Titan was entitled to receive a percentage of the ceding commission, the contract contained a provision disclaiming any intent to create a third-party beneficiary. The tortious interference with a contract claim failed because it was legally impossible for TIG to interfere with its own contract (the reinsurance agreement). The tortious interference with business relationships claim failed because Titan failed to establish that it had existing relationships with the policyholders, whose relationships were insurance policies with TIG. The defamation claim, which was based on TIG’s letter to the insurance commissioners, also failed since the letter was not alleged to contain statements that could be “reasonably construed to disgrace or injure Titan’s reputation in the community or subject Titan to public ridicule and contempt.” Finally, the negligence claim failed since Titan failed to establish, as it was required to do, that TIG owed Titan a duty of care. TIG Insurance Co. v. Titan Underwriting Managers, LLC, No. M2007-01977-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2008).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

U.K. COURT CONSTRUES PARTIES’ INTENT IN CREATING REINSURANCE CONTRACT AGAINST REINSURER

November 12, 2008 by Carlton Fields

Allianz Insurance Company of Egypt (“Allianz”) sued its reinsurer, Aigaion Insurance Company S.A. (“Aigaion”), for US $675,000 arising from the constructive loss of the oceangoing vessel “Ocean Dirk,” one of several scheduled ships under the reinsurance contract. Aigaion denied liability for the claim on the theory that the parties never arrived at consensus over the terms of the reinsurance contract, and thus it was null and void ab initio.

Allianz countered with evidence of communications by and between Allianz, Aigaion, and the intermediary broker who placed the risk, Chedid & Associates Ltd. (“Chedid”). The court held that these communications, consisting mainly of e-mail correspondence, indicated that the parties clearly intended for Aigaion to be bound as Allianz’s reinsurer for certain risks covered by Allianz’s underlying insurance. Aigaion took the position that the communications reflected a continued intent on the part of both parties to negotiate certain terms of the contract, even after the reinsurance contract had issued, but that the parties failed to reach consensus sufficient to create a contract. The court found in Allianz’s favor, noting that the communications reflected a resort to certain shorthand understood in the industry, and that Aigaion clearly communicated its intent to be bound by those terms with the same understanding as had Allianz, at the latest by a date certain which may have post-dated the contract, but nonetheless pre-dated the loss. The Court entered judgment in favor of Allianz for the net premium due. Allianz Insurance Company of Egypt v. Aigaion Insurance Company S.A. [2008] EWHC 1127 (Queen’s Bench Div. Comm. June 2, 2008).

This post written by John Pitblado.

FACTUAL DISPUTES PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO WHETHER CLAIMS COOPERATION CLAUSE WAS AGREED TO BY REINSUREDS

November 5, 2008 by Carlton Fields

In this English case, the claimant reinsurer, Markel, applied for the UK equivalent of summary judgment against two defendant German reinsureds, seeking a declaration that it was not liable under a contract of reinsurance. The primary issue was whether the contract provided in a claims cooperation clause that it was a condition precedent to any liability under it that if the reinsureds knew of any circumstances which may give rise to a claim against them, they should advise Markel within thirty days. Conflicting evidence was submitted as to whether the parties had agreed to the clause as suggested by Markel. Consequently, the court stated it was unable to accept Markel’s submission that there should be summary judgment since the issue involved questions of fact to be determined at trial. The court further addressed the separate issue of whether knowledge of the manager of the reinsurance pool (VOV) amounted to knowledge of the reinsureds for purposes of the claims cooperation clause. The court rejected Markel’s construction of the clause, holding that under the terms expressed, knowledge of VOV would not be imputed. Summary judgment was denied on all issues. Markel Capital Ltd. v. Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG [2008] EWHC 2517 (Comm. Oct. 24, 2008).

This post written by Brian Perryman.