Contract Interpretation

CONNECTICUT FEDERAL COURT GRANTS REINSURER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ENTITLING IT TO COMMISSION ADJUSTMENT PAYMENTS

November 11, 2015 by John Pitblado

In a diversity action arising out of a series of reinsurance agreements, a reinsurer, Odyssey Reinsurance Company, alleged that it was owed sliding scale commission adjustment payments from Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corporation, and sought summary judgment on its breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims. On August 20, 2015, a district court in Connecticut denied Odyssey’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice, and allowed Cal-Regent to amend its answer to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to properly plead that Odyssey breached the reinsurance agreements (which we reported on September 21, 2015). Thereafter, Cal-Regent did not amend its answer, and Odyssey renewed its motion for summary judgment. On October 14, 2015, the Court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact, and that Odyssey is entitled as a matter of law to a declaratory judgment that Cal-Regent breached the reinsurance agreements, allowing Odyssey to recover over $2.7 million in the commission adjustment payments, plus prejudgment interest.

Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corp., No. 3:14-cv-00458 (USDC D.Conn. Oct. 14, 2015).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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NEW YORK APPELLATE COURT LEAVES OPEN QUESTION OF WHETHER A LOSS PORTFOLIO TRANSFER CONSTITUTES “TREATY REINSURANCE”

November 5, 2015 by Carlton Fields

A New York state appellate court recently affirmed a decision denying a cedents motion to dismiss certain affirmative defenses asserted by a reinsurer, but found it could not rule as a matter of law whether a loss portfolio transfer (“LPT”) entered into by the cedents constituted “treaty reinsurance”.

A prior discussion of this case can be found here. The cedents sued the reinsurer for breach of certain facultative certificates. One of the affirmative defenses asserted by the reinsurer was that the cedents’ entry into the LPT breached warranty retention provisions in the certificates. In opposing this defense, the cedents have argued that the LPT fell within the “treaty reinsurance” exception in the warranties. The trial court ruled that because the LPT was retroactive in nature, it did not constitute “treaty reinsurance”, relying upon dicta from prior reinsurance cases in New York for the proposition that such reinsurance can only be prospective. The Appellate Division disagreed, noting that the authority cited by the parties was inconclusive or failed to squarely address the issue, thus finding premature this prong of the trial court’s ruling. As many LPT transactions have been entered into by cedents in recent years, a final ruling by the court on the “treaty reinsurance” question will be noteworthy. Granite State Ins. Co. v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co., No. 652506/12 (App. Div., 1st Dep’t Oct. 15, 2015).

This post written by Rob DiUbaldo.

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COURT DENIES MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL IN ALLEGED INSURANCE KICKBACK SCHEME

October 27, 2015 by Carlton Fields

We have previously reported on a case styled Munoz v. PHH Corp., one of similar suits alleging putative class actions under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act arising from purported “sham” reinsurance transfers covering private mortgage insurance. Here, the California district court had granted PHH’s partial motion to dismiss and certified the remainder of the class. Plaintiffs subsequently filed for interlocutory appeal concerning whether a prior decision in the Ninth Circuit concerning equitable tolling and equitable estoppel disturbed the holdings in other California district court opinions. The court found that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the second of three prongs for certification—that there is substantial ground for difference of opinion among the courts. A “party’s strong disagreement with the court’s ruling is not sufficient for there to be a substantial ground for difference.” The court found that the appellate and district court opinions were not inconsistent, instead, “all assume that there are situations in which equitable tolling or equitable estoppel can apply to RESPA violations.” Even divergent application of settled law is not sufficient to show substantial ground for difference. Munoz v. PHH Corp., No 1:08-cv-00759-AWI-BAM (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

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IN REINSURANCE-RELATED COMMISSION DISPUTE, COURT GRANTS DEFENDANT LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER RATHER THAN GRANT PLAINTIFF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

September 21, 2015 by Carlton Fields

A lawsuit filed in the United States Court for the District of Connecticut between Odyssey Reinsurance Company and Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corporation involves a dispute over commission payments in a reinsurance scheme with State National Insurance Company, Inc. According to Odyssey, Cal-Regent has not made the appropriate commission payments for 2003 to 2007. According to Cal-Regent, however, Odyssey failed to perform the contracts and Cal-Regent is entitled to a set-off. In its complaint, Odyssey alleged that it “has performed all of its obligations under the Reinsurance Agreement” and had performed all conditions precedent to bringing suit. Odyssey moved for summary judgment, and Cal-Regent argued that Odyssey was not entitled to summary judgment, among other reasons, because of the dispute over whether the Odyssey had first breached the reinsurance contracts. However, in its answer to Odyssey’s complaint, Cal-Regent had the burden “to deny Odyssey’s performance with particularity, which Cal-Regent failed to do.” Rather than granting summary judgment to Odyssey on this issue, the court issued a decision allowing Cal-Regent to amend its answer and affirmative defenses, including granting leave to add an affirmative defense of material breach.

In another decision issued on the same day, however, the court dismissed Cal-Regent’s counterclaim for a setoff, finding that it had been brought under Connecticut law, rather than Texas law, when the parties had agreed to Texas law in the reinsurance agreement. Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corp., No. 3:14-cv-00458-VAB (USDC D. Conn. Aug. 20, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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DISTRICT COURT WON’T ALLOW INSURER TO “REPACKAGE” ITS BREACH OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH CLAIMS

September 10, 2015 by Carlton Fields

We previously reported on Old Republic National Title Insurance Co. v. First American Title Insurance Co., in which the court partially dismissed First American’s claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing to the extent the predicate breach of reinsurance contract claim alleged by First American failed to state a claim. The court has now denied First American’s motion to amend its answer. In the motion, First American attempted to demonstrate the predicate breach of reinsurance contract by contending that Old Republic failed to make payment under the contract based on false accusations and improper document requests. But the court agreed with Old Republic that the claims as pled did not support First American’s new allegations, and could not serve as a basis for a claim for the breach of the utmost duty of good faith. Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. First American Title Ins. Co., No. 8:15-cv-126-T-30EAJ (USDC M.D. Fla. July 17, 2015).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

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