Contract Interpretation

Applied Underwriters Defeats Class Certification in Long-Running Worker’s Compensation Reinsurance Dispute

February 27, 2019 by Benjamin Stearns

Applied Underwriters beat back an attempt by plaintiffs to certify a class in their lawsuit related to Applied Underwriters’ “EquityComp” and “SolutionOne” workers’ compensation programs. We previously reported on this case, which involves a disputed Reinsurance Participation Agreement used to control worker’s compensation rates, on July 21, 2016, December 1, 2016, November 15, 2017, January 31, 2018, and August 30, 2018. The court has now determined that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a class action would be “superior” to individual actions, as required by four factors under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), and denied class certification.

In determining that the first factor of the class members’ interest in individually controlling the litigation, weighed against certification, the court noted that the individual damages alleged by claimants in this action were large and there was no evidence that any class member would be unable to bring an action absent class certification. The second factor of the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by class members, weighed “strongly” against certification, as more than “100 separate arbitrations, lawsuits, and California Department Insurance appeals involving 67 California participants in the program” were already pending. On that basis, the court determined that a substantial number of putative class members had an interest in controlling their own litigation and that “realistic alternatives” to a class action exist.

The third factor of the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum, weighed “slightly” against certification, where the remaining claims were all brought under California law (which weighed in favor of certification), but the many potential claimants were “located throughout the state,” including some that were “far from this court.” Additionally, certifying the class would automatically select federal court as the preferred forum for all class members even though the previously filed actions discussed above had demonstrated otherwise.

Finally, the court determined the “manageability” factor of the likely difficulties in managing a class action, also weighed against certification, where the court would have to determine the extent of overlap between the class action and the many previously filed actions, as well as how to properly formulate a class notice that accounts for the potentially overlapping and differing claims brought in the various actions and the class action. “These difficulties would only be magnified where many similar actions have already concluded and others have progressed substantially.”

Shasta Linen Supply, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-1222-WBS-AC (USDC E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019).

DC District Court Permits Vantage Commodities To File Amended Complaint And Denies Reinsurer Defendants’ Motion For Interlocutory Appeal

February 7, 2019 by Benjamin Stearns

The District Court for the District of Columbia issued an order denying a motion to reconsider its prior order allowing Vantage Commodities to file an amended complaint and denying the reinsurer defendants’ motion for interlocutory appeal. In the underlying decision, the court determined that, while Vantage had not stated a claim for breach of contract because it had failed to allege facts showing a contractual relationship, the complaint adequately stated claims for breach of implied contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment.

The court found that Vantage had alleged enough facts to survive a motion to dismiss, noting that the court was required to draw all reasonable inferences in Vantage’s favor at the motion to dismiss stage. That determination was limited to the specific allegations in Vantage’s amended complaint, and did not “create new law.”

The court refused to exercise its discretion to allow an interlocutory appeal of its non-final order, finding that the questions of law the reinsurers presented were “tied up in the specific facts of this case.” Furthermore, while the reinsurers argued that the court’s prior order “goes against the weight of authority in reinsurance law that an insured cannot maintain a direct action against a reinsurer,” they failed to cite any specific case law showing that the court’s order was in conflict with other authorities. The court concluded that the reinsurer defendants did not meet their burden of showing that the circumstances of this case justified a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of final judgment. For more information regarding this case, see our prior posts here and here.

Vantage Commodities Financial Services I, LLC v. Assured Risk Transfer PCC, LLC, Case No. 1:17-CV-01451 (USDC D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2019).

Fourth Circuit Holds Reinsurance Participation Agreement Is Insurance Contract Under Virginia Statute, Effectively Voiding Its Arbitration Clause

February 4, 2019 by Carlton Fields

On September 14, 2017, we reported on the Fourth Circuit’s reversal of a district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration, which found that a party was judicially estopped from arguing that a Reinsurance Participation Agreement (“RPA”) was not an insurance contract. (If the RPA is an insurance contract, its arbitration provision becomes invalid under state law.) Subsequent to that ruling, on remand, the district court held that the RPA is indeed an insurance contract and that the RPA’s arbitration clause is void.

The Fourth Circuit has now affirmed the district court. The circuit court explained that the RPA was part of a workers’ compensation insurance program that Appellee Minnieland Private Day School purchased from Appellant Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc. (AUCRA) and its affiliated entities. Under this “EquityComp” program, the pooled companies provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage to employers and also mutually reinsure each other’s insurance business. A layer of reinsurance is also provided by AUCRA. AUCRA in turn enters into RPAs with EquityComp customers, under the terms of which each customer pays into a segregated “cell” or account that is then used to fund AUCRA’s liabilities. In this fashion, EquityComp customers participate in underwriting the risk of their own workers’ compensation insurance policies. Minneland sued AUCRA alleging that AUCRA was not authorized or licensed to act as an insurance company under Virginia law; that the RPA was an “insurance contract” and not a “reinsurance” agreement; and that AUCRA misrepresented the EquityComp program, and the RPA specifically, to circumvent Virginia insurance and workers’ compensation laws.

In affirming the denial of arbitration, the Fourth Circuit rejected AUCRA’s argument that the RPA was a standalone contract. Instead, the panel determined that the RPA was but one component of an integrated insurance sale because the documents, including the RPA, were intended to provide Minnieland with workers’ compensation insurance coverage.

Minnieland Private Day School v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co. Inc., Case No. 17-2385 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2019).

English High Court Refuses to Set Aside an Order for Enforcement of an International Arbitration Award

January 9, 2019 by Jeanne Kohler

This case relates to a dispute between Eastern European Engineering Ltd. (“EEEL”) and Vijay Construction (Proprietary) Ltd. (“VCL”), both of which are incorporated in the Seychelles, arising out of the construction of a hotel resort and spa. In 2011, the parties had entered into six materially identical contracts. Disputes arose and EEEL eventually terminated the contracts. EEEL referred the disputes to an International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration seated in Paris. A sole arbitrator was appointed, who issued an award in November 2014 in EEEL’s favor (the “Award”).

VCL challenged the Award in the French courts on three grounds. The French court dismissed VCL’s challenge. Although VCL initially appealed that decision, it did not purse the appeal and it was subsequently dismissed in May 2017. Concurrently, in January 2015, VCL also initiated proceedings in the Seychelles, seeking to set aside the Award on essentially the same grounds as those on which the challenges were based in the French proceedings. In April 2017, the Seychellois court dismissed all of VCL’s challenges and held that the Award was enforceable. VCL, however, successfully appealed that decision because, under Seychellois law, there is no power to order enforcement on the basis that the New York Convention had been previously repudiated by the Seychelles. The merits of the substantive grounds of the lower court’s decision were not considered in the appeal.

In August 2015, EEEL successfully obtained an order from the English High Court to enforce the Award in England and Wales and to enter judgment against VCL (the “August 2015 Order”). In October 2015, VCL applied under section 103 of the Arbitration Act 1996 to set aside the August 2015 Order. That application was stayed while the French and the Seychellois proceedings were pending. EEEL argued that VCL’s application should be denied because of issue estoppel and public policy on finality. As to issue estoppel, EEEL argued that the conditions were satisfied because the decision of the French court was a final merits decision in a court of competent jurisdiction between the same parties.

The English High Court denied VCL’s application to set aside the August 15 Order. First, the English court agreed that, in relation to VCL’s challenge based on jurisdiction, VCL was estopped as VCL’s argument in the English proceeding appeared to be exactly the same as that which was made in the French proceeding. As to VCL’s challenge on the ground of procedural unfairness, the court found that VCL’s argument was “slightly different” in the English proceeding, and thus the court considered the merits of the challenges. In considering each of VCL’s challenges, the court found that they failed. Thus, the English court did not have to reach the question of public policy on finality. It, however, noted that it would “have concluded that the balance came down in favor of upholding the public policy on finality,” explaining that the facts here, where VCL had sought to raise substantially the same challenges to the Award in two other courts, one of which had a full evidentiary hearing, “are circumstances which would weigh very heavily against allowing VCL a third challenge.”

Eastern European Engineering Ltd. v. Vijay Construction (Proprietary) Ltd., [2018] EWHC 2713 (Comm) (Oct. 11, 2018).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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Federal Court Denies Bifurcation of Contract Claims and Uberrimae Fidei and Late Notice Defenses in Reinsurance Dispute

January 7, 2019 by John Pitblado

A Michigan federal court declined to bifurcate a case involving a contract dispute between a ceding insurer, Amerisure, and its reinsurer, Transatlantic Re, in a case arising from underlying asbestos claims dating back to the early 1980’s.

Amerisure sued TransRe alleging that it failed to reimburse Amerisure under a facultative reinsurance agreement covering losses and loss expenses arising from underlying asbestos claim liabilities insured by Amerisure. For its part, TransRe alleged that Amerisure breached the “duty of utmost good faith” by failing to apprise TransRe of all relevant information in its underwriting of the facultative agreement, thereby voiding the agreement. TransRe also claimed that Amerisure’s claim is barred due to late notice.

Amerisure filed a motion to bifurcate the proceedings to address the contract issues first. TransRe opposed the motion arguing that even if the contract issues were resolved, the breach of duty of utmost good faith and late notice issues would remain to be addressed, and thus bifurcation would not result in a more efficient proceeding.

The trial judge referred the issue to a special master, who found that bifurcation was inappropriate, as a phased proceeding would not result in convenience to the parties or judicial efficiency. The report noted that much of the discovery involved on the contract issues would overlap with the issues involved in TransRe’s defense based on breach of the duty of utmost good faith, such as the underwriting intent and meaning of the applicable policy or reinsurance language. The report concluded, therefore, that phasing the proceedings might ultimately be less efficient, rather than more efficient, and recommended denial of the motion.

The judge accepted the special master’s recommendation and denied Amerisure’s motion.

Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co., No. 2:18-cv-11966 (USDC E.D. Mich., Nov. 29, 2018 (Report and Recommendation of Special Master), Dec. 20, 2018 (adopting report)).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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