Contract Formation

West Virginia Federal Court Refuses to Force Non-Signatory to Participate in Arbitration

September 9, 2021 by Carlton Fields

Mountain Valley Pipeline LLC (MVP) contracted with U.S. Trinity Energy Services LLC for the construction and installation of the Mountain Valley Pipeline across property in Greenbrier County, West Virginia. Trinity subcontracted with M.T. Bores LLC to furnish equipment to excavate a tunnel in connection with the installation of the pipeline. But before the installation was completed, MVP terminated the project.

M.T. Bores claimed that it was not paid in full for the excavation equipment and thereafter placed a mechanic’s lien against the property for the balance due. M.T. Bores then instituted an action in the Greenbrier County Circuit Court seeking enforcement of the mechanic’s lien against MVP’s real property. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, and Trinity thereafter moved to compel arbitration under the arbitration clause in the subcontract between M.T. Bores and Trinity. M.T. Bores did not dispute that it was required to arbitrate its claims but rather sought to compel MVP to participate in the arbitration.

Although recognizing that MVP was not a party to the subcontract, M.T. Bores sought to compel MVP’s participation based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel and third-party beneficiary theory. M.T. Bores argued that MVP should be estopped from refusing to arbitrate because it directly benefitted from the subcontract since the equipment contributed to MVP’s pipeline. The district court declined to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel where MVP had not asserted any claim against M.T. Bores arising from the subcontract but rather was only defending claims brought against it by M.T. Bores. The district court similarly rejected M.T. Bores’ argument that MVP was a third-party beneficiary of the subcontract insofar as it was the owner of the property that was the site of M.T. Bores’ performance under the subcontract, finding that there was no evidence that the subcontract was created for MVP’s sole benefit. The district court noted that “[a] project owner will doubtless receive incidental benefits from its contractor’s subcontracts; but those benefits alone will not render the owner a third-party beneficiary.”

M.T. Bores also argued that MVP should be compelled to arbitrate in the interest of judicial economy since the claims against MVP and Trinity were inextricably intertwined. Although the district court agreed that M.T. Bores’ claims against MVP and Trinity involved some overlapping legal and factual issues, the court found the claims were not so “inextricably intertwined” to justify requiring MVP to participate in an arbitration absent its consent.

The district court similarly found no merit to M.T. Bores’ argument that MVP was an essential party to the arbitration since Trinity’s payment obligations to M.T. Bores under the subcontract were linked to, and may have been contingent on, MVP’s payment to Trinity.

Even so, the district court noted that an express provision in the subcontract deprived M.T. Bores of the ability to compel MVP to arbitrate absent Trinity’s consent. The district court accordingly denied M.T. Bores’ motion to compel MVP to participate in the arbitration between Trinity and M.T. Bores.

M.T. Bores, LLC v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, No. 5:20-cv-00602 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 2, 2021).

Court Compels Employment Dispute to Arbitration, Rejecting Defenses That Arbitration Clause Did Not Survive Termination and That Clause Was Unconscionable

July 23, 2021 by Benjamin Stearns

The dispute surrounded the employee’s termination due to an inability to be physically present at the workplace. The employee filed suit in Rhode Island state court, alleging that the employer failed to provide reasonable accommodations for her known disability. The employer removed the case to federal court and then filed a motion to compel arbitration.

The employee contended that the employment agreement and its arbitration provision ended with the employment relationship, but the court found that the arbitration clause survived the underlying contract. The court found that the language of the agreement “along with common sense” indicated that employment-related disputes, including termination, were governed by the arbitration provision. The court further ruled that whether the employment agreement was still in effect was a matter of contract interpretation that was for the arbitrator to decide.

The court also rejected the employee’s argument that the arbitration provision was unconscionable under governing state law (Utah). Regarding substantive unconscionability, the court found that the contract was not “so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party” and that there was no “overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain.” The court disagreed with the employee that the arbitration provision lacked mutuality or that the required venue of Utah, the employer’s home state, was unfair. Regarding mutuality, the court held that it required only that both parties would be bound to the terms of any dispute that would be required to be submitted to the arbitrator (not that the contract must be equally balanced or that every dispute needed to be arbitrated). And regarding the venue, the court found that a Utah-based arbitration did not increase the likelihood of partiality (noting that the agreement required an arbitrator from the AAA) or create undue expense and inconvenience (the employer agreed to conduct arbitration remotely).

Regarding procedural unconscionability, the court was not persuaded by the employee’s argument that she did not have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the employment agreement. The court found that the employee’s allegations went to the unconscionability of the contract as a whole, rather than the arbitration provision, which was an issue for the arbitrator, not the court.

The court compelled arbitration and elected to dismiss the complaint rather than enter a stay of the proceedings since all of the employee’s claims were subject to arbitration.

Trainor v. Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00426 (D.R.I. June 16, 2021).

First Circuit Concludes App User Is Bound by Arbitration Clause in App’s Terms and Conditions

May 4, 2021 by Brendan Gooley

The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently concluded that an app user had sufficient notice of and was bound by an arbitration clause in the app’s terms and conditions. The court rejected the user’s arguments that, among other things, she was not bound by the clause because she had to scroll down to see it. The court concluded that the user was bound by the arbitration clause.

Handy Technologies Inc. operates an application that enables users to retain house cleaners and other home services. Maisha Emmanuel, a nanny and housekeeper, signed up to offer her services through Handy’s app. As part of that process, Emmanuel submitted an application that required her to click a checkbox next to the statement: “I agree to Handy’s Terms of Use.” The phrase “terms of use” was a hyperlink that, if clicked, would have taken the user to Handy’s terms, which include a mandatory arbitration clause. Emmanuel, however, clicked the checkbox, submitting her application, without accessing or reviewing the terms of use. After an interview, background check, and orientation session, Emmanuel gained access to the Handy app, which contained a screen stating: “I understand that the Handy Service Professional Agreement has changed and that I need to carefully read the updated agreement on the following screen before agreeing to the new terms.” When Emmanuel clicked through to the next screen, she saw the initial portion of Handy’s independent contractor agreement. The visible portion noted that Emmanuel was agreeing to be bound by the agreement but did not display language regarding arbitration. Had Emmanuel scrolled down, she would have seen the mandatory arbitration clause. Emmanuel, however, did not scroll through the screens or terms when using the app.

Emmanuel subsequently filed a putative class action alleging that Handy had misclassified her and other similarly situated users as independent contractors when it should have classified them as employees and that Handy had therefore violated, inter alia, the FLSA by failing to pay her and similarly situated users minimum wage. Handy moved to compel arbitration.

The district court granted Handy’s motion, and Emmanuel appealed.

The First Circuit affirmed. The court applied Massachusetts law on notice to app users regarding arbitration agreements, concluding that Emmanuel had “reasonable notice of the term in the Agreement concerning arbitration” and that a valid contract to arbitrate therefore existed. Handy’s app was clear that Emmanuel was agreeing to a contract. Although the arbitration clause was not visible without scrolling, the app was clear that the entirety of the agreement could be viewed by scrolling down. Emmanuel’s onboarding process, which included an interview, orientation, and background check, also supported the conclusion that Emmanuel knew she was entering into a significant contractual relationship by signing up for Handy’s app.

The First Circuit also declined to consider Emmanuel’s contention that Handy’s agreement was unconscionable. Emmanuel’s argument regarding unconscionability, that Handy allegedly had a unilateral right to modify the agreement, was not directed to the agreement’s arbitration clause and was therefore for the arbitrator to address, not the court.

Emmanuel v. Handy Technologies, Inc., No. 20-1378 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2021).

No “Meeting of the Minds” Where Material Terms of Arbitration Agreement Were Changed After Party Electronically Signed Document

April 27, 2021 by Carlton Fields

This action concerned a dispute between the plaintiffs, two individual investors, and the defendants, a financial planning adviser and her firm. After the plaintiffs’ investments did not work out as they had hoped, the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants in the Western District of North Carolina for state law contract and fraud claims.

The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the asset management agreement that the plaintiffs executed when they hired the defendants to manage their investments, which required the parties to arbitrate any dispute that may arise between the parties concerning any transaction or the construction, performance, or breach of the agreement. The defendants also moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, to transfer venue, and to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but all motions, including the arbitration motion, were denied by the district court. Notably, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to compel, as the parties submitted different versions of the asset management agreement and therefore had not formed an agreement to arbitrate.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the parties did not form an agreement to arbitrate. Calling it a “very simple contract dispute,” the circuit court relied on general principles of contract formation and found there was no “meeting of the minds,” and therefore no contract, because both parties did not agree to the same terms. The circuit court noted that the two versions of the agreement submitted to the district court differed as to a number of terms, including one that added an extra account to be managed and designated how it was to be managed. The circuit court found there was no evidence in the record to establish that the plaintiffs were ever informed of, let alone reviewed, such changes.

Because the designation of which accounts were to be managed and how they were to be managed would be of paramount importance for any couple turning over its hard-earned savings to a financial firm for management, the circuit court found that the fact that the defendants did not bother to solicit this information from the plaintiffs after they submitted the signed form through DocuSign, a commonly used online platform for signing and transmitting documents, was fatal to the formation of the contract.

The circuit court noted that while the defendants (a sophisticated certified financial professional and her firm) changing the terms of an agreement after a customer signs it does not add to the impression of fairness that one hopes to get from a financial institution managing an individual investor’s portfolio, what happened here was at best “sloppy” on the part of the defendants and precluded formation of a contract.

Rowland v. Sandy Morris Financial & Estate Planning Services LLC, No. 20-1187 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2021)

Employer Enforces Arbitration Despite Absence of Signature

March 22, 2021 by Brendan Gooley

An employer was able to enforce an arbitration agreement without an employee’s signature and even though one of the parties in the lawsuit was also a non-signatory to the agreement.

Elizabeth Trujillo was an employee of Volt Management Corp., an employee leasing company. Through Volt, she worked as an on-site coordinator at Schneider Electric, where she performed human resources functions for employees Volt leased to Schneider.

Trujillo sued Volt and Schneider after her request for a disability accommodation was purportedly denied and she was terminated, allegedly for retaliatory reasons.

Volt filed a motion to compel arbitration. The district court granted Volt’s motion and ordered all three parties to arbitrate Trujillo’s claims because her claims against Schneider were intertwined with her claims against Volt. Trujillo appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

The Fifth Circuit rejected Trujillo’s argument that she was not required to arbitrate because she never signed an arbitration agreement. Trujillo had submitted a job application that contained an arbitration agreement, accepted her employment knowing that she was agreeing to submit her claims to arbitration, and continued working for Volt after she received Volt’s alternate dispute resolution policy in Volt’s employee handbook. Most importantly, the arbitration agreement did “not contain express language indicating that the parties intended to be bound to the arbitration agreement only if the parties signed the agreement.” There was “nothing more than a blank signature block that [spoke] to the party’s intent” and the district court therefore “did not err in holding that the arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable … without Trujillo’s signature.”

The court also rejected Trujillo’s claims that Volt failed to prevent competent evidence to establish a valid agreement to arbitrate and that the district court erred by requiring her to arbitrate her claims against Schneider, a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement. Intertwined claims estoppel, which the court had previously predicted the Texas Supreme Court would adopt if it was presented with the question, applied because Trujillo’s claims against Schneider were “‘intimately founded in and intertwined with’ Trujillo’s underlying contract with Volt.”

Trujillo v. Volt Management Corp., No. 20-50526 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2021).