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You are here: Home / Archives for Arbitration / Court Decisions / Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT RESTRICTS EXTRASTATUTORY JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS

June 25, 2014 by Carlton Fields

The Eleventh Circuit recently limited the authority by which an aggrieved party can obtain judicial review of arbitration awards outside of the four grounds enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act, ruling that an insurance policy alone could not serve as “an independent basis for the enforcement of an arbitration award.” The plaintiff argued that its right to expanded judicial review was based on the policy’s express language that “[a]ny decision rendered in arbitration is binding on you and us unless judicial review is sought…you and we have the right to judicial review of any decision rendered in arbitration.” The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that if parties wish to allow for more avenues to judicial review, they must explicitly designate the “state statutory or common law alternatives to the FAA in their arbitration agreements.” Otherwise, the contract alone will not suffice as the sole basis for judicial review when the FAA itself does not apply. Campbell’s Foliage, Inc. v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., No. 13-11896 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2014).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

APPELLATE COURT HOLDS THAT ARBITRATORS DID NOT ACT IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY OR IN MANIFEST DISREGARD OF LAW IN DENYING MOTION TO VACATE AWARD

June 19, 2014 by Carlton Fields

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate an arbitration award issued in a dispute between the Johnsons and Wetzel’s Pretzels, concerning the termination of a franchise agreement. The appellants, the Johnsons, challenge the award on grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing provisions in the franchise agreement that required the Johnsons to assign their lease and property interests to the defendant. The Ninth Circuit denied the appellants’ claims, stating that the Johnsons were unable to show that the award was “irrational or exhibit[ed] a manifest disregard of law,” two of the limited grounds on which a federal court may vacate an arbitral award. Emphasizing the terms of the franchise agreement, the Court stated that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the agreement, which expressly provided for the assignment of the plaintiff’s lease and property interests upon termination of the agreement. Additionally, the Court indicated that the Johnsons were unable to offer convincing evidence that award exhibited a manifest disregard of law. Wetzel’s Pretzels, LLC v. Johnson, No. 12-56716 (10th Cir. Apr. 3, 2014).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

COURT VACATES ARBITRATION AWARD WHERE ARBITRATION HELD UNDER INCORRECT ARBITRATION RULES

May 15, 2014 by Carlton Fields

A federal judge in Houston recently vacated an arbitration award where the reinsurance agreement specified that the arbitration of any disputes would proceed “under the auspices of the ICC,” but the arbitration actually proceeded under the American Arbitration Association’s Commercial Arbitration Rules. The Court found that the parties to the reinsurance agreements selected the International Chamber of Commerce, and application of its rules, as a mandatory and essential condition of their agreement to arbitrate. Because this did not occur, the selected arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims presented. The court noted that generally, after the conclusion of an arbitration, a court cannot second guess the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and decision so long as the arbitrator (1) is arguably construing or applying the contract, and (2) is acting within the scope of his authority. The court found, however, that the case presented a rare example of the second exception, in which an arbitrator assumed authority over a dispute that the parties’ agreements mandated be referred to a different forum, namely the ICC. This error fundamentally prejudiced the proceedings. PoolRe Insurance Corp. v. Organizational Strategies, Inc., Case No. H-13-1857 (USDC S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

THIRD CIRCUIT ISSUES OPINION ON ARBITRABILITY OF DIRECT AND ASSIGNED, OR DERIVATIVE, CLAIMS

May 14, 2014 by Carlton Fields

The Third Circuit recently vacated a lower court’s decision granting a motion to compel arbitration of (1) direct claims by certain cardiac services health providers against CIGNA and (2) claims by those providers on behalf of employee benefit plan participants who were initially denied coverage of the cardiac services by CIGNA but subsequently provided such services by the providers in exchange for assignment of their rights and claims under ERISA against CIGNA to the providers. After observing that the plain language of an arbitration agreement controls and that the presumption of arbitrability applies only where an arbitration provision is ambiguous, the Court of Appeals first held that the alleged facts underlying the direct claims unambiguously did not concern “the performance or interpretation” of the administrative agreement between CIGNA and the providers, as required by the arbitration clause, because the claims involved a CIGNA policy update document distinct from, and sent years after, the administrative agreement. As for the derivative claims, which related to CIGNA’s decision to deny coverage of the cardiac services to the participants, the court concluded that such coverage decision was subject to the terms or conditions of the applicable benefit plan and governed by ERISA, not the administrative agreement. The participants’ rights to pursue their ERISA claims in court could not be diluted through compelled arbitration just because the providers, as assignees, had promised to arbitrate certain of the direct claims they might bring against CIGNA. CardioNet, Inc. v. CIGNA Health Corp., No. 13-2496 (3d Cir. May 6, 2014).

This post written by Kyle Whitehead.

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Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Contract Interpretation

COURT SANCTIONS PARTY FOR IMPROPER REMOVAL OF ACTION SEEKING CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD

April 16, 2014 by Carlton Fields

The facts in Jackson v. Sleek Audio, LLC, et. al., Case No. 13-80725-CIV-Marra (S.D. Fla. March 17, 2014) stemmed from an arbitrators award against Curtis Jackson (“Jackson”) in his action against former business associates, Sleek Audio and others (“Sleek”). The arbitrator’s award included an award of attorney’s fees for which, Jackson contended, he lacked authority to award under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1, et. seq. (“FAA”) and under Florida law.

Following the award by the arbitrator, Jackson brought an action in the Southern District of Florida seeking to vacate the arbitration award and also removed Sleek’s petition in the State Court seeking confirmation of the award. Jackson argued the arbitrator relied on the FAA’s preemption of Florida law in finding authority to award attorney’s fees and, thus, the issue of the FAA’s preemption formed the basis of the federal question jurisdiction. Sleek then moved to dismiss the action to vacate the award and to remand its own action seeking confirmation of the award. The parties agreed there was no diversity of citizenship and the federal court did not have jurisdiction under the FAA.

In its analysis of federal question jurisdiction, the Court first restated the principle that only complete preemption can convert state law claims into federal statutory claim in order to serve as a basis for federal question jurisdiction. In this case, the FAA did not completely preempt state law and thus could not form an independent basis for jurisdiction. The Jackson Court concluded that Jackson therefore did not have “an objectively reasonable basis for removal” and ordered Jackson to pay Sleek’s costs, including attorney’s fee, incurred in connection the removal proceedings.

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Jurisdiction Issues

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