A Special Focus article by Rollie Goss discusses a Court of Appeals opinion which gives practical effect to the honorable engagement provision of a reinsurance agreement.
This post written by Rollie Goss.
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New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields
A Special Focus article by Rollie Goss discusses a Court of Appeals opinion which gives practical effect to the honorable engagement provision of a reinsurance agreement.
This post written by Rollie Goss.
See our disclaimer.
A federal district court has confirmed a $14 million arbitration award entered in favor of Amerisure against its reinsurer Everest. As we earlier reported, the court had previously denied the motion to seal briefing associated with Amerisure’s motion to confirm the award. Now at issue was the confirmation, modification, or vacatur of the award, which directed Everest to indemnify Amerisure for its share of asbestos losses that fell within the parties’ reinsurance treaties. Everest moved to vacate the award on several grounds, including an arbitrator’s “evident partiality” in the proceedings and the panel’s allegedly erroneous procedural and evidentiary rulings. At the core of the reinsurance dispute was whether Amerisure could aggregate individual asbestos losses into a single occurrence in order to exceed the applicable retention and thereby qualify for indemnification under the reinsurance treaties. The panel held that Amerisure could aggregate the losses by relying, in part, on what it found to be the “commonly accepted” business of treating multiple asbestos losses as a single occurrence. The panel rejected the argument that Amerisure’s claim was precluded or undercut by the fact that the underlying claims were settled as individual losses and further discounted the expert opinion testimony offered by Everest as unpersuasive. The district court, in turn, affirmed the award, rejecting all arguments of partiality or erroneous rulings. While Everest had established the panel exceeded its powers in one respect, it did not find that warranted vacatur or modification of the award. Amerisure Mutual Insurance Co. v. Everest Reinsurance Co., Case No. 14-cv-13060 (USDC E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2015).
This post written by Renee Schimkat.
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An arbitration award to Petitioner, Employers Insurance of Wausau A Mural Company (“Wausau”), has been confirmed after Respondents withdrew their prior objections. The dispute arose over payment obligations stemming from a Quota Share reinsurance agreement between the Respondents, Nutmeg Insurance Company and Twin City Fire Insurance Company (“Nutmeg/Twin”), and Wausau. The dispute went to arbitration where a panel, finding in favor of Wausau, directed Nutmeg/Twin to provide documentation relating to the claim of loss— including proof of payment and a narrative on the appropriateness of a loss settlement award.
Nutmeg/Twin subsequently objected to Wausau’s petition to confirm the award on jurisdictional grounds for “non-final issues,” specifically the parties’ obligations under various remaining claims. Wausau argued that Nutmeg/Twin’s objections were moot as the parties’ obligations had been performed. The court, however, did not need to resolve this question as Nutmeg/Twin withdrew their arbitration award objections as part of a settlement arrangement. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Nutmeg Insurance Company, Case No. 14-CV-9284 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2015).
This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the district court’s vacatur ruling and remanded the matter for entry of an order confirming an arbitration award. While the First Circuit found that several of the arbitration panel’s holdings may have been erroneous, the court held that “even serious error” by arbitrators will not invalidate an award and, further, “any error by the panel . . . does not rise to the level necessary to justify vacatur.” Plaintiff Robert Fenyk filed a complaint in Vermont state court alleging Raymond James Financial Services (RJFS) fired him because of his sexual orientation and his status as a recovering alcoholic in violation of Vermont employment laws. RJFS countered that Fenyk should not be afforded the protections of Vermont employment law because Fenyk was not an employee. RJFS also moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a previously signed agreement between the parties. Fenyk dismissed the suit and submitted his claims to arbitration.
In arbitration, Fenyk sought to amend his proceeding to bring additional claims under federal, New York, and Florida law. The arbitral panel denied Fenyk’s motion to amend but did award him $600,000 in back pay and $36,042.03 in attorney’s fees and costs. RJFS challenged the award in the district court, arguing that the arbitration panel had misapplied Florida law, the state where Raymond James is based. RJFS further argued that Fenyk’s claims were made beyond the one-year statute of limitations for civil rights cases, and therefore barred. The district court agreed with these positions and vacated Fenyk’s previous award, finding that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority.
A panel of three First Circuit judges unanimously reversed, remanding for the entry of an order confirming the arbitration award. The Court held that although there was uncertainty as to whether the arbitrators had correctly applied applicable law, even “serious error” of law is not a basis for invalidating an arbitration award, and the uncertainty did not establish that they had exceeded their authority under the arbitration provision. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1252).
This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.
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Organizational Strategies Inc. (OSI) had entered into an agreement with Capstone Associated Services Ltd. for the latter to form three captive insurance companies for OSI. Included in the contract was an arbitration clause that required any disputes to be resolved under American Arbitration Association rules. PoolRe (a third-party insurer), and the three captive insurers separately entered into contracts that included different arbitration provisions requiring application of International Chamber of Commerce rules. Ultimately, all of the agreements were cancelled, and Capstone demanded arbitration for breach of contract against OSI under AAA rules. When PoolRe sought to compel a separate arbitration and was unable to appoint an Anguilla-based arbitrator through the mechanism envisioned under its contracts, PoolRe intervened in the OSI arbitration for the “limited purpose of having [the arbitrator] appoint an Anguilla-based arbitrator.” Instead of appointing an Anguilla arbitrator, however, the OSI arbitrator applied AAA rules and exercised jurisdiction over PoolRe’s claims, finding that PoolRe had waived its right to arbitration in Anguilla by intervening. An award later issued, finding that OSI had breached its contracts with Capstone, PoolRe, and a law firm involved with the captive insurance program. The arbitrator granted Capstone, PoolRe and the firm more than $450,000 in attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs.
OSI moved to vacate the entire award in Texas federal court on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by including PoolRe in the arbitration; the arbitrator was not authorized under the contracts to appoint himself as the arbitrator of PoolRe’s claims nor to apply AAA rules instead of ICC rules. The court agreed and vacated the entire award, reasoning that PoolRe’s intervention had “tainted the entire process.” The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that because the arbitrator “acted contrary to the express arbitrator- and forum-selection clauses in the arbitration agreements to which PoolRe was a party” the district court’s holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority would be affirmed. The Fifth Circuit further explained that a district court does not err “by failing to vacate in part, particularly where the arbitrator awarded a lump sum ‘to be divided among the parties as they see fit.’” PoolRe Insurance Corp. v. Organizational Strategies Inc., No. 14-20433 (5th Cir. April 7, 2015).
This post written by Michael Wolgin.
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