• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar

Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

  • About
    • Events
  • Articles
    • Treaty Tips
    • Special Focus
    • Market
  • Contact
  • Exclusive Content
    • Blog Staff Picks
    • Cat Risks
    • Regulatory Modernization
    • Webinars
  • Subscribe
You are here: Home / Archives for Arbitration / Court Decisions / Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

Arbitrator’s Decision Not Based On Manifest Disregard Of The Law, But Challenge To That Decision Was Not So Meritless As To Warrant Sanctions

April 24, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

Jonathan Kessler brought a claim in arbitration against his former employer, Kent Building Services, after he was fired from his job as Kent’s president, asserting that he had not been fired for cause and was thus owed severance. The arbitrator determined that Kent breached Kessler’s contract by firing him without cause, a decision the arbitrator found was arbitrary and irrational and thus a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and thus awarded him six month’s severance pay.

Kent challenged this award in federal court, arguing that the arbitrator’s decision on good faith and fair dealing demonstrated a manifest disregard of New York contract law. Kent based this argument on a New York trial court decision holding that termination of employment only breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if it results from a “constitutionally impermissible purpose or [violates] statutory or decisional law,” something not shown during the arbitration. The court rejected this argument, finding that other case law makes it clear that unconstitutionality or illegality are “sufficient but not necessary” to support a claim based on the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Further, the court found that the arbitrator applied the correct law in finding that Kent had discretion regarding whether to fire Kessler and that the irrational exercise of this discretion could support a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court therefore found that the arbitrator had not acted in manifest disregard of the law.

However, the court rejected Kessler’s motion for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for filing a meritless petition to vacate. While the court disagreed with Kent’s argument regarding the requirements of good faith and fair dealing claims under New York law, it found that making argument was not unreasonable. Kessler had also argued that Kent had acted in bad faith when it included in its petition allegations of numerous failures by Kessler in his job performance while failing to mention that the arbitrator had specifically found that these failures were not the basis for Kent’s decision to fire Kessler. The court found that this should be interpreted as simply an attempt by Kent “to provide greater context for the parties’ employment dispute,” rather than a bad faith attempt to mislead the court. Finding no frivolous argument and no bad faith, the court declined to award sanctions.

Kent Building Services, LLC v. Kessler, 17-CV-3509 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Week's Best Posts

Court Vacates Arbitration Award In Crop Insurance Dispute That Awarded Remedies Preempted By Federal Law

April 19, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

The plaintiff, a farming company, demanded arbitration against Diversified Crop Insurance Services over the nonpayment of federally reinsured claims. The plaintiff brought several claims under policies it had purchased from Diversified, to which Diversified denied coverage, due to a misstatement of the farm’s location and a separate clerical omission as to the number of acres covered, both of which were allegedly errors committed by Diversified’s agent. The arbitrator found for the plaintiff and trebled damages against Diversified.

When the plaintiff moved to confirm the award, the court considered whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority by basing her decision on extra-contractual state law remedies, which are preempted by federal law associated with Diversified’s reinsurance coverage from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. The court found that the arbitrator did exceed her authority by finding that “the farm was uninsured, and therefore not covered by the policy, yet award[ing] damages in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud because she attributed the lack of coverage to Diversified and its agents.” The court found further evidence of the arbitrator’s exceeding the scope of her authority in the fact that she trebled the awards under North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. As such, the court vacated the award. Williamson Farm v. Diversified Crop Insurance Services, Case No. 5:17-CV-513-D (USDC E.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

NEW YORK DISTRICT COURT CONFIRMS FOREIGN ARBITRATION AWARD, REASONING THAT COURTS WITH SECONDARY JURISDICTION MAY NOT REFUSE TO CONFIRM AN AWARD DUE TO AMBIGUITY

March 28, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

Pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (the “Convention”), Petitioner, a German corporation, sought an order confirming a final arbitration award of a money judgment against Respondent, a Turkish national, issued by a Swiss tribunal. In opposition to Petitioner’s motion to confirm the final award, Respondent argued, among other things, that the final award was so ambiguous as to be unenforceable.

The District Court, however, was not persuaded by that argument. Specifically, the Court held, “[w]hatever ambiguity existed by looking solely to the award section of the Final Award, it is resolvable by the record and the Arbitral Tribunal’s thorough Final Award opinion; it is clear what the Arbitral Tribunal decided.” More significant was the Court’s holding on ambiguity as grounds for refusal to confirm the award generally. In this regard, the Court held that “[w]hen sitting in secondary jurisdiction, as the Second Circuit has recently reminded district courts, the parameters within which a district court may refuse enforcement are rigidly circumscribed: ‘[T]he [New York] Convention is equally clear that when an action for enforcement is brought in a foreign state, the state may refuse to enforce the award only on the grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of the [New York] Convention.’” Therefore, because ambiguity is not a ground “explicitly set forth” in Article V, the Court determined that it is not a ground for consideration when determining whether or not to confirm a foreign award. BSH Hausgeräte GMBH v. Jak Kamhi, Case No. 17-5776, (USDC S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

FOURTH CIRCUIT INSTRUCTS DISTRICT COURT TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD THAT WAS NOT MUTUAL, FINAL, AND DEFINITE

March 26, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s order granting Norfolk Southern Railway Company’s motion to confirm an arbitration award determining the amount Sprint must pay to Norfolk Southern for continued use of railroad rights. Under the parties’ contract, because the parties’ respective appraisers disagreed as to the proper amount, a third appraiser was instructed to arrive at a compromise with one (or both) of the other appraisers. Ultimately, the third appraiser agreed with the amount set forth by Norfolk Southern’s appraiser, but conditioned his assent to the award subject to two conditions- (1) that Norfolk Southern had marketable title and (2) that the value used by Norfolk Southern’s appraiser was reasonable. The third appraiser also reserved the right to withdraw his assent if his assumptions proved to be incorrect. The AAA panel found that this decision constituted a final and binding arbitration award, which upon Norfolk Southern’s motion, the district court confirmed.

Sprint appealed the district court’s confirmation of the award, and despite the deferential standard of review accorded to arbitration awards, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court did err in determining that the third appraiser’s decision was a “final” award. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit found significant that the third appraiser “made clear that he might withdraw his assent — thus dissolving the compromise and the arbitration award itself — at some point in the future.” Moreover, the Court noted that the third appraiser “did not merely base his assent on certain assumptions, but rather reserved the right to withdraw his assent [even] if his assumptions proved to be incorrect… [and therefore, could not] be squared with any conception of ‘finality.’” As such, the Fourth Circuit instructed the district court to vacate the award. Norfolk So. Railway Co. v. Sprint Comm’s Co. L.P., Case No. 16-2017 (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Week's Best Posts

D.C. CIRCUIT COURT RULES ON CURRENCY CONVERSION ISSUE IN ARBITRAL AWARD

March 22, 2018 by John Pitblado

Following a Greek arbitration, Petitioner sought to confirm an arbitration award and enter judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The arbitral award was issued on July 2, 2013 for €39,818,298 in damages and $162,500 in costs. Apply Rule 59(e), the District Court converted the entire award (plus interest) into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate in effect on July 2, 2013 – the date of the arbitral award – making the total judgment $62,731,104.80. Since the euro had declined over the course of the litigation, the judgment increased its value by approximately $11.9 million.

On Appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court found the District Court had erred in two ways: (1) it incorrectly concluded that Rule 59(e) precedent did not apply to Petitioner because it was not a “losing party;” and (2) it incorrectly concluded that it was “manifestly unjust to award [Petitioner] judgment in euros even though [Petitioner] had expressly sought relief in euros at least three times and had not asked for dollars until its post-judgment motion.”

The Circuit Court held that “under Rule 59(e), a district court may not convert a judgment to dollars if the movant contracted in euros, received its arbitral award in euros, requested euros in its complaint and filed three proposed order seeking euros, before reversing course post-judgment.” The matter was remanded with instructions to reenter judgment in accordance with the arbitral award.

Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, No. 17-7082 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2018)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Page 1
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 29
  • Page 30
  • Page 31
  • Page 32
  • Page 33
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 115
  • Go to Next Page »

Primary Sidebar

Carlton Fields Logo

A blog focused on reinsurance and arbitration law and practice by the attorneys of Carlton Fields.

Focused Topics

Hot Topics

Read the results of Artemis’ latest survey of reinsurance market professionals concerning the state of the market and their intentions for 2019.

Recent Updates

Market (1/27/2019)
Articles (1/2/2019)

See our advanced search tips.

Subscribe

If you would like to receive updates to Reinsurance Focus® by email, visit our Subscription page.
© 2008–2025 Carlton Fields, P.A. · Carlton Fields practices law in California as Carlton Fields, LLP · Disclaimers and Conditions of Use

Reinsurance Focus® is a registered service mark of Carlton Fields. All Rights Reserved.

Please send comments and questions to the Reinsurance Focus Administrators

Carlton Fields publications should not be construed as legal advice on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended for general information and educational purposes only, and should not be relied on as if it were advice about a particular fact situation. The distribution of this publication is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship with Carlton Fields. This publication may not be quoted or referred to in any other publication or proceeding without the prior written consent of the firm, to be given or withheld at our discretion. To request reprint permission for any of our publications, please contact us. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the firm. This site may contain hypertext links to information created and maintained by other entities. Carlton Fields does not control or guarantee the accuracy or completeness of this outside information, nor is the inclusion of a link to be intended as an endorsement of those outside sites. This site may be considered attorney advertising in some jurisdictions.